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ABSTRACT
This dissertation analyzes three participatory technology assessment (pTA)
projects conducted within United States federal agencies between 2014 and 2018. The
field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) argues that a lack of public participation
in addressing issues of science and technology in society has produced undemocratic
processes of decision-making with outcomes insensitive to the daily lives of the public.
There has been little work in STS, however, examining what the political pressures and
administrative challenges are to improving public participation in U.S. agency decisionmaking processes. Following a three-essay format, this dissertation aims to fill this gap.
Drawing on qualitative interviews with key personnel, and bringing STS, policy studies,
and public administration scholarship into conversation, this dissertation argues for the
significance of “policy entrepreneurs” who from within U.S. agencies advocate for pTA
and navigate the political controls on innovative forms of participation. The first essay
explores how the political culture and administrative structures of the American federal
bureaucracy shape the bureaucratic contexts of public participation in science and
technology decision-making. The second essay is an in-depth case study of the role
political controls and policy entrepreneurs played in adopting, designing, and
implementing pTA in NASA’s Asteroid Initiative. The third essay is a comparative
analysis of how eight political and administrative conditions informed pTA design and
implementation for NASA’s Asteroid Initiative, DOE’s consent-based nuclear waste
siting program, and NOAA’s Environmental Literacy Program. The results of this
vi

dissertation highlight how important the political and administrative contexts of federal
government programs are to understanding how pTA is designed and implemented in
agency science and technology decision-making processes, and the key role agency
policy entrepreneurs play in facilitating pTA through these political and administrative
contexts. This research can aid STS scholars and practitioners better anticipate and
mitigate the barriers to embedding innovative forms of public participation in U.S.
federal government science and technology program design and decision-making
processes.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Background
I came to the Public Policy and Administration program at Boise State University
with a background in political and environmental philosophy. After years of developing
the humanist’s tools for examining how political power shapes disparate experiences of
justice and injustice, I grew apprehensively aware that I lacked the tools to examine
empirically how the structures of democratic government, and the people within them,
exercise this power. Completing coursework in the program left me with a keen interest
in the philosophy and ethics of public administration and its relationship to public trust in
democratic processes and institutions. In this light, it was inevitable that when writing a
dissertation at the intersection of Science and Technology Studies (STS), public policy,
and public administration, I would end up examining how the political and administrative
contexts of the American federal bureaucracy shape opportunities for innovative public
participation in science and technology program decision-making.
In the Spring of 2019, I was fortunate to be selected to work as senior personnel
through a graduate assistantship on a National Science Foundation research grant. The
project aimed to examine if designing and implementing participatory technology
assessment (pTA) exercises at three U.S. federal agencies lead to a shift in perceptions of
what the public can contribute to science and technology decision-making. Organized by
the Expert and Citizen Assessment of Science and Technology (ECAST) network, these
pTA exercises were embedded within agency science and technology programs and, thus,
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within the political and administrative structures of the American federal bureaucracy. As
my advisor and I conducted interviews for the project, we noticed a theme emerging in
the observations agency personnel and ECAST members shared with us about the
agencies’ cultures concerning the role of the public in technical decision-making. A lot of
what we were hearing had to do with how these cultures were heavily informed by the
political pressures and administrative challenges agencies and personnel face when trying
to do something innovative within bureaucratic constraints. We anticipated some
elements of this but were surprised by the themes that were emerging regarding the role
public participation plays in unsettling the political and administrative relationships
between government institutions.
What no one accounted for, however, was that amid doing the research we found
ourselves in a global pandemic that would test, and reveal, the fabric of the relationship
between public trust, democratic government, and science. While I was already interested
in what we were hearing and what it may mean for STS participatory theory and practice,
the COVID-19 pandemic brought into focus my broader and personal interest in the
details of what innovative forms of public participation in government decision-making
means to democracy and society. Writing a dissertation at the intersection of STS, public
policy, and public administration during a global pandemic underscored not only what
happens when an already fractured relationship of trust between the public and
institutions of democratic government is stressed by the realities of scientific facts, but
also what is at stake in not addressing the fractures.
As a field that has for decades examined the social and political relationship
between science, technology, and society, there were some within STS that saw the
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COVID-19 pandemic as a potential model case of how scientific expertise, the public,
and government could work together to address a complex, life-threatening issue. For
example, Daniel Sarewitz (2020) wrote that the process of addressing the COVID-19
pandemic in the United States could offer “a powerful and extremely clear lesson about
the appropriate role of science in helping guide us towards a better future.” According to
Sarewitz, the science was good enough to justify government public health policies that
would be acceptable enough to the majority of American politicians and to the American
public to realign political values towards the agreeable enough goal of preserving life.
The hope was that as more scientific information became available, preexisting partisan
conflicts would yield to a common goal. Indeed, at the time of this writing in the summer
of 2021, the Biden administration is reporting that 52% of Americans have at least one
shot of the COVID-19 vaccine (US CDC, 2021a), and infection and hospitalization rates
are decreasing overall (US CDC, 2021b).
By early summer of 2020, however, when COVID-19 began to show how
devastating it would be to lives the world over, a litany of partisan debates and public
protests began to rise around the science regarding the virus (e.g., infectiousness,
severity, vaccines) (e.g., COVID vaccine, 2020; Holden, 2020), and the public health
policies enacted to mitigate its impacts (e.g., lockdowns, mask mandates, limit or suspend
public gatherings) (e.g., Aratani, 2020; Beckett, 2020). This cut short the optimism that
expert-informed policies could help temper underlying political tensions enough to move
towards a common cause. Moreover, at the time of this writing over a year into the
pandemic, no number of empirical public health or medical facts helped reconcile the
preexisting conflicts between political values in which the COVID-19 pandemic has
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taken place. In fact, scientific facts seem to have reinforced the political positions at the
base of the conflicts (e.g., ‘Here fire, you hungry?’, 2021; Pengelly, 2021; Wilson, 2021).
The degree to which the response to the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States
has been divisively partisan despite the volumes of scientific facts at our disposal is a
testament to how expertise and technical information is not sufficient for addressing
issues of science and technology in society (e.g., Callon et al., 2009; McNeil, 2013;
Sturgis & Allum, 2004). It is a stark reminder of Brian Wynne’s (1992) critical insights
that scientific facts are in and of themselves not vehicles of credibility or trust, and that
credibility and trust in government decisions on matters of science and technology are
subject to the underlying relationship between the public and government. Moreover, the
condition of that relationship is shaped by the histories and structures of political power
that have been formed by how the public participates in the various processes of
government decision-making (Arnstein, 1969). In short, the virus did not cause
irreconcilable political conflicts, nor did it cause the crises of public trust in democratic
government. It did act, however, as a vehicle for stressing the preexisting “democratic
deficits” between the public and government shaped by a lack of public participation in
decision-making processes throughout government (Durant, 1995).
The example of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States illustrates what is at
stake in the relationship between participation, democracy, and the public. Public
administration scholarship has long examined how a lack of public participation in
different forms of government administration impacts the trust in and effectiveness of
democratic institutions (Arnstein, 1969; Durant, 1995; Fung, 2015; Nabatchi, 2010;
Ruscio, 1996; Wattenberg, 2002). When it comes to matters of science and technology in
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society, STS has also examined how a lack of public participation in addressing these
issues has produced undemocratic processes of decision-making. These processes and
their outcomes are insensitive to the daily lives of the public and reinforce social and
political disparities (Callon et al., 2009; Feenberg, 2012; Foltz, 1999; Jasanoff, 2005;
Sclove, 1995; Stilgoe et al., 2014; Wynne, 1992). One of the many theoretical tensions
and practical challenges STS encounters in advocating greater and more open
participation as an intervention to these undemocratic processes and outcomes, however,
is the “policy pathway” problem of getting the results of the field’s independently
organized participatory exercises to inform formal government decision-making
processes (Delborne et al., 2013; Delgado et al., 2011). Additionally, STS participatory
theory and practice struggles with the bureaucratic barriers that frustrate attempts to
embed innovative forms of public participation in government science and technology
programs and decision-making (Depoe et al., 2004; Hamilton, 2003; Hendry et al., 2004).
Against this backdrop, I write a dissertation that brings concepts from public
administration scholarship, policy studies, and STS into conversation to reframe how
STS engages with the political and administrative conditions that shape barriers to and
opportunities for innovative public participation in U.S. federal science and technology
decision-making. Doing so may better equip public participation scholars and
practitioners to grapple with and address the bureaucratic barriers that resist innovative
forms of public participation in government science and technology programs and
decision-making. The dissertation follows a three-essay format. First, Chapter 2 provides
conceptual analysis that develops the theoretical framework for the latter two mostly
empirical essays. Next, Chapter 3 is an in-depth case study of one of these agency
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projects, using Multiple Streams Approach (Kingdon, 1984, 2011) to deepen our
understanding of how policy entrepreneurs function at the administrative level. Finally,
Chapter 4 reports on the results of a comparative study of pTA exercises in three federal
agencies – the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Department
of Energy (DOE), and the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA). This work highlights eight factors that may either enable or constrain
innovative public participation in the federal bureaucracy.
Overview of Cases and Research Methodology & Methods
Between 2014 and 2018, the Expert and Citizen Assessment of Science and
Technology (ECAST) network of academic, policy research, citizen science, and
informal science education institutions worked with these agencies to organize, design,
and implement pTA exercises. In 2014, ECAST and NASA designed and implemented
pTA exercises for the agency’s Asteroid Initiative for planetary defense and missions to
Mars (Tomblin et al., 2015). In 2016, ECAST and DOE began designing pTA
deliberations for the agency’s consent-based siting program for nuclear waste. The
forums were slated to convene in early 2017. Following the 2016 presidential election,
however, in anticipation of policy changes by the new administration, DOE suspended
the consent-based siting program and cancelled the pTA project before it could be
implemented. Lastly, through a 2018 NOAA Office of Education Environmental Literacy
Program grant providing funding and agency support, ECAST designed and implemented
several pTA forums around the U.S. on local climate resilience planning.
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Under the auspices of a National Science Foundation research grant 1 investigating
how designing and implementing pTA exercises embedded within these three agencies
impacted their technocratic cultures of expertise, my advisor, Dr. Jen Schneider, and I
conducted thirty-two (32) semi-structured interviews with twenty-five (25) participants
between June 2019 and October 2020. Interviews were conducted with ECAST members
and NASA, DOE, and NOAA personnel who were directly involved with designing and
implementing pTA exercises, or who had knowledge of agency culture during the time of
the exercises. I conducted qualitative analysis of public documents, mostly used to
establish the background details of each case, and of 1670 minutes (or about 28 hours) of
interview data. The complete details to the second and third essays’ research
methodology and methods can be found in their respective chapters.
These essays will identify and analyze the bureaucratic contexts that informed the
processes of adopting, designing, and implementing pTA in U.S. federal agency program
design and decision-making. While there is a substantial literature in STS that theorizes
the importance of public participation in government science and technology decisionmaking, this dissertation will contribute to our understanding of the political cultures and
administrative structures that inform the limits on and capacities for innovative public
participation in federal government agencies. By bringing STS into conversation with
public administration and policy studies scholarship, this work will help fill gaps in our
understanding of how historical, political, and administrative contexts constrain and

Award no. 1827574 – “Participatory Technology Assessment and Cultures of Expertise in the U.S.
Federal Government.”
1
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enable public participation in government science and technology decision-making, and
which conditions are most likely to lead to successful engagements with pTA exercises.
Table 1.1

Summary of Interviews Conducted for Dissertation

Total Number of
Interviewees

Total Number of
Interviews

Total Number of
Minutes/Hours

25

32

1670 min / ~28 hrs

NASA

DOE

NOAA

Number of
Interviews

12

11

9

ECAST

7

4

6

Contractor

0

3

0

Agency Personnel

5

1*

2

Former Personnel

0

2

0

*Conducted with NASA personnel familiar w/ DOE’s administrative situation.
Overview of Content
My dissertation engages with three questions concerning how STS participatory
theory and practice engages with the political and administrative contexts of the
American federal bureaucracy when it comes to embedding innovative forms of public
participation in government science and technology program design and decisionmaking. The opening essay (Chapter 2) sets the theoretical stage for the second two
essays by answering a call by Jason Chilvers and Matthew Kearnes (2020) for us in STS
to remake our approach to the relationship between participation, democracy, and the
public. They argue that a preoccupation with designing methods for participation
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measured against ideal models of deliberative democracy has hampered the field’s
capacity to contribute to enhancing public trust, averting crises of expertise and
democracy, and building more socially responsive and responsible science and
innovation (Chilvers and Kearnes, 2020, p. 347). This is due in large part to a gap in our
knowledge of how “the constituent elements of participation emerge and are coproduced
through” the diverse social, political, and government contexts in which participation can
take place (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2020, p. 354).
One of their suggested research agendas for remaking participation in science and
democracy is to “ecologize” STS participatory theory and practice by attending to
participation’s relational interdependence with larger social and political systems. I
examine how a detailed understanding of the wider political culture and administrative
structures of American federal government can do this “ecologizing” work. This may
help us better understand the bureaucratic barriers to innovative forms of public
participation in government science and technology decision-making. I argue that we in
STS can look to the well-established public administration theory of “political control.”
The theory of political control can form the basis for examining how the political
pressures and administrative challenges federal agencies and personnel face shape the
processes of designing and implementing novel methods of public participation in
government science and technology program design and decision-making (Lipsky, 2010;
Meier & O’Toole Jr, 2006; Rohr, 1986). The first essay engages with the question “What
can public administration’s theory of ‘political control’ contribute to how STS
participatory theory and practice engages with the political and administrative contexts
of public participation in U.S. federal government decision-making?” Answering this can
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help us in STS come to better terms with how the challenges we face with bureaucrats’
resistance to novel public participation are core features of American federal
bureaucracy.
The first essay develops a framework of three maxims based in public
administration’s theory of political control. These maxims speak to how designing and
implementing innovative forms of public participation in U.S. federal agencies will
invariably face political pressures and administrative challenges:
1. Political pressures on and administrative challenges to innovative public
participation in program design and decision-making are inherent to the federal
bureaucracy because of political controls on agency discretion.
2. These political pressures and administrative challenges will shape the processes of
adopting, designing, and implementing innovative forms of participation; the
extent of this shaping is widely variable.
3. Pressures and challenges that come with innovative forms of participation can
often be managed or mitigated by agency personnel with bureaucratic expertise.
The third maxim is the ameliorative component of the framework, and is a vehicle for
examining how agency personnel can soften how these political pressures and
administrative challenges shape pTA with their bureaucratic expertise. The second and
third essays use this framework to inform elements of in-depth case study of pTA in
NASA’s Asteroid Initiative and a comparative analysis of the three cases of pTA in
NASA, DOE, and NOAA, respectively. In them, I expand on the second maxim and
underline the importance of the expert bureaucratic work of agency personnel in line with
the third.
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Essay Two (Chapter 3) engages with the question of “how did NASA ‘policy
entrepreneurs’ navigate the ‘multiple streams’ of the program implementation process to
facilitate participatory technology assessment (pTA) exercises be a part of the Asteroid
Initiative’s program design and decision-making process?” For the in-depth case study of
pTA in NASA’s Asteroid Initiative, I use John Kingdon’s “Multiple Streams Approach”
(MSA) (1984, 2011) for examining the political processes that explain how government
policies and programs change but to the programmatic level. Kingdon describes the
policy process as composed of three separate yet interdependent “streams” – the problem,
policy, and politics streams. Each contains a different set of factors that can align to
create opportunities for policy change.
A central element of MSA is identifying “policy entrepreneurs,” individuals who
use their institutional knowledge and bureaucratic expertise to bring the streams together
to create opportunities for policy changes and innovations (Anderson et al., 2019;
Cairney, 2018; Kingdon, 2011; Mintrom & Norman, 2009). In line with the second
maxim, I use MSA’s streams to organize and examine the political and administrative
factors surrounding the adoption, design, and implementation of pTA in NASA’s
Asteroid Initiative. In line with the third maxim, I highlight the crucial role played by
NASA policy entrepreneurs to facilitate adopting, designing, and implementing pTA in
ways ECAST members could not on their own, due in large part to their bureaucratic
expertise in navigating political pressures and administrative challenges.
While this case study reveals the details of how political and administrative
contexts shaped the processes of designing and implementing pTA embedded within a
U.S. federal agency, it does not afford a broad perspective on how political controls
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inform these processes across different contexts. Essay Three engages with the
comparative question of “what were the political and administrative conditions that
shaped how participatory technology assessment (pTA) exercises were implemented in
NASA’s Asteroid Initiative, DOE’s consent-based siting program, and NOAA’s
Environmental Literacy Program?” I use a “very small-N” Qualitative Comparative
Analysis (QCA) approach (Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009; Marx et al., 2014; Ragin, 1987,
2014) to compare the conditions informing these three cases of pTA design and
implementation in federal agency programs. The goal of the QCA approach is to explain
how within sets of similar cases an outcome occurred in some while in others it did not.
This is done by identifying conditions and analyzing the relationships between them in
and across cases.
I identified eight political and administrative conditions that shaped the processes
of designing and implementing pTA across NASA’s Asteroid Initiative, DOE’s consentbased siting program, and in NOAA’s Environmental Literacy Program. Through an
analysis of the relationships between conditions in each case, I explain how each of these
three cases of designing and implementing pTA occurred the way it did. These eight
conditions are general enough to apply to other cases where innovative forms of public
participation were embedded in U.S. federal science agency decision-making, but also
specific enough to identify the individual political pressures and administrative
challenges that can inform the design and implementation processes. Moreover, I argue
that two conditions – Political Priority and Policy Entrepreneurs – contribute the most to
informing how innovative forms of public participation are designed and implemented.
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Table 1.2

Summary of Identified Political and Administrative Conditions
Condition

Description

Decision Support

pTA results informed decision-making

Cooperative Agreement

The contract between agency and ECAST
was a cooperative agreement

Administrative Rules

Administrative rule requirements impacted
pTA design

“Top Cover”

Agency managers supported pTA

Controversy

The degree of controversy surrounding the
program pTA was embedded in

Agency Culture

The degree to which the agency’s
organizational culture was open to pTA

Political Priority

The Presidential Administration prioritized
greater public participation

Policy Entrepreneurs

Agency personnel actively facilitated
designing and implementing pTA

Conclusion
There is a trend in STS participatory theory and practice of being mainly
preoccupied with designing and evaluating participation against ideal measures of
deliberative democracy. It has left us with a gap in our knowledge and understanding
concerning the bureaucratic details that frustrate efforts to embed innovative forms of
public participation in American federal government science and technology decisionmaking. A more attuned reading of these bureaucratic contexts – the political pressures
and administrative challenges that agencies face when attempting to innovate on public
participation – may help us in STS better anticipate the challenges to and opportunities
for embedding innovations in participation. It may also help us be more sensitive to how
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these political pressures and administrative challenges can be addressed with the
bureaucratic expertise of policy entrepreneurs within government agencies.
This dissertation contributes to filling these gaps in our STS participatory theory
and practice by bringing to bear concepts from public administration scholarship on the
political control of the bureaucracy and empirical evidence on how we understand
bureaucrats’ resistance to more open and deliberative forms of public participation in
U.S. federal government science and technology decision-making. This different reading
of bureaucratic barriers in Essay One can help us in STS engage with the “bureaucracy
problem” in the same way we engage with the “problem of expertise”: not a problem to
be solved or erased, but a tension to be tempered; not an aberration to democracy, but a
core feature of American democratic government.
The empirical analyses in Essay Two and Three expand on the details of how
political and administrative conditions shaped the design and implementation of an
innovative form of public participation and underscore just how crucial policy
entrepreneurs within government are to navigating these political pressures and
administrative challenges. The bureaucratic expertise of federal government agency
personnel, in some cases, can actually enable greater public participation in science and
technology decision-making. Filling these gaps in STS participatory theory and practice
with this kind of knowledge and understanding may help us develop a greater sensitivity
to the inexorable relationship between building public trust in government by innovating
on methods of public participation and our capacity to address issues of science and
technology in democratic society.
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CHAPTER TWO (ESSAY ONE): THE RULES OF PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT: HOW
POLITICAL CONTROLS IMPACT PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN AMERICAN
FEDERAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DECISION-MAKING
Introduction and Background
Jason Chilvers and Matthew Kearnes (2020) have recently called for us in the
field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) to remake our approach to the
relationship between participation, democracy, and the public. STS has long examined
how a lack of public participation in addressing issues of science and technology in
society has produced undemocratic processes of decision-making. These processes and
their outcomes are not only insensitive to the daily lives of the public but also reinforce
social and political disparities (e.g., Callon et al., 2009; Feenberg, 2012; Foltz, 1999;
Jasanoff, 2005; Sclove, 1995; Stilgoe et al., 2014; Wynne, 1992). Chilvers and Kearnes
(2020) applaud the significant advances made in our methods for designing and
evaluating more open and deliberative forms of public participation in science and
technology (e.g., J. Burgess & Chilvers, 2006; e.g., Delborne et al., 2013; Delgado et al.,
2011; Fiorino, 1990; Guston, 1999; Irwin et al., 2013; Kleinman et al., 2007, 2011;
Powell & Colin, 2008; Powell & Kleinman, 2008; Rowe & Frewer, 2000, 2005; Stirling,
2008). They suggest, however, that “despite notable success, such developments have
often struggled to enhance public trust, avert crises of expertise and democracy, and build
more socially responsive and responsible science and innovation” (Chilvers and Kearnes,
2020, p. 347).
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They argue that the predominant reason for this is that a “residual realist”
approach dominates STS participatory theory and practice. This “residual realist”
approach theorizes participation, democracy, and the public as predefined elements that
exist independently of one another and independent of the sociopolitical contexts that
produce conflict. Under this approach, participation design and evaluation, heavily
informed by normative (and ideal) theories of deliberative democracy (e.g., Dryzek,
2000, 2012; Habermas, 1984; Mouffe, 2000, 2005), becomes deeply focused on
achieving predetermined procedural standards of success (Fiorino, 1990; Rowe &
Frewer, 2000, 2005; Stirling, 2008). Participatory theory and practice on issues of science
and technology is disconnected from the wider social and political contexts in which
public participation takes place. In short, a focus on “high church” issues has produced a
participatory theory and practice that struggles with “low church” realities (Sismondo,
2008).
For example, STS literature on designing and implementing participation mostly
focuses on specific events organized independent of but parallel to government
policymaking on science and technology (e.g., Guston, 1999; Kleinman et al., 2007,
2011). Chilvers and Kearnes (2020) would argue that this focus is a product of a linear
understanding of the relationship between participation and outcomes. This approach is
preoccupied with achieving ideal participation designs that predominantly focus on
tempering the tensions concerning expertise (e.g., Collins & Evans, 2002; Gorman, 2002;
Jasanoff, 2003a; Nowotny, 2003; Wynne, 2003) and work towards refining ideal methods
of deliberative democracy. Little attention is paid to the broader contexts and details that
inform how the results of these independent participation events are made a part of
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decision-making within democratic institutions. This is evidenced by how the results of
these independently organized deliberations often face political and administrative
barriers, or “policy pathway” problems, to informing the government policymaking
processes they run parallel to and are meant to impact (e.g., Delborne et al., 2013).
While the “policy pathway” problem is just one of many theoretical tensions and
practical challenges the field faces (see Delgado et al., 2011), grappling with it is central
to creating greater opportunities for more democratic public participation in government
science and technology decision-making. Developing our knowledge and understanding
of these contexts is key to the interventionist-oriented STS project of redistributing
democratic political power through greater public participation (Arnstein, 1969; Carroll,
1971; Nelkin, 1977, 1979). The “residual realist” approach, however, has stifled our
understanding of how political cultures and administrative structures impact the processes
of designing and implementing more open and democratic public participation in
government science and technology decision-making.
Chilvers and Kearnes (2020) suggest that we develop a relational, coproductionist
approach to counteract the “residual realist” trend in STS participatory theory and
practice. A relational coproductionist approach is grounded in how the “subjects, objects,
and formats that make up the constituent elements of participation emerge and are
coproduced through” the diverse social, political, and government contexts in which
participation takes place (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2020, p. 354). It focuses on the details of
how the relationships between participation, democracy, the public are made and remade
as “scientific, democratic, and political orders” change (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2020, p.
350; Marres, 2015; Marres & Lezaun, 2011). By developing our knowledge and

23
understanding of the political and institutional details that shape participation, STS
participatory theory and practice may better contribute to intervening on the
undemocratic processes and disparate outcomes that have dominated science and
technology decision-making.
Chilvers and Kearnes (2020) offer four interrelated research agendas for further
developing a relational coproductionist approach. One of these agendas includes the
recommendation to “ecologize” STS participatory theory and practice by “recognizing,
attending to, and/or mapping the diversities of, and interrelations between, sociomaterial
collectives of participation and public involvement that make up wider spaces such as
systems, issues, and constitutions” (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2020, p. 358). In their article,
they focus on developing techniques for mapping the formation of issues to “enable the
identification of diverse collectives of participation and their relative positioning and
relations within wider controversy and issue spaces” (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2020, p. 359).
However, they also describe “ecologizing” as attending to participation’s relational
interdependence with larger systems. One of these larger systems is the relationship
between the public and participation in government decisions-making. According to
Chilvers and Kearnes (2020), a relational coproductionist approach attends to how
processes of participation are shaped by the “political cultures and constitutional relations
between citizens, science, and the state” (p. 354).
Following this research agenda, this essay is a first step towards beginning to
ecologize STS participatory theory and practice within the wider political culture and
administrative structures in which American government science and technology
decision-making takes place. This process involves addressing two related impacts the
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residual realist approach has had on our understanding of public participation in
government science and technology decision-making. First, a preoccupation with
designing and evaluating participation methods according to “ideal” standards has left
our participatory theory and practice ill-equipped to grapple with the messy political and
administrative contexts of public participation in government decision-making.
Consequently, this has engendered a skepticism towards the political and administrative
barriers to more open forms of public participation. This skepticism often reads resistance
to public participation as antagonism towards lay perspectives because of a technocratic
bias in decision-making. In short, because embedding more deliberative participatory
approaches in government agencies is often imperfect when measured against the
“residual realist” standard, STS has primarily occupied a place of critique rather than
intervention in those systems. This has stifled building a knowledge and understanding of
how the political and administrative aspects of public participation in government impact
participation in science and technology decision-making.
European STS researchers have already begun to develop an ecologizing literature
on how political culture informs methods and designs of public participation in the
democratic processes of government institutions (Ezrahi, 2012; Felt et al., 2008; Horst &
Irwin, 2010; Jasanoff, 2005; Laurent, 2017; Pallett, 2015; Seifert, 2006). Moreover, they
have also begun to detail how the government structures produced by those political
cultures impact the designs and outcomes of participation exercise when embedded
within government decision-making processes (Emery et al., 2015; Krabbenborg &
Mulder, 2015; Krick, 2015; Rask, 2013). For example, a large portion of this literature
focuses on the Danish Board of Technology’s consensus conference method and how it
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has served as an ideal model in STS for how to design and embed public participation
into government science and technology decision-making processes (Jensen, 2005; Joss,
1998; Joss & Durant, 1995; Klüver, 2000). Maja Horst and Alan Irwin (2010), however,
highlight that the successes of the Danish Board of Technology model in Denmark (i.e.,
government-sponsored consensus conferences with the formal purpose of informing
government decision-making) may be unique to a specific aspect of Danish political
culture and to the administrative structures of Danish government. Other approaches
should be considered from the vantage point of their own political ecologies. Context
matters.
It is against this backdrop that I focus on ecologizing STS participatory theory
and practice within the political history and administrative structures of the American
federal bureaucracy. A detailed knowledge of the bureaucratic contexts surrounding
public participation in U.S. government decision-making may help us better understand
the barriers to and opportunities for embedding more open and deliberative forms of
public participation in federal agency science and technology programs. American STS
scholars and practitioners have only recently begun to examine the contexts surrounding
more open forms of public participation embedded within United States federal agency
science and technology decision-making processes (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2017; Gustetic et
al., 2018; Kaminski, 2012; Tomblin et al., 2017). There has been limited examination,
however, of how the political culture and administrative details of the American federal
bureaucracy inform the barriers to and opportunities for embedding more deliberative
public participation in science and technology program design and decision-making.
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I suggest that the well-established public administration theory of “political
control” may aid STS participatory theory and practice in understanding the kinds of
bureaucratic tensions – political pressures and administrative challenges – federal
agencies and personnel face when designing novel methods of public participation in
government program design and decision-making (Bertelli & Lynn, 2006; Frederickson
et al., 2015; Lipsky, 2010; Meier & O’Toole Jr, 2006). Examining the political controls
on the discretion of agency personnel may shed some light on the reasons for resistance
to implementing innovative forms of public participation in federal program design and
decision-making (Bora, 2010; Long & Beierle, 1999; Shapiro, 2013, 2020). While such
resistance may stem from a technocratic mindset opposing lay perspectives to issues of
science and technology, this essay argues that there are other factors at play that should
be considered. Like with the STS debates surrounding the “problem of expertise” (e.g.,
Collins & Evans, 2002; Gorman, 2002; Jasanoff, 2003a; Nowotny, 2003; Wynne, 2003),
the theory of political control can help us come to terms with how the challenges we face
with bureaucrats’ resistance to novel public participation are not problems to be solved or
erased, but tensions to be tempered. In other words, the impacts of political control that
frustrate STS participatory theory and practice are core features of American democracy,
not aberrations. They are to be managed because they cannot be avoided.
Moreover, I propose that we can use the theory of political control as the basis of
a framework for better approaching the political and administrative barriers to innovative
public participation in government science and technology decision-making. I present
this framework as three maxims for examining how innovative forms of public
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participation are adopted, designed, and implemented in U.S. federal agency program
design and decision-making:
1. Political pressures on and administrative challenges to innovative public
participation in program design and decision-making are inherent to the federal
bureaucracy because of political controls on agency discretion.
2. These political pressures and administrative challenges will shape the processes of
adopting, designing, and implementing innovative forms of participation; the
extent of this shaping is widely variable.
3. Pressures and challenges that come with innovative forms of participation can
often be managed or mitigated by agency personnel with bureaucratic expertise.
The next section presents public administration’s theory of political control in the context
of public participation in U.S. federal program design and decision-making. After that, I
ground the utility of this analytic framework by using the first two maxims to briefly
examine what the political pressures and administrative challenges were in three cases of
designing and implementing participatory technology assessment (pTA) exercises, a
deliberative form of public participation, at three U.S. federal agencies – the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Department of Energy (DOE), and
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
The third maxim – that bureaucratic experts, or “policy entrepreneurs,” can
manage and mitigate political controls – is the subject of Essay 2 and 3 of this
dissertation, so I do not go into detail on that here. However, I conclude this essay by
discussing how this “political control” framework helps us not only ecologize STS
participatory theory within the wider political and administrative contexts of public

28
participation in the American federal bureaucracy, but may also contribute to designing
and implementing better STS participatory practices in the American federal government
context.
Theoretical Framework
Expert knowledge is often framed as creating an inherent tension in democratic
values in that it violates the principle of equal power when it comes to democratic
decision-making (e.g., Grundmann, 2017; Jasanoff, 2003b; Ottinger, 2013; Turner, 2001,
2013). STS scholars continue to debate how to best temper this tension to make science
and technology decisions that are expertly informed while also responsive to public
values (e.g., Collins & Evans, 2002; Gorman, 2002; Jasanoff, 2003a; Nowotny, 2003;
Rayner, 2003; Wynne, 2003, 2007). Efforts to temper this tension are complicated by
how partisan politics sometimes uses expertise to frustrate the process of making
empirically grounded and socially informed science and technology decisions that are in
the public’s interest (Brown, 2015; M. Burgess, 2014; Hoppe, 2005, 2009; Jasanoff,
1992; Pielke Jr, 2007; Woodhouse & Nieusma, 1997; Wynne, 1992). Greater public
participation is championed as a way of better ensuring that the public’s values and
interests are a central part of government science and technology decision-making
(Delgado et al., 2011; Foltz, 1999; Stilgoe et al., 2014).
Government agencies often close off opportunities for more deliberative public
participation in decision-making, however, by treating participation events as
instrumental pro forma engagements to meet legal requirements (Endres, 2012; Hamilton
& Wills-Toker, 2006; Hendry, 2004). Moreover, there is research that has shown that
agencies are resistant to hearing from certain publics when their input may complicate an
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existing or expeditious political narrative (Condit et al., 2012; Depoe et al., 2004; Innes &
Booher, 2004). In short, there is ample evidence to support skepticism towards
government-led public participation in science- and technology-related programs. At the
same time, one impact of “residual realism” on STS participatory theory and practice is
that “high church” commitments to normative and ideal deliberative practices often read
the barriers and resistance to greater public participation from government agencies and
personnel as antagonism to it. Such a reading is incomplete.
Ecologizing STS participatory theory and practice within the larger issues of
public participation in government decision-making prompts a deeper examination into
how the political culture and administrative structures of government inform these
barriers to more open and deliberative participation. Understanding the reasons for these
political and administrative barriers may lend STS participatory theory and practice some
insight into how to better approach designing and implementing government-embedded
participation. Three elements of public administration scholarship on political control are
pertinent to the maxims listed above. First, there is an inherent tension at the heart of
American political philosophy concerning the relationship between politics and
administration that informs American political culture and government. Second, the
political controls placed on government administration as a way of tempering this tension
impact the priorities and behaviors of federal agencies. Lastly, political controls in the
form of administrative rules on public participation often constrain government agency
discretion on how to engage with the public in program decision-making.
The field of American public administration has long examined how the
relationship between the political processes of lawmaking and the administrative
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processes of implementation shape the behaviors of elected government representatives
and unelected bureaucrats (Bertelli & Lynn, 2006; Lipsky, 2010; Meier & O’Toole Jr,
2006; Waldo, 1948). In the American context, it begins with differing political
philosophies among the framers of the U.S. Constitution concerning how to maintain
democratic accountability within government administration in the face of the separation
of legislative and executive powers. The Hamiltonian position for a strong executive with
robust administrative discretion stands in contrast to the Jeffersonian position that
democratically elected representatives should have direct oversight of and heavy controls
on the executive’s discretion to administer government (Rohr, 1986). Samuel Krislov and
David Rosenbloom (1981) articulate the apprehension concerning administrative
discretion this way: “It is not the power of public bureaucracies per se, but their
unrepresentative power, that constitutes the greatest threat to democratic government” (p.
21). This Jeffersonian apprehension towards the potential threat administrative discretion
poses to the legitimacy of democratic government permeates American political culture
and, ironically, forms the basis of some of the bureaucratic barriers to greater public
participation in government decision-making.
A consequence of the Jeffersonian position is the imposition of political controls
on the administrative discretion of the executive bureaucracy (McCubbins et al., 1987;
Wood & Waterman, 1991). The political process often produces laws that are scarce on
details and funding that government agencies and personnel are nonetheless required to
implement. This motivates an increased use of professional administrative discretion to
implement programs in resource- and option-constrained environments (Goodsell, 2014;
Lipsky, 2010). As agencies and bureaucrats find ways to implement policies and
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programs in ways deemed outside of what the political process intended, however,
elected representatives and the public lose trust in the bureaucracy’s choices (Cigler,
1990). Elected representatives check the administrative discretion of agencies by
imposing political controls in the forms of political pressures and administrative rules.
Congress and the Executive Office of the White House use the leverage of budgets and
political support as pressures on agencies, while administrative rules dictate the
procedural requirements of how to design and implement government programs
(McCubbins et al., 1987; Wood & Waterman, 1991). The result of this escalating tension
is that both elected officials and government agencies often focus more on institutional
politics and preservation than on passing effective laws and implementing programs that
are sensitive to public values and address public concerns (R. F. Durant, 1995;
Frederickson et al., 2015; Meier & O’Toole Jr, 2006; Wilson, 2019).
The most explicit form of political control on embedding innovative forms of
public participation in federal science and technology programs are administrative rules
on how agencies can engage with the public. Congressional laws like the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA) establish the minimum and mandatory requirements (i.e., public
comment periods in the Federal Register; when public hearing and meetings are required,
etc.) for public participation in matters of federal agency rule and program decisionmaking. Public input generated from these minimum requirements, however, has been
shown to be ineffective in substantially informing decision-making processes (Bryer,
2013). The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) “governs how the federal
government seeks outside advice,” and specifically, “who participates in government
decision-making, when they participate, how they participate, and what influence
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participation has on policy” (Long & Beierle, 1999). While research shows that FACA
has had some success with creating opportunities for greater public participation in
federal agency decision-making, there are “ambiguities in the law and its regulations
which limit the willingness of public agencies to engage the public outside of FACA”
rules (Long & Beierle, 1999). Additionally, the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)
stipulates the procedural requirements for how agencies can collect any type of
information from the public. Agency procedures for collecting information from the
public need the approval or exemption of the Office of Management and Budget within
the Executive Office of the White House. While meant to reduce the total amount of
paperwork burden the federal government imposes on private businesses and citizens,
some federal agencies have argued that meeting basic PRA requirements make routine
administration burdensome (Shapiro, 2013, 2020).
Taken together, the requirements of these administrative rules often create
administrative challenges for agencies wishing to engage with the public on program
decision-making in innovative ways beyond the minimum requirements mandated by the
APA and within the limits set forth by FACA and PRA. Given the administrative burdens
and potential legal consequences with administrative rules, there are few incentives for
agencies to experiment with innovative forms of public participation in program
decision-making. STS scholar Alfons Bora (2010) calls this matrix of legal limits on top
of the already rigid technocratic framework of science and technology decision-making
the “iron cage of law.” Bora (2010), like public administration scholars, highlights the
irony in this “iron cage.” Even though these rules are meant to ensure that agency
discretion does not extend beyond the control of the political will of democratically
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elected representatives, in practice they act as limits on how the public can participate in
government program decision-making. Political controls meant to maintain democratic
legitimacy and accountability of the American federal bureaucracy can in fact act as
barriers to more deliberative, and arguably more democratic, public participation.
Administrative rules can pose administrative challenges to embedding innovative
forms of public participation in program decision-making. They often disincentivize
experimenting with public participation methods beyond APA minimums because of the
administrative burdens, and potential legal consequences, of FACA and PRA
requirements. Moreover, political pressures from Congress or the Executive Office create
potential budgetary consequences or loss of political support for agencies if the processes
or results of innovative public participation stray from what Congress or the Executive
Office intended. Political controls can form barriers to embedding innovative forms of
public participation in program decision-making. Ecologizing STS participatory theory
and practice within these bureaucratic contexts does not dismiss agency resistance to
innovative forms of public participation. It can help, however, develop our knowledge
and understanding of how to examine and approach these bureaucratic barriers in our
participatory theory and practice.
Using the theory of political control as a basis for a framework for examining the
bureaucratic contexts of embedding innovative public participation in agency science and
technology program design and decision-making involves reading barriers as
consequences of political control mechanisms. The first and second maxims together
recognize that as an inherent feature of the American federal bureaucracy, there will
likely be political pressures on the agency and administrative rules for personnel that will
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challenge designing and implementing innovative forms of public participation. Given
the administrative rules on public participation, there will invariably be potential
administrative challenges. Elucidating political pressures will require examining the
political relationship between the agency, the specific program, Congress, and the
Executive Office of the President. The second maxim is a call to examine how political
controls impact the design and implementation processes. Lastly, the theory of political
control speaks not only to the limits placed on agencies and personnel, but also to how
expert bureaucratic knowledge is used by agency personnel to navigate these pressures
and challenges to implement innovative ideas. The third maxim is the ameliorative
component of the framework, and is a vehicle for examining how agency personnel can
soften the impacts of these political pressures and administrative challenges.
To illustrate how the three maxims at the heart of this chapter can help develop a
more attuned knowledge and understanding of these bureaucratic contexts, I use the first
two maxims to examine the political controls on embedding pTA into three U.S. federal
science and technology programs drawing on three real-world projects that took place
between 2014 and 2018. The next section begins with a brief introduction of these
projects, organized by the Expert and Citizen Assessment of Science and Technology
(ECAST) network, which worked with NASA, DOE, and NOAA personnel to design and
implement pTA in agency programs. After this, I highlight some examples of the political
pressures and administrative challenges that arose from using pTA as an innovative form
of public participation. These examples are drawn from semi-structured interviews
conducted with ECAST members and NASA, DOE, and NOAA personnel. This essay
does not provide a full, scientific exploration of these three cases (Essays 2 and 3 of this
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dissertation do that); rather, this essay pulls illustrative quotes from the three case studies
to better articulate how the first two maxims described above work in the American
federal bureaucracy. As such, this chapter is exploratory and theoretical in nature, but
aims to ground its theorizing in empirical examples. Essays 2 and 3 offer detailed
examinations of the three agency cases through an in-depth case study and a comparative
analysis that expands on the second maxim and underlines the expert bureaucratic work
of agency personnel in line with the third. These latter two essays provide detailed
background on the cases and fully formed research methods sections.
Examples of Political Controls on Public Participation
Between 2014 and 2018, the Expert and Citizen Assessment of Science and
Technology (ECAST) worked with three U.S. federal agencies – NASA, DOE, and
NOAA – to design and implement participatory technology assessment (pTA) exercises
as innovative forms of public participation in program design and decision-making. As a
network of academic, policy research, citizen science, and informal science education
institutions distributed across the U.S., ECAST works with local, state, and federal
government organizations to design and implement pTA forums where the public can
deliberate on science and technology issues (J. Burgess & Chilvers, 2006; J. Durant,
1999; Guston & Sarewitz, 2002; Hennen, 1999, 2012; Kaplan, Farooque, Sarewitz, &
Tomblin, 2021; Sclove, 2010a, 2010b).
In 2014, ECAST and NASA designed and implemented pTA exercises for the
agency’s Asteroid Initiative for planetary defense and missions to Mars (Tomblin et al.,
2015). In 2016, ECAST and DOE began designing pTA deliberations for the agency’s
consent-based nuclear waste siting program. The forums were slated to convene in early
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2017. Following the 2016 presidential election, however, in anticipation of changes in
policy direction by the new administration, DOE suspended the consent-based siting
program and cancelled the pTA project before it was implemented. Lastly, through a
2015 NOAA Environmental Literacy Program grant, ECAST designed and implemented
several pTA forums around the U.S. deliberating on local climate resilience strategies.
Under the auspices of a National Science Foundation grant 2 aimed at examining
how pTA exercises in U.S. science and technology agencies impact the technocratic
cultures of expertise, interviews were conducted with ECAST members and NASA,
DOE, and NOAA personnel who were involved with designing and implementing pTA
exercises. Thirty-two (32) semi-structured interviews were conducted with twenty-five
(25) participants between June 2019 and October 2020. Participants are referred to by
their organizational affiliation (i.e., ECAST, NASA, Former DOE, DOE Contractor,
NOAA) and a random number assigned to them (e.g., NASA 3). I conducted member
checks with interviewees I have quoted to assure accurate representation of their intention
and meaning in context. While conducting these interviews, participants shared examples
of how political controls on the agencies in the form of political pressures and
administrative rules impacted the processes of designing and implementing pTA.
Political Pressures
NASA’s Political Stakeholders
NASA personnel shared that, like most federal agencies, NASA is sensitive to the
political processes that impact its budget and its political support for mission direction.

Award no. 1827574 – “Participatory Technology Assessment and Cultures of Expertise in the U.S.
Federal Government.”
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NASA 1 said that “when NASA says stakeholders, they are talking about a pretty narrow
group of stakeholders. NASA is talking about the Presidential administration and the
Congress – political stakeholders.” While NASA’s democratic stakeholders are the
American public and its commercial stakeholders are its aerospace technology and
engineering contractors, the agency has two political stakeholders: the political body that
controls its budget and legislates its mandates (i.e., Congress) and, as a mission-driven
agency, the office that decides its mission objectives (i.e., the Executive office of the
White House). NASA 1, through several years of working at the agency, said that they
have noticed that NASA leadership is “apprehensive about disrupting whatever balance
and agreements [it] thinks it has with the White House and the Congress.”
An example of this “apprehension” is when agency leadership is deciding on
which projects to work on and how those projects are presented to the public and its
political stakeholders. NASA 1 described an instance when a project appeared to be
something different from what the political stakeholders had sanctioned. They
characterized the leadership’s attitude as, “We couldn't possibly put that out there
because we already knew what we were going to do, because it was already politically
blessed.” NASA personnel shared that agency leadership had similar concerns that the
results of the pTA exercises could disrupt “politically blessed” agreements with its
political stakeholders. NASA 2 said that “from a public perception standpoint, some
people might see risks associated with asking the public what they think and then does
that mean you have to do what they say.” NASA 1 added that there were concerns about
“what if the public comes in and says we think we should do something 180 degrees
different than what we've already got an agreement to do?”
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This is an example of how political pressures are institutionalized into an
agency’s culture. This contributes to shaping their attitude towards public participation in
program design and decision-making, in general, and especially innovative forms, like
pTA. NASA leadership was concerned about pTA because it could make it difficult to
maintain a clear alignment with mission and program ideas that had been “politically
blessed” by Congress and the White House. It is an “apprehension” of jeopardizing
relationships that shape budgets and political support on mission decisions.
NOAA’s Insulation
NOAA personnel shared their thoughts on why the agency tends to have a
different experience with political pressures than other agencies. NOAA 2 shared that the
agency “is buried within the Department of Commerce and we're not usually visible to
the White House or Congress on the first pass [of the budget] because they're so focused
on the economy and trade and exports.” Additionally, NOAA 2 observed that “because
we do have such an important scientific and life and safety role, they don't usually give us
a heavily political person. They usually give us somebody that's more competent.” They
went on to add that this insulates them from the impacts political pressures have on other
agencies; “EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] just get thrashed. We watch NASA
do somersaults for the politicals [i.e., political appointees]. Department of Energy just
gets whiplash on policies. And NOAA just stays under the radar and chugs along.” While
NOAA does face substantial political pressures on some of its programs, like fisheries
management, its placement within the Department of Commerce and its perception as a
research and safety agency insulates its programs from the kinds of political headwinds
other U.S. federal science agencies face.
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As the political control theory holds, political pressures on agencies to make
certain decision over others is inherent to the bureaucratic and administrative structures
of U.S. government. Moreover, these two examples underscore how political pressures,
while an institutional aspect of U.S. federal government, have varying degrees of impact
depending on the agency and program. The NASA personnel’s observations highlight
how the agency has institutionalized an apprehension towards anything that may disrupt
its “politically blessed” agreements with Congress and the White House. Reading
resistance predominantly as technocratically-motivated individuals opposing lay
perspectives on matters of science and technology is incomplete. The NOAA personnel’s
observations highlight how the organizational structure of an agency shapes the extent to
which political pressures impact personnel’s discretion to implement innovative
programmatic choices, like embedding pTA for innovative public participation.
Administrative Rules
“Myths” about Public Engagement
NASA 2 shared that when it comes to administrative rules concerning public
participation in federal government program design and decision-making, “there's a lot of
myths about what you can and can't do,” leading federal agencies and personnel to be
“afraid to engage with the public because they don't know how to do it within the rules.”
According to NASA 2, “there's always the standard questions around, ‘well, how does
FACA and the PRA apply to this? If you're getting public input on something, don't you
have to go through a lengthy process with OMB?’” NASA 3 recalled that administrative
rules controlling public participation had already blocked other forms of public
engagement for the Asteroid Initiative:
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There is always the potential threat or challenge of FACA. . . . even Paperwork
Reduction. It prevented us from having people volunteer their time to take
telescopes into their backyard and look for asteroids. That was prohibited.
If something as seemingly uncomplicated as the public using telescopes in their
backyards to look for asteroids was prohibited, using pTA to gather the public’s thoughts
on the Asteroid Initiative to inform program design and decision-making would likely
face some burdensome administrative challenges.
PRA “Fiasco”
While the administrative challenges to pTA were ultimately addressed for
NASA’s Asteroid Initiative, negotiating the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction
Act (PRA) caused significant delays and changes to the design of pTA in the DOE
project to the point of jeopardizing its legal and practical viability. ECAST 1 described
the process of negotiating the PRA requirements as a “fiasco.” Negotiations between
ECAST and DOE’s Office of General Counsel (OGC) delayed the project at several
points in the design process. DOE’s OGC had legal opinions about how acceptable initial
pTA designs were within PRA rules. ECAST 5 shared that this “fiasco” stemmed from
OGC’s opinion that ECAST was “not allowed to hand people a piece of paper with a
question on it and have them fill it out” because that would qualify as a survey. Even
once ECAST and the DOE OGC came to an agreement of how to record on paper the
public’s responses during the pTA deliberations, that still required approval by OMB, a
process that would take anywhere between six to twelve months. After several months of
delays, to ensure that the forums would be ready to implement on schedule, ECAST
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decided to change its pTA design and forgo any use of paper by the public to record their
responses.
Administrative rules are fundamental structures to the relationship of political
control between elected officials and agencies. These examples highlight how
administrative rules control the ways agencies can engage with the public in program
design and decision-making. Moreover, the latter DOE example demonstrates how
grappling with the administrative challenges they create impacted pTA design to the
point of heavily changing pTA design and jeopardizing its implementation. Like with
political pressures, administrative challenges will inevitably play a role in shaping the
barriers to and opportunities for embedding innovative forms of public participation in
U.S. federal government science and technology decision-making.
Conclusion
Answering Chilvers and Kearnes’ (2020) call by ecologizing STS participatory
theory and practice within the bureaucratic contexts that inform government decisionmaking does not excuse agency resistance to greater and more open public participation.
It does mean, however, that if we want to contribute to enhancing public trust in science
and to averting crises of democracy, we can no longer read resistance to public
participation in government as antagonism mostly stemming from technocratic
opposition to lay perspectives. With the help of public administration scholarship, I have
argued that the political pressures on and administrative challenges to agency discretion
in public participation are inherent elements of the political controls on the American
federal bureaucracy. This means that working towards embedding innovative forms of
public participation within government science and technology decision-making
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processes will invariably face bureaucratic barriers. Like the “problem of expertise,” the
“problem of bureaucracy” that STS participatory theory and practice faces is not a
problem to be solved but a tension to be tempered.
Given these complexities, and in light of what may seem an impenetrable
institutional barrier to innovative public participation in government science and
technology decision-making, the long-standing trend in STS of focusing on civil society
participation exercises may seem like the better investment of time and resources.
However, while these civil society events produce multiple positive outcomes like
refinements to design and nurturing citizen empowerment (e.g., Árnason, 2013; Guston,
1999; Sprain & Reinig, 2018), operating outside of the administrative and political
structures of the American federal bureaucracy does little to redistribute formal
democratic power (Arnstein, 1969). Such extra-institutional efforts are important, they
serve as proof-of-concept for public engagement, and they seemingly uphold
commitments to independence more easily. They grapple poorly, however, with how we
might meaningfully effect policy and administrative processes, which is where most
decision-making occurs. We avoid such grappling at our own theoretical and practical
expense. There is room in STS to pursue both; we just need more information on and
more practice with agency-embedded efforts.
This essay begins to identify and examine the impacts political pressures and
administrative rules had on designing pTA in three U.S. federal agencies as a proving
ground for the three maxims presented above. These maxims can be used to examine the
details of the bureaucratic contexts informing innovative forms of public participation
like pTA in these three agencies. Doing so may help build a richer understanding of how
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political pressures and administrative rules impact the adoption, design, and
implementation of innovative forms of public participation in government science and
technology program design and decision-making. This may help develop an STS
participatory theory and practice that not only better anticipates bureaucratic hurdles to
innovative public participation but that is also better equipped to address them. This is
especially true for the ameliorative maxim of the framework, which involves
investigating how political pressures and administrative challenges can be overcome by
the bureaucratic expertise of agency personnel. The next two essays in this dissertation
detail and underscore how this kind of bureaucratic expertise works and thus continue the
work of ecologizing STS participatory theory and practice within the wider political and
administrative systems of American federal government.

44
References
Árnason, V. (2013). Scientific citizenship in a democratic society. Public Understanding
of Science, 22(8), 927–940.
Arnstein, S. R. (1969). A ladder of citizen participation. Journal of the American Institute
of Planners, 35(4), 216–224.
Bertelli, A. M., & Lynn, L. (2006). Madison’s managers: Public administration and the
constitution. JHU Press.
Bertrand, P., Pirtle, Z., & Tomblin, D. (2017). Participatory technology assessment for
Mars mission planning: Public values and rationales. Space Policy, 42, 41–53.
Bora, A. (2010). Technoscientific normativity and the “iron cage” of law. Science,
Technology, & Human Values, 35(1), 3–28.
Brown, M. B. (2015). Politicizing science: Conceptions of politics in science and
technology studies. Social Studies of Science, 45(1), 3–30.
Bryer, T. A. (2013). Public participation in regulatory decision-making: Cases from
regulations.gov. Public Performance & Management Review, 37(2), 263–279.
Burgess, J., & Chilvers, J. (2006). Upping the ante: A conceptual framework for
designing and evaluating participatory technology assessments. Science and
Public Policy, 33(10), 713–728.
Burgess, M. (2014). From ‘trust us’ to participatory governance: Deliberative publics and
science policy. Public Understanding of Science, 23(1), 48–52.
Callon, M., Lascoumes, P., & Barthe, Y. (2009). Acting in an uncertain world. MIT
Press.
Carroll, J. D. (1971). Participatory technology. Science, 171(3972), 647–653.
Chilvers, J., & Kearnes, M. (2020). Remaking participation in science and democracy.
Science, Technology, & Human Values, 45(3), 347–380.
, B. A. (1990). Public administration and the paradox of professionalization. Public
Administration Review, 50(6), 637–653.

45
Collins, H., & Evans, R. (2002). The third wave of science studies: Studies of expertise
and experience. Social Studies of Science, 32(2), 235–296.
Condit, C. M., Lynch, J., & Winderman, E. (2012). Recent rhetorical studies in public
understanding of science: Multiple purposes and strengths. Public Understanding
of Science, 21(4), 386–400.
Delborne, J., Schneider, J., Bal, R., Cozzens, S., & Worthington, R. (2013). Policy
pathways, policy networks, and citizen deliberation: Disseminating the results of
World Wide Views on Global Warming in the USA. Science and Public Policy,
40(3), 378–392.
Delgado, A., Lein Kjølberg, K., & Wickson, F. (2011). Public engagement coming of
age: From theory to practice in STS encounters with nanotechnology. Public
Understanding of Science, 20(6), 826–845.
Depoe, S. P., Delicath, J., & Elsenbeer, W. (2004). Communication and public
participation in environmental decision making. SUNY Press.
Dryzek, J. S. (2000). Deliberative democracy and beyond: Liberals, critics,
contestations. Oxford University Press.
Dryzek, J. S. (2012). Foundations and frontiers of deliberative governance. Oxford
University Press.
Durant, J. (1999). Participatory technology assessment and the democratic model of the
public understanding of science. Science and Public Policy, 26(5), 313–319.
Durant, R. F. (1995). The democratic deficit in America. Political Science Quarterly,
110(1), 25–47.
Emery, S. B., Mulder, H. A. J., & Frewer, L. J. (2015). Maximizing the policy impacts of
public engagement: A European study. Science, Technology, & Human Values,
40(3), 421–444.
Endres, D. (2012). Sacred land or national sacrifice zone: The role of values in the Yucca
Mountain participation process. Environmental Communication, 6(3), 328–345.

46
Ezrahi, Y. (2012). Imagined democracies: Necessary political fictions. Cambridge
University Press.
Feenberg, A. (2012). Questioning technology. Routledge.
Felt, U., Fochler, M., Mager, A., & Winkler, P. (2008). Visions and versions of
governing biomedicine: Narratives on power structures, decision-making and
public participation in the field of biomedical technology in the Austrian context.
Social Studies of Science, 38(2), 233–257.
Fiorino, D. J. (1990). Citizen participation and environmental risk: A survey of
institutional mechanisms. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 15(2), 226–
243.
Foltz, F. (1999). Five arguments for increasing public participation in making science
policy. Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 19(2), 117–127.
Frederickson, H. G., Smith, K. B., Larimer, C. W., & Licari, M. J. (2015). The public
administration theory primer (3rd ed.). Westview Press.
Goodsell, C. T. (2014). The new case for bureaucracy. CQ press.
Gorman, M. E. (2002). Levels of expertise and trading zones: A framework for
multidisciplinary collaboration. Social Studies of Science, 32(5–6), 933–938.
Grundmann, R. (2017). The problem of expertise in knowledge societies. Minerva, 55(1),
25–48.
Gustetic, J. L., Friedensen, V., Kessler, J. L., Jackson, S., & Parr, J. (2018). NASA’s
asteroid grand challenge: Strategy, results, and lessons learned. Space Policy, 44–
45, 1–13.
Guston, D. H. (1999). Evaluating the first U.S. consensus conference: The impact of the
citizens’ panel on telecommunications and the future of democracy. Science,
Technology, & Human Values, 24(4), 451–482.
Guston, D. H., & Sarewitz, D. (2002). Real-time technology assessment. Technology in
Society, 24(1–2), 93–109.

47
Habermas, J. (1984). The theory of communicative action: Reason and the rationalization
of society (Vol. 1). Beacon Press.
Hamilton, J. D., & Wills-Toker, C. (2006). Reconceptualizing dialogue in environmental
public participation. Policy Studies Journal, 34(4), 755–775.
Hendry, J. (2004). Decide, announce, defend: Turning the NEPA process into an
advocacy tool rather than a decision-making tool. In S, Depoe, J. Delicath & W.
Elsenbeer (Eds.), Communication and Public Participation in Environmental
Decision-Making (pp. 99–112). SUNY Press.
Hennen, L. (1999). Participatory technology assessment: A response to technical
modernity? Science and Public Policy, 26(5), 303–312.
Hennen, L. (2012). Why do we still need participatory technology assessment? Poiesis &
Praxis, 9, 27–41.
Hoppe, R. (2005). Rethinking the science-policy nexus: From knowledge utilization and
science technology studies to types of boundary arrangements. Poiesis & Praxis,
3(3), 199–215.
Hoppe, R. (2009). Scientific advice and public policy: Expert advisers’ and
policymakers’ discourses on boundary work. Poiesis & Praxis, 6(3–4), 235–263.
Horst, M., & Irwin, A. (2010). Nations at ease with radical knowledge: On consensus,
consensusing and false consensusness. Social Studies of Science, 40(1), 105–126.
Innes, J. E., & Booher, D. E. (2004). Reframing public participation: Strategies for the
21st century. Planning Theory & Practice, 5(4), 419–436.
Irwin, A., Jensen, T. E., & Jones, K. E. (2013). The good, the bad and the perfect:
Criticizing engagement practice. Social Studies of Science, 43(1), 118–135.
Jasanoff, S. (1992). Science, politics, and the renegotiation of expertise at EPA. Osiris, 7,
194–217.
Jasanoff, S. (2003a). Breaking the waves in science studies: Comment on H.M. Collins
and Robert Evans, `the third wave of science studies’. Social Studies of Science,
33(3), 389–400.

48
Jasanoff, S. (2003b). (No?) Accounting for expertise. Science and Public Policy, 30(3),
157–162.
Jasanoff, S. (2005). Designs on nature: Science and democracy in Europe and the United
States. Princeton University Press.
Jensen, C. B. (2005). Citizen projects and consensus-building at the Danish Board of
Technology: On experiments in democracy. Acta Sociologica, 48(3), 221–235.
Joss, S. (1998). Danish consensus conferences as a model of participatory technology
assessment: An impact study of consensus conferences on Danish Parliament and
Danish public debate. Science and Public Policy, 25(1), 2–22.
Joss, S., & Durant, J. (1995). Public participation in science: The role of consensus
conferences in Europe. NMSI Trading Ltd.
Kaminski, A. P. (2012). Can the demos make a difference? Prospects for participatory
democracy in shaping the future course of US space exploration. Space Policy,
28(4), 225–233.
Kaplan, L., Farooque, M., Sarewitz, D., & Tomblin, D. (2021) [Forthcoming]. Designing
participatory technology assessments: A reflexive method for advancing the
public role in science policy decision-making. Journal of Technological
Forecasting and Social Change, 171(120974).
Kleinman, D. L., Delborne, J. A., & Anderson, A. A. (2011). Engaging citizens: The high
cost of citizen participation in high technology. Public Understanding of Science,
20(2), 221–240.
Kleinman, D. L., Powell, M., Grice, J., Adrian, J., & Lobes, C. (2007). A toolkit for
democratizing science and technology policy: The practical mechanics of
organizing a consensus conference. Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society,
27(2), 154–169.
Klüver, L. (2000). The Danish board of technology. In N. Vig & H. Paschen (Eds.),
Parliaments and technology: The development of technology assessment in
Europe (pp. 173–197). SUNY Press.

49
Krabbenborg, L., & Mulder, H. A. J. (2015). Upstream public engagement in
nanotechnology: Constraints and opportunities. Science Communication, 37(4),
452–484.
Krick, E. (2015). Negotiated expertise in policy-making: How governments use hybrid
advisory committees. Science and Public Policy, 42(4), 487–500.
Krislov, S., & Rosenbloom, D. H. (1981). Representative bureaucracy and the American
political system. Praeger.
Laurent, B. (2017). Democratic experiments: Problematizing nanotechnology and
democracy in Europe and the United States. The MIT Press.
Lipsky, M. (2010). Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public
service. Russell Sage Foundation.
Long, R. J., & Beierle, T. C. (1999). The Federal Advisory Committee Act and public
participation in environmental policy. (pp. 1–46)
https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.10817.
Marres, N. (2015). Material participation: Technology, the environment and everyday
publics. Springer.
Marres, N., & Lezaun, J. (2011). Materials and devices of the public: An introduction.
Economy and Society, 40(4), 489–509.
McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R. G., & Weingast, B. R. (1987). Administrative procedures as
instruments of political control. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization,
3(2), 243–277.
Meier, K. J., & O’Toole Jr, L. J. (2006). Bureaucracy in a democratic state: A
governance perspective. JHU Press.
Mouffe, C. (2000). The democratic paradox. Verso.
Mouffe, C. (2005). On the political. Psychology Press.
Nelkin, D. (1977). Technological decisions and democracy: European experiments in
public participation. Sage.

50
Nelkin, D. (1979). Scientific knowledge, public policy, and democracy: A review essay.
Knowledge, 1(1), 106–122.
Nowotny, H. (2003). Democratising expertise and socially robust knowledge. Science
and Public Policy, 30(3), 151–156.
Ottinger, G. (2013). Refining expertise: How responsible engineers subvert
environmental justice challenges. NYU Press.
Pallett, H. (2015). Public participation organizations and open policy: A constitutional
moment for British democracy? Science Communication, 37(6), 769–794.
Pielke Jr, R. A. (2007). The honest broker: Making sense of science in policy and politics.
Cambridge University Press.
Powell, M., & Colin, M. (2008). Meaningful citizen engagement in science and
technology: What would it really take? Science Communication, 30(1), 126–136.
Powell, M., & Kleinman, D. (2008). Building citizen capacities for participation in
nanotechnology decision-making: The democratic virtues of the consensus
conference model. Public Understanding of Science, 17(3), 329–348.
Rask, M. (2013). The tragedy of citizen deliberation – two cases of participatory
technology assessment. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 25(1), 39–
55.
Rayner, S. (2003). Democracy in the age of assessment: Reflections on the roles of
expertise and democracy in public-sector decision making. Science and Public
Policy, 30(3), 163–170.
Rohr, J. A. (1986). To run a constitution: The legitimacy of the administrative state.
University Press of Kansas.
Rowe, G., & Frewer, L. J. (2000). Public participation methods: A framework for
evaluation. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 25(1), 3–29.
Rowe, G., & Frewer, L. J. (2005). A typology of public engagement mechanisms.
Science, Technology, & Human Values, 30(2), 251–290.
Sclove, R. (1995). Democracy and technology. Guilford Press.

51
Sclove, R. (2010a). Reinventing technology assessment. Issues in Science & Technology,
27(1), 34–38.
Sclove, R. (2010b). Reinventing technology assessment for the 21st century. Washington,
DC: Science and Technology Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.3402.5364
Seifert, F. (2006). Local steps in an international career: A Danish-style consensus
conference in Austria. Public Understanding of Science, 15(1), 73–88.
Shapiro, S. (2013). The Paperwork Reduction Act: Benefits, costs and directions for
reform. Government Information Quarterly, 30(2), 204–210.
Shapiro, S. (2020). Reinvigorating the Paperwork Reduction Act. Regulation, 43, 36–42.
Sismondo, S. (2008). Science and technology studies and an engaged program. The
Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, 1, 13–31.
Sprain, L., & Reinig, L. (2018). Citizens speaking as experts: Expertise discourse in
deliberative forums. Environmental Communication, 12(3), 357–369.
Stilgoe, J., Lock, S. J., & Wilsdon, J. (2014). Why should we promote public engagement
with science? Public Understanding of Science, 23(1), 4–15.
Stirling, A. (2008). “Opening up” and “closing down”: Power, participation, and
pluralism in the social appraisal of technology. Science, Technology, & Human
Values, 33(2), 262–294.
Tomblin, D, Worthington, R., Gano, G., Farooque, M., Sittenfeld, D., & Lloyd, J. (2015).
Informing NASA’s Asteroid Initiative: A Citizen’s Forum. pp. 1–32.
https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ecast-informing-nasaasteroid-initiative_tagged.pdf
Tomblin, David, Pirtle, Z., Farooque, M., Sittenfeld, D., Mahoney, E., Worthington, R.,
Gano, G., Gates, M., Bennett, I., Kessler, J., Kaminski, A., Lloyd, J., & Guston,
D. (2017). Integrating public deliberation into engineering systems: Participatory
technology assessment of NASA’s asteroid redirect mission. Astropolitics, 15(2),
141–166.

52
Turner, S. (2001). What is the problem with experts? Social Studies of Science, 31(1),
123–149.
Turner, S. (2013). The politics of expertise. Routledge.
Waldo, D. (1948). The administrative state: A study of the political theory of American
public administration. The Ronald Press Company.
Wilson, J. Q. (2019). Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it.
Basic Books.
Wood, B. D., & Waterman, R. W. (1991). The dynamics of political control of the
bureaucracy. American Political Science Review, 85(3), 801–828.
Woodhouse, E. J., & Nieusma, D. (1997). When expert advice works, and when it does
not. IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, 16(1), 23–29.
Wynne, B. (1992). Misunderstood misunderstanding: Social identities and public uptake
of science. Public Understanding of Science, 1(3), 281–304.
Wynne, B. (2003). Seasick on the third wave? Subverting the hegemony of
propositionalism: Response to Collins & Evans (2002). Social Studies of Science,
33(3), 401–417.
Wynne, B. (2007). Public participation in science and technology: Performing and
obscuring a political–conceptual category mistake. East Asian Science,
Technology and Society, 1(1), 99–110.

53

CHAPTER THREE (ESSAY TWO): THE POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION OF
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: A CASE STUDY OF PARTICIPATORY TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT IN NASA’S ASTEROID INITIATIVE
Introduction
We in the Science and Technology Studies (STS) community have several sets of
literatures informing our participatory theory and practice. There is literature on how the
knowledge asymmetry between experts and lay citizens have the potential to produce and
reinforce undemocratic decision-making processes and outcomes in science and
technology issues (e.g., Collins & Evans, 2002; Grundmann, 2017; Jasanoff, 2003;
Liberatore & Funtowicz, 2003; Nowotny, 2003; Sarewitz, 2000, 2004; Turner, 2001,
2013; Woodhouse & Nieusma, 1997; Wynne, 1992). Research in this area also examines
how technical expertise may be used selectively to advance partisan policy positions
(e.g., Hoppe, 2005, 2009; Jasanoff, 1992; Pielke Jr, 2007). There is also extensive
research on designing, organizing, and evaluating different forms of public engagement
on issues of science and technology in society with the goal of addressing these
undemocratic and partisan processes (e.g., Chilvers & Kearnes, 2020; Delgado et al.,
2011; Fiorino, 1990; Guston, 1999, 2014; Kleinman et al., 2007; Powell & Colin, 2008;
Powell & Kleinman, 2008; Rowe & Frewer, 2000, 2005; Selin et al., 2017; Stirling,
2008; Wehling, 2012).
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This design literature, especially the work that is centered in the United States,
focuses predominantly on public engagement activities independently organized by civic
society groups that run parallel to government policy questions but independent of the
formal government science and technology decision-making processes (e.g., Delborne et
al., 2013; Guston, 1999). STS scholars and practitioners have only recently started to
examine how innovative forms of public participation fit into formal government science
and technology policy- and decision-making processes (Bertrand et al., 2017; Emery et
al., 2015; Gustetic et al., 2018; Kaminski, 2012; Krabbenborg & Mulder, 2015; Krick,
2015; Rask, 2013). This literature is limited, however, in its examination of the
bureaucratic processes that inform the political and administrative feasibility of
innovative forms of public participation in U.S. federal government agency science and
technology decision-making.
There is a gap in our STS participatory theory and practice regarding how the
organizational politics and administrative structures of the U.S. federal bureaucracy
inform the ease or difficulty with which innovative forms of public participation are
embedded into formal government agency science and technology decision-making
processes. Filling this gap is central to creating greater opportunities for more open and
deliberative public participation in government science and technology decision-making.
Creating these opportunities advances the STS project of intervening in the potentially
undemocratic processes and outcomes of the technocratic approach to sociopolitical
questions of how science and technology impacts public life (Callon et al., 2009;
Feenberg, 2012). Doing so by advocating and creating greater opportunities for public
participation is a process of restructuring and democratically redistributing political
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power (Arnstein, 1969; Carroll, 1971; Nelkin, 1977, 1979). In this light, an essential
element of this chapter is to report on how innovative forms of public participation
engage with the current structures of bureaucratic and political power in U.S. federal
government agency science and technology decision-making.
This essay aims to fill this gap in our understanding of how participatory practices
might actually work in the context of American federal agencies. I examine how
experimenting with a deliberative form of public participation – participatory technology
assessment (pTA) – in a US federal agency revealed the political pressures on and
administrative challenges to innovative forms of public participation in government
science and technology decision-making. Specifically, this chapter reports on the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Asteroid Initiative, which
took place during the second Obama Administration’s Open Government Initiative. In
2013, the Expert and Citizen Assessment of Science and Technology (ECAST) network
submitted a response to a NASA request for information for the Asteroid Grand
Challenge, a component of the Asteroid Initiative. In their submission, ECAST suggested
pTA as a method of public engagement in the Asteroid Initiative’s program design and
decision-making processes. Traditional STS research might examine the impacts pTA
had on the public’s sense of empowerment after participating, or the impacts pTA had on
the agency’s views on the role of the public in decision-making. This chapter takes a
different tack. Drawing from policy studies and public administration scholarship, I
analyze the political, policy, and administrative contexts surrounding the adoption,
design, and implementation of pTA in NASA’s Asteroid Initiative.
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I examine what the political, policy, and administrative contexts were for NASA
personnel to successfully adopt pTA, and for ECAST and NASA personnel to cooperate
on designing and implementing pTA. I use tools from a well-known policy studies theory
developed by John Kingdon in the 1980’s (1984, 2011) as an analytic framework; the
Multiple Streams Approach (MSA). To understand the bureaucratic contexts of American
federal government agency program decision-making, I draw from public administration
scholarship’s “political control” literature (e.g., Rohr, 1986; Frederickson et al., 2015,
Chapter 2; Meier & O’Toole Jr, 2006). Meant to keep them accountable to the political
process of democratic decision-making, U.S. federal government agencies face controls
on their discretion on how to design and implement programs. These political controls
often create bureaucratic barriers to experimenting with innovative forms of public
participation within federal agency decision-making processes.
Through these frameworks, this case study analysis of pTA at NASA aims to
accomplish two goals. We lack theoretical sensitivity to and an empirical knowledge of
how the political, policy, and administrative contexts of the U.S. federal bureaucracy
create barriers to innovative public participation in government science and technology
decision-making. I suggest that we in STS can benefit from policy studies and public
administration perspectives. My first goal is to apply the MSA and political control
frameworks to develop an understanding of how the (mis)alignment of political, policy,
and administrative contexts informs the ease or difficulty with which innovative forms of
public participation are embedded in formal U.S. federal government science and
technology decision-making processes. A second goal is to highlight the role federal
government personnel play as “policy entrepreneurs” (Kingdon, 1984, 2011) in creating
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opportunities for innovative forms of public participation in science and technology
decision-making processes. STS participatory theory and practice can begin to develop
approaches that appreciate how the bureaucratic expertise of federal government agency
personnel, in some cases, actually enables greater public participation in decisionmaking.
Background
There are three background elements useful to understanding this case study.
First, I introduce the ECAST research and practitioner network who submitted and
collaborated with NASA personnel to design and implement pTA for the agency’s
Asteroid Initiative. Second, I highlight how the Obama administrations’ Open
Government Initiative encouraged U.S. federal executive departments and agencies to
practice greater transparency, collaboration, and public participation in its work. Third, a
summary of NASA’s Asteroid Initiative and the pTA exercises that were implemented
for the Asteroid Initiative. Details of how each informed the political, policy, and
administrative contexts will be elaborated on in the findings section.
ECAST and Participatory Technology Assessment
Established in 2010, the Expert and Citizen Assessment of Science and
Technology (ECAST) is a network of academic research, policy analysis, citizen science,
and informal science education institutions distributed across the United States that works
towards greater public involvement in issues at the intersection of science, technology,
and society (Sclove, 2010a, 2010b; Kaplan, Farooque, Sarewitz, & Tomblin, 2021).
Building on the work once done by the now-defunct Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA) of informing policymakers on the social impacts of science and
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technology, ECAST designs and organizes peer-to-peer deliberations on issues of science
and technology in society both to educate the public and to solicit their perspectives. The
public participation element in assessing science and technology policy options is what
constitutes pTA (Burgess & Chilvers, 2006; J. Durant, 1999; Guston & Sarewitz, 2002;
Hennen, 1999, 2012). ECAST shares the results of these public deliberations with
decision-makers so that science and technology policy can be informed by the public’s
values and perspectives. Like many forms of public deliberation on science and
technology, the results of pTA face several political and administrative challenges to
being incorporated into formal government decision-making processes (Delborne et al.,
2013; Griessler, 2012; Loeber et al., 2011; Rask, 2013; Reber, 2006; Saretzki, 2012). One
of ECAST’s normative goals is to create opportunities to embed pTA within formal
government science and technology decision-making processes.
Obama Administrations’ Open Government Initiative
On January 21st, 2009, President Barack Obama signed the “Memorandum on
Transparency and Open Government” (M-09-12). This, along with two other memos (M10-06; M-10-11) from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), are the
administrative basis for the Obama administrations’ “Open Government Initiative”
(OGI). The OGI embodied the administrations’ commitment to “creating an
unprecedented level of openness in Government” through promoting practices that would
implement the principles of transparency, participation, and collaboration throughout
executive departments and agencies (Holdren et al., 2009, p. 3). Implementing these
principles would “ensure the public trust,” “strengthen our democracy, and promote
efficiency and effectiveness in Government” (Holdren et al., 2009, p. 3). In terms of
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participation, the rationale for why government should be participatory was because
“public engagement enhances the Government's effectiveness and improves the quality of
its decisions” (Holdren et al., 2009, p. 3). As such, the federal government “should offer
Americans increased opportunities to participate in policymaking and to provide their
Government with the benefits of their collective expertise and information” (Holdren et
al., 2009, p. 3). The latter two associated OMB memos directed “executive departments
and agencies to take specific actions to implement the principles of transparency,
participation, and collaboration” along with providing guidance on how “Prizes and
Challenges” could be used to promote open government, respectively (Orszag, 2009;
Ziens, 2010).
NASA’s Asteroid Initiative and the Citizen’s Forum
In April 2013, NASA announced its Asteroid Initiative. The motivation behind
the Initiative were twofold. A Congressional mandate ordered NASA to detect all
hazardous asteroids in near-Earth space and to develop a planetary defense strategy. The
Obama Administration White House directed NASA to progress on the longstanding goal
of a human mission to Mars. This involved developing an asteroid capturing and
redirecting system as a technological proving ground for missions to Mars. As such, the
goal of the Asteroid Initiative was to build a “proving ground” for the technologies that
would enable a crewed journey to Mars by first preparing and demonstrating the ability to
“safely live and work away from Earth for extended periods before attempting a mission”
(Tomblin et al., 2015, p. 5). To do this, the Asteroid Initiative had two components: the
Asteroid Redirect Mission (ARM), and the Asteroid Grand Challenge (AGC). The ARM
was NASA’s project “to capture a small asteroid, redirect it into a stable orbit in
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translunar space, and explore it with astronauts carried onboard the Orion spacecraft as
early as 2021” (U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2013a). The goal of
the AGC was to create “an increased focus on defending our planet against the threat of
catastrophic asteroid collisions” (U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
2013a).
In June of 2013, NASA opened a request for information (RFI) through the AGC
for the Asteroid Initiative. As a “grand challenge,” the AGC was touted as “the first
opportunity for industry and other potential partners, including private individuals, to
offer ideas on planning for NASA's mission to redirect an asteroid for exploration by
astronauts and the agency's asteroid grand challenge” (U.S. National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, 2013b). The AGC RFI called for input on six areas to “refine the
Asteroid Redirect Mission concept, formulate plans for flight systems development, and
gather ideas for broadening participation in the mission and planetary defense” (U.S.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2013a). The sixth item, “Partnerships
and Participatory Engagement,” specifically called for “innovative methods such as
crowd sourcing, prizes and challenges, citizen science, and public-private partnerships to
increase the resources for tackling the planetary defense problem and to broaden
participation” (U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2013a).
ECAST submitted pTA as an innovative method of participatory engagement for
Asteroid Initiative program design and decision-making under the sixth item. Of the 55
submissions to this category, NASA asked 12, including ECAST, to present at an
Asteroid Initiative Ideas Synthesis Workshop in October of 2013 (U.S. National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2014). In January of 2014, NASA published the
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results of the workshop in the Ideas Synthesis Workshop report. One of the report’s
recommendations was for NASA “to consider forums for engaging the public in two-way
policy conversations” regarding the Asteroid Initiative (U.S. National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, 2014, p. 14). By May of 2014, NASA selected ECAST’s pTA
proposal and entered into a cooperative agreement to design and implement the pTA
exercises for the Asteroid Initiative. Between May and September of 2014,
representatives from NASA and ECAST met several times to design the content and plan
the implementation of pTA as the Citizen’s Forum on NASA’s Asteroid Initiative.

NASA

Asteroid
Initiative
Asteroid Grand
Challenge

Asteroid
Redirect
Mission

Citizen's
Forum (pTA)

Figure 3.1

Organizational Chart of pTA Exercises within NASA

In November 2014, daylong Citizen’s Forums took place in two cities, Phoenix
and Boston. The four topics for deliberation were asteroid detection, asteroid mitigation,
deciding between two engineering options for the ARM, and three scenarios for human
space flights for Mars exploration. During the forums, participants read background
materials to inform them on the four topics, deliberated the topics, engaged with experts
via questions and answers, and, finally, voted on a set of questions jointly prepared by
NASA and ECAST. With the votes and written rationales, ECAST was tasked with
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generating “usable outcomes” that would “provide useful input to NASA’s decision
making” (Tomblin et al., 2015, p. 8). An interim report consisting of the results from the
ARM session was delivered to NASA managers in December 2014, prior to their making
a downselect decision about which of two options the agency should pursue for the ARM.
In March 2015, ECAST made a top-level briefing at NASA headquarters of the pTA
results. A summary and full report of the results consisting of additional assessments and
evaluation were publicly released in August 2015.
Theoretical Framework
I examine the political, policy, and administrative contexts surrounding the
adoption, design, and implementation of pTA at NASA at the intersection of STS, policy
studies, and public administration. I draw on the “political control” framework from
public administration to describe and explain the political pressures and administrative
challenges to designing and implementing pTA. I use the Multiple Streams Approach
from policy studies to organize and identify the key elements that contributed to
adopting, designing, and implementing pTA in NASA’s Asteroid Initiative program
design and decision-making. It also highlights the expert bureaucratic work policy
entrepreneurs within NASA did at the programmatic level to facilitate adopting,
designing, and implement pTA. The rationale for combining these frameworks follows a
brief review of their respective literatures.
The Multiple Streams Approach
The field of policy studies offers several frameworks, theories, and models for
understanding the social and political processes that explain how laws and policies
changes over time (Birkland, 2019; Weible & Sabatier, 2018). One of these frameworks

63
is the “Multiple Streams Approach” (MSA) developed in the 1980’s by John Kingdon
(1984, 2011). Kingdon describes the policy process as composed of three separate yet
interdependent “streams” – the problem, policy, and politics streams. Each stream
represents a set of elements, actors, and processes that interact to create opportunities for
change in policy and decision-making processes. The “problem stream” consists of the
myriad issues shaped by and brought to the attention of the public, policymakers, and
decision-makers. The “policy stream” identifies the suite of new and long-standing policy
solutions formulated within a policy community; these are solutions looking for the right
problem to be a vehicle for adoption. The “politics stream” denotes the political
feasibility of selecting a problem and solution in the context of different political
pressures coming from the public, interest groups, and changing Congressional and
Presidential agendas. Across these streams move “policy entrepreneurs” who bring
together the streams to create “windows of opportunity.” Policy entrepreneurs are
individuals within and outside of government who, with their political savvy,
administrative expertise, connections, influence, and knowledge of institutional politics
and culture, facilitate certain problems and policy solutions through the politics stream
(Anderson et al., 2019; Cairney, 2018; Mintrom & Norman, 2009).
Compared to other theories of the policy process, MSA is a flexible framework
meant to identify a set of variables and the relationships among them (Weible and
Sabatier, 2018). Kingdon’s work developed MSA by reconstructing how two nationalscale policy changes and decisions were made (e.g., major federal healthcare policy in the
U.S., and the adoption of a new federal transportation infrastructure funding policy), and
the framework is still most frequently used to analyze federal policymaking at a high
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level. Using it at the agency programmatic level, which is what this study does, will
require some modifications to the MSA framework. There is scholarly precedence for
making such modifications in a growing body of literature applying MSA to programlevel implementation and decision-making (See Béland & Howlett, 2016; Cairney &
Jones, 2016; Fowler, 2019; Rawat & Morris, 2016; Smith et al., 2015).
With some modifications, MSA can help provide STS a framework for
identifying and explaining how the (mis)alignment of problem, political, policy, and
administrative contexts informs the ease or difficulty with which innovative forms of
public participation, like pTA, are embedded within formal U.S. federal government
science and technology decision-making processes. Additionally, the policy entrepreneur
concept from the MSA toolkit can help us examine how government agency personnel,
using their knowledge of organizational culture and bureaucratic expertise, create
opportunities for innovative forms of public participation within formal decision-making
processes at the programmatic level. MSA, at the very least, can act as a heuristic
framework for STS to organize and examine the political and administrative complexity
surrounding the use of innovative public participation in U.S. federal agency science and
technology decision-making processes.
MSA helps to analyze the problem, political, and policy streams in which
innovative forms of public participation may be embedded within formal U.S. federal
government science and technology decision-making processes while identifying the
crucial role government personnel play as policy entrepreneurs. Analyzing how
innovative forms of public participation are embedded within government science and
technology decision-making processes involves examining the political pressures and the
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administrative challenges government agencies and their personnel face when
implementing government programs. These pressures and challenges inform the ease or
difficulty with which innovative forms of public participation can be incorporated into
program design and decision-making processes. Public administration’s theory of
“political control” can help us better understand how the political culture and
administrative structures of American federal government shape the priorities and
behaviors of federal agencies when it comes to public participation.
Political Control
The field of American public administration has long examined how the
relationship between the political processes of lawmaking and the administrative
processes of implementation shapes the behaviors of elected government representatives
and unelected bureaucrats (Bertelli & Lynn, 2006; Lipsky, 2010; Meier & O’Toole Jr,
2006; Waldo, 1948). At the heart of American political philosophy and government is the
tension between if the executive branch should have strong administrative discretion or if
democratically elected representatives should have direct oversight of and heavy controls
on the executive’s discretion to administer government (Rohr, 1986). A consequence of
the latter position is the imposition of political controls on the administrative discretion of
the executive bureaucracy (McCubbins et al., 1987; Wood & Waterman, 1991).
The political process often produces laws that are scarce on details and funds that
government agencies and personnel are nonetheless required to implement. This
motivates an increasing degree of administrative expertise in uses of discretion to
implement programs in resource- and option-constrained environments (Goodsell, 2014;
Lipsky, 2010). As agencies and bureaucrats find ways to implement policies and
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programs in ways deemed outside of what the political process intended, however,
elected representative and the public lose trust in the bureaucracy’s choices (Cigler,
1990). Elected representatives check the administrative discretion of agencies by
imposing political controls in the forms of political pressures and administrative rules.
Congress and the Executive Office of the White House use the leverage of budgets and
political support as pressures on agencies, while administrative rules dictate the
procedural requirements of how to design and implement government programs rules
(McCubbins et al., 1987; Wood & Waterman, 1991). The result of this escalating tension
is that both elected officials and government agencies often focus more on institutional
politics and preservation than on passing laws and implementing programs that are
sensitive to public values and address the public’s concerns (Durant, 1995; Frederickson
et al., 2015; Meier & O’Toole Jr, 2006; Wilson, 2019).
The most explicit form of political control on embedding innovative forms of
public participation in federal science and technology programs are administrative rules
on how agencies can engage with the public. Congressional laws like the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA) establish the minimum and mandatory requirements (e.g., public
comment periods in the Federal Register) for public participation in matters of federal
agency rule and program decision-making. Public input from these minimum
requirements, however, are shown to be ineffective in substantially informing decisionmaking processes (Bryer, 2013). The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) “governs
how the federal government seeks outside advice,” specifically, “who participates in
government decision-making, when they participate, how they participate, and what
influence participation has on policy” (Long & Beierle, 1999). There are, however,
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“ambiguities in the law and its regulations which limit the willingness of public agencies
to engage the public outside of FACA” rules (Long & Beierle, 1999). The Paperwork
Reduction Act (PRA) stipulates the procedural requirements of how agencies can collect
any type of information from the public. Agency procedures for collecting information
from the public need the approval or exemption of the Office of Management and Budget
within the Executive Office of the White House. While meant to reduce the total amount
of paperwork burden the federal government imposes on private businesses and citizens,
some federal agencies have argued that meeting basic PRA requirements make routine
administration burdensome (Shapiro, 2013, 2020).
Taken together, the requirements of these administrative rules often create
administrative challenges for agencies to engage with the public on program decisionmaking in innovative ways beyond the minimum requirements mandated by the APA and
within the limits set forth by FACA and PRA. Given the administrative burdens and
potential legal consequences, there are few incentives for agencies to experiment with
innovative forms of public participation in program decision-making. STS scholar Alfons
Bora (2010) calls this matrix of legal limits on top of the already rigid framework of
technocracy concerning science and technology decision-making the “iron cage of law.”
Bora (2010), like public administration scholars, highlights the irony in this “iron cage”
of administrative rules. Even though these rules are meant to ensure that agency
discretion does not extend beyond the control of the political will of democratically
elected representatives, they in practice act as limits on how the public can participate in
government program decision-making. Political controls meant to maintain democratic
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legitimacy and accountability of the American federal bureaucracy can in fact act as
barriers to more deliberative, and arguably more democratic, public participation.
The MSA and the “political control” frameworks, when used together, can benefit
STS participatory theory and practice by characterizing the political, policy, and
administrative contexts that inform the ease or difficulty with which innovative forms of
public participation are embedded within formal U.S. federal government science and
technology decision-making processes. The joint use of these frameworks highlights the
important role policy entrepreneurs within government agencies play in anticipating and
grappling with the political pressures and administrative challenges incumbent with
embedding innovative forms of public participation in government agency science and
technology decision-making. Moreover, the “political control” supplement to the MSA
framework demonstrates that the work government personnel do to navigate these
political pressures and administrative challenges is what makes them policy entrepreneurs
at this level of government science and technology program design and implementation.
Methodology and Methods
I use a case study approach to provide a “detailed examination of an aspect of a
historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to
other events” (George et al., 2005, p. 4). A detailed examination of the political, policy,
and administrative contexts that supported and constrained pTA in NASA’s Asteroid
Initiative can help develop an explanatory narrative of adoption, design, and
implementation. Constructing the explanatory narrative will draw on two sources of data:
public documents from NASA and ECAST; and semi-structured interviews with NASA
personnel and ECAST members who worked on the Citizen’s Forum pTA project. Public
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documents, mostly from NASA (e.g., press releases, request for information), are used to
establish background details. Semi-structured interviews comprise the bulk of the data
collected.
Subject identification and recruitment for this research was facilitated by the fact
that my dissertation work is a subset of a National Science Foundation-funded (NSF)
project examining participatory technology assessment and cultures of expertise in U.S.
federal government science and technology agencies 3. The co-principal investigator on
the NSF project is an ECAST member. Their network of contacts facilitated access to and
introductions with a specific and finite list of NASA personnel and ECAST members
who were involved at various stages of the Citizen’s Forum pTA project. A snowball
sampling technique, however, was still used at the end of each interview to ensure that
the specific and finite list of participants was not self-limiting.
Twelve semi-structured interviews were conducted between June and October of
2019: seven with ECAST members, five with NASA personnel, and one with an
independent observer of a Citizen’s Forum exercise. Interviews ranged from 40 to 70
minutes in length for a total of 750 minutes of interview data. Interviewers (Jen
Schneider and I) asked questions and explored topics concerning:
•

the purpose of the Asteroid Initiative, its components, and which NASA offices
were involved;

This paper draws on data collected and analyses conducted under the auspices of NSF grant no. 1827574
titled “Participatory Technology Assessment and Cultures of Expertise in the U.S. Federal Government.”
Institutional Review Board (IRB) documents have been submitted to, approved, and renewed by Boise
State University for the NSF grant, along a separate set of IRB documents for this dissertation research.

3
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•

NASA’s interest in “Partnerships and Participatory Engagement” and pTA for the
Asteroid Initiative;

•

NASA’s strategy and history of public engagement and participation in decisionmaking processes;

•

Sources of resistance and challenges to public participation in NASA decisionmaking processes;

•

the working relationship between NASA and ECAST in designing, implementing,
and reporting on the Citizen’s Forum.

Interviews were conducted remotely on Zoom and Google teleconferencing platforms
and were audio recorded. Audio recordings were transcribed using an online, automated
transcription service, TEMI, and were then checked and updated for accuracy and
completeness against the audio recordings prior to data analysis. Throughout the chapter,
I refer to interviewees by their organizational affiliation (i.e., ECAST and NASA) and a
random number assigned to them (e.g., NASA 3). I conducted member checks with
interviewees I have quoted to assure accurate representation of their intention and
meaning in context.
I conducted data analysis on two levels. First, documents and interview transcripts
were imported into NVivo 12 Pro, a qualitative data analysis software, where they were
coded for themes among answers to interview questions (Campbell et al., 2013; Fereday
& Muir-Cochrane, 2006; Maher et al., 2018). 4 Second, data were further reduced and
organized into analytic memos where themes and concepts across interviews were
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Codebook in Appendix A.
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brought together to build analytic narratives. 5 Following a modified grounded theory
approach, themes and concepts emerging from the data were used to refine interview
questions to better target explanatory details, and to begin to build a theoretical model
that generalizes those details (Charmaz, 1990, 2017). At the same time, theories from
STS, policy studies, and public administration were used to inform the questions we
initially asked, the analysis of data, and how I coded or named certain social processes –
this is why the approach is “modified” and not considered a purely grounded theory
approach. For example, as the analysis developed, it become clear that a useful
theoretical framework for organizing and analysis is Kingdon’s (2011) MSA framework
(i.e., organizing the explanatory narrative by “streams” and analyzing by identifying
policy entrepreneurs and their actions).
Findings
Following the MSA framework, I present the findings from the qualitative
analyses of interviews and public documents in four sections. First, I identify how four
NASA personnel acted as policy entrepreneurs within the agency by using their
knowledge of and experience with the agency’s organizational culture and politics
surrounding public participation in program design and decision-making. The “political
control” framework aids in understanding the expert bureaucratic work policy
entrepreneurs do at the program design and implementation level. The next three sections
examine each stream – problem, policy, and politics. The basic conceptual and analytic
elements of the framework remain the same, namely, explaining changes through tracing
the relationship between the processes of the streams and the participants in those

5

Examples of analytic memos in Appendix B.
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processes (Rawat & Morris, 2016). Applying MSA to program design and
implementation, however, requires some modifications to the elements of the framework.
I elaborate on the relevant modifications to the streams as I present each.
Policy Entrepreneurs
Kingdon describes policy entrepreneurs as advocates within and outside of
government who are willing to use their skills and resources to both take advantage of
and create the conditions for change among the three streams. Kingdon identifies three
basic qualities of a policy entrepreneur: being in a position or having the authority to be
heard; using political savvy and/or expertise in an issue or policy area to skillfully
negotiate a position and soften resistance to change; and persistence (2011). They adapt
their strategy depending on the scale of the system they operate within, anticipating and
taking advantage of opportunities for change in larger systems (i.e., waiting for the “big
wave”), while also creating the conditions for change within smaller systems (i.e.,
bringing the streams together) (Cairney, 2018). Identifying policy entrepreneurs within a
system and tracing their actions within the streams is central to the analytic and
explanatory work of the framework.
There were policy entrepreneurs within ECAST who worked within the policy
stream to develop pTA as a solution to a problem. I focus here, however, on the four
policy entrepreneurs within NASA who did the work within the problem and politics
stream to create the opportunity to successfully adopt, design, and implement pTA in the
Asteroid Initiative’s program design and decision-making. Focusing on the work policy
entrepreneurs in government do is key to understanding what the political pressures are
and administrative challenges involved with embedding innovative forms of public
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participation in science and technology decision-making. In line with the characteristics
observed by Kingdon and subsequent MSA scholars, these four individuals held positions
throughout the directorates and offices involved with the Asteroid Initiative where they
had the authority to be heard by managers and leadership. Their administrative
knowledge and expertise from years of working in the U.S. federal bureaucracy, along
with their internal knowledge of NASA’s organizational politics and culture, allowed
them to skillfully advocate for the pTA option and navigate possible resistance to it.
Additionally, it is worth noting that three of the four NASA policy entrepreneurs had
graduate-level training in STS that informed their interests in advocating for pTA in
NASA’s program design and decision-making.
STS Training
Three of the four NASA policy entrepreneurs had graduate-level academic
training in STS-related fields. NASA 5 said that their STS training familiarized them with
the “deliberative ideals for what should really be the goal for involving the public in
making decisions, and what are the ultimate rationales you should base science and
engineering decisions on.” NASA 1 shared that their STS-training informed their
professional interest in “the intersection of public engagement with science and
technology” and motivated their work of “really widening the aperture of who was
involved and where the ideas could come from” for NASA. For NASA 2, their academic
and professional training fostered a “fascination with a variety of different ways in which
the government and other people work together in order to provide greater value.” This
motivated NASA 2’s view that ECAST’s pTA proposal was “a meaningful way to
engage the general public with things that would traditionally be thought of as too
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technical for them to have an opinion on.” Additionally, NASA 2 shared that what they
had learned of the history of technology policy in the U.S., they read ECAST’s pTA
submission as a way of “filling the OTA gap.” With the closure of OTA in 1995, the U.S.
federal government lacked an office dedicated to examining the social and political
impacts of science and technology on the American public. NASA 2 saw pTA as a way
of filling this assessment gap but through a deliberative method of public participation at
the agency level. This training sensitized all three to the technocratic structures of science
and technology decision-making, the resistance to more public participation within these
structures, and of the benefits to greater public participation in science and technology
decision-making.
Positioned to Work
The four policy entrepreneurs held positions throughout NASA that facilitated the
agency adopting ECAST’s pTA submission, and their ability to speak with and garner
support throughout a broad range of colleagues, supervisors, and managers across
different directorates, offices, and programs. NASA 2 and NASA 3 held positions in the
AGC branch of the Asteroid Initiative and had working access to managers in all the
associated offices and directorates. While NASA 1 and NASA 5 were not in offices
directly involved with the AGC or ARM, their STS training sensitized them to how the
RFI created an opportunity for greater public participation. NASA 1 shared that when the
RFI solicitation went out, “it was something that I definitely was aware of and paid
attention to. I became very aware of the ECAST submission and that really made all of us
perk up. And that's really when I got on-board.” For NASA 5, “once it had been put on
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the books, I was basically able to offer my help for free” with full support from their
supervisor.
Even though only NASA 2 and 3 worked within the same office together, these
four individuals from across the agency came together to form a team within NASA to
support pTA becoming a part of the Asteroid Initiative’s program design and decisionmaking. According to NASA 1:
Given that there are so few people at NASA who really subscribe to public
participation in this kind of deeper way than just dissemination of information, it
was kind of easy for us to pull together, to coalesce into a group to work on this.
As I will detail in the politics stream section, working together as a team allowed these
policy entrepreneurs to address the different political pressures and administrative
challenges to designing and implementing pTA as part of the Asteroid Initiative’s
program design and decision-making processes. They were able to do this successfully
because of their administrative knowledge and expertise from years of working in the
U.S. federal bureaucracy, along with their internal knowledge of NASA’s organizational
culture and politics.
Working from the Inside
When the AGC RFI was released in June 2013, the four NASA policy
entrepreneurs had a combined fifteen years of experience in NASA, with an additional
ten years of combined experience in other federal agencies. Their combined knowledge
of NASA’s cultural and political dynamics, in concert with their STS training and their
positions within the Asteroid Initiative directorates and offices, equipped them to address
the concerns colleagues and managers had about pTA-style public participation in
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program design and decision-making. Because of their knowledge of NASA’s cultural
and political dynamics, they knew they had to work strategically so that their supervisors
and NASA managers would accept pTA through the design and implementation phases.
NASA 5 recounted that early on, once ECAST’s pTA submission had been
selected and the policy entrepreneur team convened, they met amongst themselves to
strategize. NASA 5 shared:
Internally to the NASA team, to myself and to [NASA 1] prior to the ECAST
members onboarding, [NASA 2] said at one point that there was some concern
that we could really freak managers out because there's not a clear-cut story on
this. We could get told by NASA management that we have to shut this down. We
need to make sure that this starts going smoothly.
Sensitive to the organizational culture of the agency, NASA policy entrepreneurs knew
they had to have a clear presentation of the benefits of pTA-style public participation to
agency leadership before they could begin to design and implement the pTA with
ECAST. Informed by this knowledge, the NASA policy entrepreneur team strategically
presented the idea of pTA to agency leadership to foster support and acceptance. NASA 1
explained:
There were meetings that we [NASA policy entrepreneurs] set up with various
senior leaders within the agency to gauge their sense of approval and how they
felt about this. . . . We did the meetings individually. That was one thing that we
were very deliberate about was to do one-on-one meetings versus group meetings.
We didn't want it to become group opinions against, or we didn't want anyone to
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feel like they couldn't speak up and share their opinion if it was different than
what we expect.
NASA 2 described the strategy as a “roadshow” approach:
I think one of the things that I always do is take an approach where you roadshow
an idea, meaning you lay out why you think that it's beneficial but hav[e] a kind
of a super drafty form so people that might be opponents to it inside an agency
feel like they can inform the idea a little bit. You go last to the people that you
think are going to be the most opposed to it. By that point, you've already talked
to and have a lot of people [who] are supportive, so it's harder for them to say no.
NASA 1 described the success of this strategy when recounting one of these meetings
with a senior person within the agency:
I was shocked that he was so supportive of it because it was the kind of thing
where I feel like NASA, in public, doesn't do these types of things typically, and
sort of has a party line and a message . . . . we were all just in shock that this was
relatively easy to get support for.
By presenting the project idea as a rough sketch open to changes, it afforded the policy
entrepreneur team flexibility in terms of how to approach senior members of NASA.
Moreover, by strategically approaching senior leaders who would be more
supportive of public participation in program design and decision-making first, it allowed
them to present the project idea to more potentially resistant leaders as being one that
already has support. NASA 2 shared:
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It wasn't that terribly difficult for us to roadshow it because we thought about all
of the things that people might be nervous about and we had answers to it about
why they didn't need to be nervous about it.
The combination of the policy entrepreneurs’ skills and the amassing approval and
support from individual members of senior leadership facilitated their work in the politics
stream concerning designing and implementing pTA. How NASA policy entrepreneurs
chose to structure the working relationship with ECAST is an example of using their
administrative expertise to support pTA.
A Cooperative Agreement
NASA and ECAST did not enter into a conventional grant contract but instead
into a cooperative agreement for the Citizen Forum project. A conventional grant contract
is “financial assistance by the Federal Government that provides support or stimulation to
accomplish a public purpose” wherein an agency funds a project and only the contractor
plans and implements (Ziens, 2010). A “Cooperative Agreement” has the “additional
criterion that the agency expects to have substantial involvement with the recipient in
carrying out the activities contemplated in the agreement” (Ziens, 2010). NASA 2
described a cooperative agreement as “one where both sides were contributing to
conducting the activity.” NASA policy entrepreneurs’ choice to work under a cooperative
agreement exemplifies both their administrative expertise and their knowledge of the
agency’s organizational culture and politics. It allowed NASA policy entrepreneurs to
support designing and implementing pTA method in ways ECAST may not have been
able to do on its own.
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Working under a cooperative agreement was an intentional choice that would
facilitate their ability to foster support for pTA and help navigate the political and cultural
challenges during the design and implementation processes. According to NASA 1:
We deliberately chose to do this by way of a cooperative agreement. It was not a
grant. . . . We wanted to do this as a cooperative agreement because it was so
relevant from a practitioner point of view . . . . it wouldn't have carried weight as
much if it had been exclusively left to ECAST to do. I think that's a really
important point, which is that it needed to be collaborative to be bought into and
trusted by NASA leadership.
An example of this was NASA 2’s observation that using a cooperative agreement was a
way of demonstrating that the NASA policy entrepreneurs would take “personal
accountability” of the project to make sure that the agency got outcomes that were useful
to the Asteroid Initiative. Additionally, NASA 1 shared that a cooperative agreement
“gave us [NASA policy entrepreneurs] the ability to control it. I don't mean that in a
negative sense. I mean, arguably, we're more in touch with what's politically permissible
within the agency.”
A cooperative agreement contract gave NASA personnel the ability to work
closely with ECAST on the pTA project. Moreover, this facilitated building trust with
NASA leadership because NASA personal knew what was “politically permissible within
the agency” and were better able than ECAST to anticipate and temper concerns from
NASA managers about designing and implementing an innovative form of public
engagement method for the agency.
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Administrative Rules of Public Engagement
Opting for a cooperative agreement as the formal working relationship between
NASA and ECAST was not the only use of the policy entrepreneurs’ administrative
knowledge and expertise to support pTA. They also applied it to grappling with the
administrative rules regarding public participation in federal government agency
decision-making at NASA. According to NASA 2, “there's always the standard questions
around, ‘well, how does FACA and the PRA apply to this? You're getting public input on
something, don't you have to go through a lengthy process with OMB?’” NASA 2 shared
that when it comes to these administrative rules concerning public participation in federal
government decision-making, “there's a lot of myths about what you can and can't do,”
leading federal agencies and personnel to be “afraid to engage with the public because
they don't know how to do it within the rules.” The complexity and legal force of these
administrative rules and procedures disincentives innovative forms of public participation
due to a sense of these rules being hurdles to public participation, with the potential for
breaking the rules. NASA 2 shared that for federal government personnel designing and
implementing innovative forms of public participation into agency programs it means
that “often times you’re paving the way if the agency's just not thought that it was worth
it to try to figure out how to do it in the past.”
In this light, the team of NASA policy entrepreneurs had to pave a new path
through these rules to address the administrative concerns NASA managers could have
about pTA. Two NASA policy entrepreneurs mainly did this work: NASA 2 by
strategically quelling concerns with OGI support, and NASA 3 by capitalizing on their
relationship with NASA’s Office of General Counsel (OGC). NASA 2 shared how they
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would often refer to M-10-11, “Guidance on the Use of Challenges and Prizes to Promote
Open Government,” part of the Obama administration’s OGI, to quell legal concerns
regarding administrative rules and to advocate the benefits of pTA. According to NASA
2, M-10-11 addressed the “common questions around legal hurdles” to innovations
concerning public participation by using prizes and challenges to promote public
participation. Moreover, M-10-11 was “basically the permission to the agencies to say,
‘not only are we supportive of this, but here's the reasons why these things are useful’”
(NASA 2).
Even with this broader political and administrative support for innovative forms
of public participation from the OGI, NASA 3 shared that there were still technical
aspects of the administrative rules surrounding pTA that had to be negotiated with
NASA’s OGC. According to NASA 3, OGC and their personnel “are paid and in place
and they are designed to protect the agency. And they take that job very seriously. And
they can be very dead-set in their ways.” According to NASA 3, administrative rules had
already stopped other forms of public engagement from being a part of the Asteroid
Initiative:
There is always the potential threat or challenge of FACA. . . . even Paperwork
Reduction. It prevented us from having people volunteer their time to take
telescopes into their backyard and look for asteroids. That was prohibited.
Both FACA and the PRA had to be considered for elements of public engagement and
participation in the Asteroid Initiative’s AGC. Moreover, if something as seemingly
innocuous as the public using telescopes in their backyards to look for asteroids was
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prohibited, using pTA to gather the public’s thoughts on the Asteroid Initiative to inform
program design and decision-making would likely face administrative challenges.
For the NASA team of policy entrepreneurs, however, NASA 3 said that they
“were fortunate to have some folks in that office [OGC] that really wanted to figure out
how to do things better” in terms of clearing ECAST’s innovative pTA method of public
participation. NASA 3 found that the NASA OGC staff were:
Willing to explore and understand what you're trying to accomplish and have
conversations with you to figure out how to accomplish that so that you actually
become a client of theirs rather than them holding the rules and saying, “you can't
do this, that, or the other.”
Having this kind of relationship with the OGC, according to NASA 3, was central to
building a path through the administrative rules that govern how federal agencies can
engage with the public in government programs.
Through a combination of training in STS theory and practice, administrative
expertise in federal government bureaucracy, holding key positions in NASA, and
general support for greater public participation in agency program design and decisionmaking, four NASA personnel acted as policy entrepreneurs for pTA in the Asteroid
Initiative. As will be detailed in the following sections, their knowledge of NASA’s
political culture and their administrative expertise was used to bring the multiple streams
of the policy process together at the programmatic level.
Problem Stream
As introduced by Kingdon, examining the problem stream consists of identifying
and tracing how an issue (e.g., a budget deficit, gun control, crime rates) becomes the
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priority of policymakers and the public as the problem that needs to be addressed.
Kingdon and MSA scholars find that issues rise in priority through three factors:
indicators, focusing events, and feedback. Indicators are specific rates or numbers used to
measure the magnitude of a problem, such as the cost of a government program or
percentage of Americans without health insurance. Focusing events are high-profile
events that highlight an issue area (e.g., when floods or wildfires motivate discussion of
how to prevent and pay for future environmental disasters). Feedback describes when a
successful solution in one policy area is used on a different problem (e.g., if privatization
works as a solution for one problem, other problems are framed as issues of privatization)
(Frederickson et al., 2015; Kingdon, 2011; Zahariadis, 2007).
Kingdon’s central observation, however, is that every issue has a “perceptual,
interpretive element” given the range of sociopolitical values and interests associated
with it (Kingdon, 2011). Successful policy entrepreneurs capitalize on the values and
interests these factors highlight to shape an issue as not only the problem that deserves
attention, but also framing it as a problem that can be addressed by a specific policy
solution. In short, policy entrepreneurs use their skills to shape an issue into a priority
problem, a problem that is an appropriate vehicle for a policy solution waiting to be
adopted.
In using MSA to trace how NASA adopted pTA as a component of program
design and decision-making, the three traditional factors of the problem stream do not
necessarily apply. However, Kingdon’s observations of how policy entrepreneurs frame
issues into problems that can be addressed by a specific policy solution does apply. For
this case, the problem stream involves tracing how policy entrepreneurs within NASA
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shaped the AGC program into a vehicle for pTA to address an agency problem with
public engagement.
Initial goal of the AGC
NASA 3 described the Asteroid Initiative as a combination of “the [Obama]
administration's desire to have humans go and explore an asteroid” as a proving ground
for a future mission to Mars and “a Congressional mandate to find hazardous asteroids.”
NASA 2 corroborated this in sharing that the Congressional mandate “was an effort that
NASA recognized it couldn't do alone and that would take worldwide collaboration and
even have roles for citizens, citizen inventors, and citizen scientists to get involved in
finding and characterizing more asteroids.” NASA would accomplish testing mission to
Mars capabilities through the ARM while finding hazardous asteroids would be
addressed with the AGC. ARM, according to NASA 3, received “the lion's share of the
money in the Asteroid Initiative” but NASA “didn't have the money to effectively
accomplish the legislative mandate” from Congress to identify hazardous asteroids.
Facing this implementation problem for the Congressional mandate component of the
Asteroid Initiative, NASA created the AGC as an effort “to use novel techniques,
whether citizen science or public-private partnership or Prizes and Challenges as a way of
accelerating work” (NASA 3). Additionally, it was a way to “test a hypothesis of how the
public and other nontraditional partners could be involved in achieving things that NASA
can't do alone” (NASA 2).
While the first five items of the RFI were reminiscent of previous NASA RFI
when it came to addressing technical science and engineering challenges, the sixth item,
“Partnerships and Participatory Engagement,” was unique to the AGC component of the
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Initiative. When asked if this kind of request was common to NASA projects, NASA 3
shared that in years of working in the agency:
I can’t really think of a clear example where a similar question would have been a
part of an RFI because it's just not inherent in a mission directorate’s plan or
designed to have that kind of thinking. So it was, from my perspective, a pretty
unique question.”
NASA 2 shared that this sixth item in the RFI offered “the ability for people to propose to
us unique approaches to public engagement… We were primarily thinking open
innovation. So, we were primarily thinking it'd be prizes and citizen science.” As
originally drafted, the sixth item of the AGC RFI was not a call for deliberative forms of
public participation assessing the Asteroid Initiative, but for a more conventional
approach to science and technology public engagement, such as citizen science.
A Problem with Public Engagement
According to NASA 1, “public engagement for NASA has historically been
largely dissemination of information.” The frame of reference NASA 1 provided was the
Apollo missions from the 1960s, where the public engagement strategy was “build a big
rocket and send it into space and tell everybody how great America is.” The 50th
anniversary of the Apollo missions were, for NASA 1, an opportunity to reframe
NASA’s approach to public engagement. Instead, however, they shared that:
It just kind of grabbed me in a not great way. I feel like NASA was still kind of
going back to that mode of “get the word out”. . . . we haven't progressed in 50
years.”
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According to NASA 1, NASA’s Office of Communications plays an outsized role in
reinforcing this “get the word out” approach to public engagement. NASA 1 described
the Office of Communications as “very strong as far as getting the word out through
traditional media.” When it comes to the use of social media, a relatively new platform
compared to what the agency has historically used, “Folks in the office of communication
will often tell you that that is two-way engagement.”
NASA 5 framed the origins of this “get the word out” strategy of public
engagement in context of the agency’s founding legislation sharing that, “there’s a lot of
NASA communications where they truly care about what we're doing as part of NASA's
mission through the Space Act of 1958 directing NASA to share our mission with the
public.” NASA 5, however, went on to share that “I actually think that these days, this
propagandistic, potentially public-understanding-of-science-driven view is in the
minority. But it can be a powerful minority at some times.” Both NASA 1 and 5
articulated the idea that NASA has historically had a predilection to public engagement in
the form of information dissemination. It can be read as a commitment to the agency’s
organic legislation of sharing its mission with the public. It can also be read, however, as
a “propagandistic” strategy by a “powerful minority” within NASA where the goal is to
tell the American public why what the agency is doing is so great while not being open to
inviting the public to have a meaningful voice in what the agency is doing. Scholarly
examinations of NASA’s political history highlight the agency’s approach to public
engagement as a tool for garner public support to create political capital (Lambright,
2010).
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NASA 1 went on to share that “as far as things like involvement in public policy
and decision-making, that is still something that is hugely limited.” NASA 1 and 5 noted
that even this limited history of engaging the public for the purposes of informing the
agency’s missions and programs were still modeled after the “get the word out” attitude
and had goals of collecting public opinion to better NASA’s public image. NASA 1
pointed to the 1986 Paine report (i.e., Pioneering the Space Frontier: The Report of the
National Commission on Space) where town hall meetings were held to hear civilian
perspectives on the future of space exploration. NASA 5 pointed to similar sets of
meetings and focus groups done under NASA Administrator Daniel Golden in the early
1990s.
According to NASA 1, these focus groups asked the public questions like, “What
do they think of their space program? What do they most value about the space program?
What stands out to them? Do they see the space program as a benefit to them?” In terms
of the town hall meetings in the early 1990s, NASA 5 shared that a NASA manager
involved with them “actually bragged ‘yeah, we went to all these things; we never
learned one new thing.’” After speaking with NASA personnel who had been involved in
both of these town hall meeting activities in the 1980s and 1990s, NASA 1 shared that
they were all “a little skeptical about the real extent of how valuable those were.”
Moreover, they shared that “it's kind of hard to tell the extent to which anybody was
going to take those comments seriously or if these were more to validate what was
already going on.” NASA 1 was of the opinion that these town hall meetings and focus
groups “certainly didn't change the course of anything” at NASA when it came to
methods of public engagement for program design and implementation. In this light,
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NASA has historically had an instrumental or “closed” approach to public engagement
(Stirling, 2008).
Making the AGC a Vehicle for pTA
From interviews with these NASA personnel, it appears that ECAST’s pTA
submission was not necessarily what NASA personnel initially had in mind for the
“Partnerships and Participatory Engagement” item of the AGC RFI. According to
interviews with NASA 2 and 3, citizen science projects for identifying and tracking
asteroids were the expected kinds of submissions. At the same time, NASA 3 shared that
they “hadn't seen another type of engagement like ECAST was proposing, which
therefore made it really attractive as a way to enable us to hear from citizens rather than
[just] be able to answer their questions.” Furthermore, NASA 3 shared that they believed
the ECAST pTA method “could be valuable and wanted to then run the experiment on
our Asteroid Initiative and show that, yes, this is actually a really effective tool and we
could think about using it in future mission design activities.”
For NASA 2, even though the initial idea for the RFI’s sixth item was citizen
science projects, their broader approach to the subject of public engagement in NASA
missions and programs was that “there's no clear decisions in space, and they're not
always just technical decisions.” Their STS training informed this sense of needing to
engage with more than just the technical aspects of space policy. NASA 2 read ECAST’s
pTA submission as a way of “filling the OTA gap in the U.S.” of advising government on
the sociopolitical impacts of science and technology, but through a deliberative method
of public participation in agency mission and program design. Specifically, NASA 2 saw
pTA to be:
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A bit of a wayfinding activity for NASA. To engage the public in a way beyond
just communicating out stuff, but also in a way to be deliberative with them about
their own values and thinking through the decisions that are being made about
very technical topics and ultimately investments that are going to be made.
Initially framed as a way to address a program implementation problem of accomplishing
a Congressional mandate NASA “could not do on its own,” NASA personnel, like NASA
2 and 3, worked to transform the sixth RFI item into a vehicle for greater public
participation in the Asteroid Initiative’s program design and decision-making processes
when they saw ECAST’s pTA submission. Their interest and training in the benefits of
greater public participation in government science and technology decision-making
prompted them to capitalize on the AGC opportunity and OGI support to select ECAST’s
pTA submission as something that answered the RFI’s sixth item.
This initial adoption decision, however, was made with program-level discretion.
As NASA 5 shared, the pTA project could still have been shut down by agency
leadership in the design or implementation phases if they had not organized themselves to
address the organizational politics, culture, and administrative challenges facing
innovative forms of public participation. I will detail these in the politics stream section.
First, however, I examine the policy stream and the role the STS community and ECAST
have played to develop pTA as a solution. This will foster a better understanding of how
ECAST presented pTA to NASA and add texture to the challenges to come in the politics
stream.
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Policy Stream
Kingdon describes the policy stream as a space to observe how the “primeval
soup” of ideas within a policy area compete for attention and acceptance as a solution to a
problem. Policy communities and networks composed of policy researchers, analysts, and
practitioners situated within and outside of government shape ideas and present them as
solutions to problems. Examining the policy stream is a means of identifying the policy
communities, networks, their policy ideas, and tracing how they present these ideas to
policy- and decision makers as solutions to problems (Kingdon, 2011). A central
component of MSA is that policy solutions often predate policy problems. Policy
communities develop ideas, or solutions, and look for specific policy problems they can
attach their ideas to. The policy and problem stream interact through how policy
entrepreneurs in these policy communities within and outside of government present
policy ideas as the appropriate solutions to a policy problem, while simultaneously
framing policy problems to be vehicles for their solution.
When applied to reconstructing the contexts surrounding how pTA became a part
of NASA’s Asteroid Initiative program design and decision-making processes, an
examination of the policy stream involves identifying how the larger STS policy
community in general and the ECAST policy network in particular positioned pTA as a
solution to a public engagement problem facing NASA. This means tracing how ECAST
began to develop pTA as a solution to the issue of deficient public participation in
science and technology decision-making, and how ECAST shaped pTA as a solution to
NASA’s public engagement problem. Lastly, an observation of how a strategy in the STS
policy community and in the ECAST policy network of training individuals to become
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policy entrepreneurs in government science and technology agencies is key to
understanding how opportunities are created within formal science and technology
decision-making processes.
STS as a Policy Community
Researchers and practitioners in the Science and Technology Studies (STS)
community have for decades advocated the need for greater public participation in
deciding issues of science and technology in society (Carroll, 1971; Jasanoff, 2012;
Nelkin, 1977, 1979). pTA has been developed as a method that creates opportunities for
the public to collectively learn and deliberate on questions of science and technology, and
as a vehicle to share the results of these public deliberations with decision-makers to
inform policy (J. Durant, 1999; Guston, 2011; Hennen, 1999, 2012; Sclove, 2010a). With
the advent of the U.S. federal government’s National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) in
2000, certain segments of the STS community found a source of funding to develop pTA
methods and practices. A central goal of NNI was to fund projects that would develop an
understanding of how nanotechnology may benefit society. Motivated by the NNI, the
National Science Foundation began the National Nanotechnology Coordinated
Infrastructure to fund projects in line with the NNI’s vision.
A founding member of ECAST (ECAST 11) shared that this funding supported
institutions like the Center for Nanotechnology in Society, a member institution of
ECAST, to develop and implement pTA in coordination with informal science education
centers, citizen science projects, and science and technology policy research institutions,
as in the case of the National Citizens’ Technology Forum in 2008. The National
Citizens’ Technology Forum, however, ran parallel with formal government science and
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technology decision-making concerning nanotechnology and human enhancement,
outside of formal government processes.
ECAST as a Policy Network for pTA
In 2010, a group of research centers, informal science education centers, citizen
science programs and non-partisan science and technology policy think tanks from across
the U.S. came together and formed the Expert and Citizen Assessment of Science and
Technology (ECAST). The network’s objective is to create opportunities for pTA where
the public can learn and deliberate with each other on complex issues of science and
technology in society with the goal of incorporating the results of these deliberations to
government policy- and decision makers. Their first large scale pTA project was
organizing the U.S. component of the World Wide Views on Biodiversity in September
of 2012. Coordinated by the Danish Board of Technology, World Wide Views on
Biodiversity was a global democratic deliberation on biodiversity where 25 countries
participated in engaging their citizens on biodiversity policy issues with the goal of
disseminating the results to the Eleventh Conference of the Parties of the U.N.
Convention on Biological diversity (COP11).
While the global results would be presented at COP11, ECAST attempted to share
the U.S. results of the U.S. deliberations with the U.S. government representatives to
COP11 with the aim of informing the delegation’s decision-making. The actual policy
impact of the efforts were rather indirect, however, insofar as there was no clear
connection between these independently organized deliberations and formal U.S. federal
government decision-making processes (e.g., Delborne et al., 2013). With this
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experience, ECAST began to look for ways to embed its pTA method into formal U.S.
government science and technology decision-making.
The summer of 2013 was an opportunity to open that door with a U.S. federal
science and technology agency when an ECAST member attended a meeting of NASA’s
National Research Council Committee on Human Spaceflight. Sharing their experience
in a blogpost, they noted that the portion of the meeting on public and stakeholder
opinions was closed to the public except for a 30-minute morning session where only two
public participants were present. The 30-minute session was a presentation on the
agency’s public image with a focus on how surveys and polls show that the public lacks
an understanding of NASA’s value, and that the agency needs to do a better job of
informing the public about what the agency is doing. The ECAST member observed,
however, that “NASA, like too many government organizations, has no plans to shape its
future by engaging with the public. Only those who have existing knowledge and
understanding of NASA’s programs are having any influence, while members of the
public without space and aeronautics backgrounds are not seen as equal stakeholders in
the future of the program” (Mabry, 2013).
The post concludes by suggesting that the definition of “stakeholder” needs to be
broadened to include “average citizens and unusual suspects,” and that the extent of
NASA’s public engagement be something more than campaigns informing the public
about what it is doing (Mabry, 2013). According to ECAST, the blogger writes,
engagement needs to be in the form of a dialogue that can “enrich debate and reflect the
values of our democratic society” (Mabry, 2013). They pointed to the pTA method and
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format used during the World Wide Views on Biodiversity forums as an example of how
it can be done.
Once published, the ECAST blog was picked up by NASA Watch, an
independent website that is often critical of the agency’s programs and decisions.
According to ECAST 1, “everybody from up to the level of administrator will deny ever
reading it, but they all follow it very, very closely” as a means of knowing what the
criticisms from the science, technology, and engineering communities are of the agency.
NASA Watch framed its commentary of the ECAST blog with the headline, “Meetings
on Public Opinion on Space Closed to the Public.” NASA personnel familiar with
ECAST (NASA 5) read the NASA Watch post, contacted ECAST, and informed them
that there was an open RFI for the AGC with an item for “Partnerships and Participatory
Engagement.”
While the language in the RFI made explicit reference to engagement through
citizen science, ECAST members thought the RFI represented an opportunity for pTA to
be a part of government science and technology decision-making processes. The National
Research Council Committee on Human Spaceflight’s findings were that NASA needed
to do a better job of helping the public understand its projects, programs, and value. In
this light, ECAST 1 shared that their approach to the RFI was, “we're going to put one in
anyway and make our case that the Asteroid Initiative was one of the most misunderstood
programs” in the agency and that pTA could be a tool to address this issue. ECAST 11
elaborated on this strategy of speaking to the agency’s concern with public approval of its
programs. ECAST 11 shared the insight that:
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NASA has very self-consciously tried to deal with the fact that their work is more
in the public eye than certainly NSF [National Science Foundation], probably
NIH [National Institutes of Health] and more than a lot of the other mission
agencies, too. I think some of it does go back to NASA's quasi-populist origin.
As a mission-driven agency with a history of high-profile missions with large price tags
and failures that have been nation-wide events, the agency’s main concern with the public
is public approval more so than public participation in program design and decisionmaking, as highlighted by the findings presented at the National Research Council
Committee on Human Spaceflight 2013 meeting.
At the same time, however, ECAST 11 describes the space community and
NASA as a “bubble” and an “echo chamber” because when NASA announces new
projects and programs, “everybody who follows space gets in real close and tight and
nobody who doesn't follow space gets to have a word in.” In terms of its participants,
NASA’s public engagement strategy has been limited to those who are already active in
the space community and, in terms of content, limited to asking the public their opinions
on and approval of the agency’s programs. ECAST saw the AGC RFI as a potential
vehicle for pTA into the agency’s science and technology decision-making processes. It
did this by framing pTA as an opportunity to help the agency with its perceived problem
of how the public misunderstands and undervalues its programs, while also reaching out
to members of the public who are not within the space community.
The ECAST Network within Government
Both ECAST 1 and ECAST 11 shared that key to ECAST becoming aware of the
AGC and its sixth RFI item of “Partnerships and Participatory Engagement” was that a
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NASA employee trained in STS and familiar with ECAST-member institutions informed
them of the opportunity. Of the four policy entrepreneurs within NASA, three had
graduate-level training in STS, and two were familiar with ECAST and its pTA method
previous to their involvement in the Asteroid Initiative pTA project. Individuals with
graduate-level STS training going into government science and technology agencies is, of
course, a matter of personal choice and opportunity. ECAST 11, however, shared that a
strategy often deployed by the ECAST network is to maintain and develop relationships
with those who have gone through their academic programs and matriculated into
government agency jobs.
An outcome of this is that there may be policy entrepreneurs in place who help
soften the policy environment within agencies, and that may make pTA more attractive to
agency leadership. As I will detail in the politics stream section, these policy
entrepreneurs within NASA did soften political concerns agency managers had about an
innovative form of public participation in agency program design and decision-making.
Moreover, they did this in ways ECAST might not have been able to do from the outside
without internal knowledge of agency political culture. As such, this strategy of
maintaining and developing relationships with individuals who have gone through STS
training proved to be crucial to successfully adopting, designing, and implementing pTA
in the programmatic decision-making processes.
Politics Stream
While policy entrepreneurs can do work to shape problems and solutions in the
problem and policy streams, the politics stream is composed of the political challenges
that must be grappled with to bring the streams together and create opportunities for
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change in policy adoption and decision-making. Kingdon identified three main
components of the politics stream: the national mood, organized political forces, and
internal government events (2011). The national mood refers to how shifts in public
opinion about certain issues or policy areas change the political feasibility of addressing
problems or applying solutions. Organized political forces refers to how support or
opposition from interest groups affects the feasibility of changes to certain policies.
Lastly, internal government events are changes in executive administrations (i.e.,
Presidential or gubernatorial agendas), or when election results change which political
party is in control of legislative chambers. Analyzing the political stream means
identifying the greatest sources of political pressure around a policy problem and
solution, and tracing how those political pressures inform the processes of selecting
policy solutions and problems.
At the programmatic level, there are some additional elements to the politics
stream. In this case, while there were references to the national mood surrounding
asteroid hazards, and how some science, technology, and engineering associations would
respond to pTA in agency decision-making, interviews demonstrated these to be minimal
concerns for the agency and policy entrepreneurs. Identifying the broader Presidential
agenda of greater public participation in government, however, was something that
NASA policy entrepreneurs appealed to in order to make their argument in support of
pTA to agency leadership. Moreover, interviewees suggested that NASA’s culture
concerning forms of public participation different from its history of public engagement,
and how it may impact the agency’s political agreements with its political stakeholders,
were the largest components of the politics stream.
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Open Government Initiative
The goal of the Obama Administration’s OGI was to encourage transparency,
participation, and collaboration in U.S. federal government agencies through a series of
OMB memos and incentives. For example, one of the memos stated that “it is
Administration policy to strongly encourage agencies to utilize prizes and challenges as
tools for advancing open government, innovation, and the agency’s mission” (Ziens,
2010). NASA policy entrepreneurs capitalized on the administrative support for
innovative public participation in agency program design and decision-making from the
OGI by using it to soften concerns surrounding the administrative rules regarding pTA. In
this case, the OGI provided a backdrop that made implementing innovative forms of
public participation more politically feasible within NASA at the time.
Organizational Politics and Culture
Political Stakeholders

NASA policy entrepreneurs shared that like most federal agencies, NASA is
sensitive to the political processes that impact its budget and support. NASA 1 shared
that “when NASA says stakeholders, they are talking about a pretty narrow group of
stakeholders. NASA is talking about the Presidential administration and the Congress –
political stakeholders.” While NASA has democratic stakeholders in the American public
and commercial stakeholders in its aerospace technology and engineering contractors, the
agency has two primary political stakeholders: the political body that controls its budget
and legislates its mandates (i.e., Congress) and, as a mission-driven agency, the office
that directs its mission objectives (i.e., the Executive office of the White House).
Moreover, NASA 1, through several years of working at the agency, shared that they
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have noticed that NASA is “apprehensive about disrupting whatever balance and
agreements the leadership thinks it has with the White House and the Congress.”
An example of this “apprehension” is when agency leadership is deciding on
which projects to work on and how those projects are presented to the public and its
political stakeholders. NASA 1 described an instance when a project appeared to be
something different from what the political stakeholders had sanctioned. They
characterized the leadership’s attitude as, “We couldn't possibly put that out there
because we already knew what we were going to do, because it was already politically
blessed.” Agency leadership is resistant to some ideas because they are sensitive to the
need to stay in alignment with the projects and directions that have been “politically
blessed” by Congress and the White House.
In the eyes of the NASA policy entrepreneur team, ECAST’s pTA approach was a
marked departure from the agency’s usual public engagement practices. All five NASA
personnel interviewed shared that they had never seen anything like the ECAST method
of public engagement at the agency before. NASA 1 highlighted how the ECAST
approach offered NASA “such a different view of the public role than we had typically
seen in the agency.” Moreover, according to NASA 1, “ECAST’s methodology [of public
engagement] was the first I'm aware of that NASA has ever used.” NASA 4, speaking
from a higher-ranking perspective within the agency than NASA 1, 2, 3, and 5, shared
that when it comes to program planning, “to show a public audience something in a very
preliminary stage and get their thoughts and reactions, to ask ‘what do you think of this
idea?’ It's certainly not the way the agency usually does those things.”
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Given how much of a departure it was from NASA’s historical use of public
engagement as public opinion measuring, pTA was a kind of method that could
potentially disrupt the “politically blessed” agreements it had with Congress and the
White House. The NASA policy entrepreneur team shared that there were concerns from
agency managers and leadership that the results of the pTA exercises could deviate from
what had already been politically agreed upon with its political stakeholders. NASA 2
said that “from a public perception standpoint, some people might see risks associated
with asking the public what they think and then does that mean you have to do what they
say.” NASA 1 added that there were concerns of “what if the public comes in and says
we think we should do something 180 degrees different than what we've already got an
agreement to do?” As presented in the policy entrepreneur section, the NASA policy
entrepreneur team knew to anticipate these kinds of concerns from agency management
and leadership regarding maintaining a good relationship with their political stakeholders
and were able to present pTA in a way that navigated these apprehensions. Specifically,
they framed pTA and its results as “one input of many” that could “just be more
information for you to talk about when making a decision” (NASA 2). This framing
softened the political apprehensions enough to allow pTA to be designed and
implemented with minimal obstacles.
Office of Communications

Even though some NASA managers and leadership voiced these kinds of
concerns, NASA 1 shared that most of the “apprehension” about what may disrupt
“politically blessed” agreements, “really comes from our comms and legislative folks
more so than our technical senior leadership.” NASA 2 corroborated this and added that
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public participation concerns are “more of a communications office fear usually, a
hesitance maybe to talk about planning before a decision has been made.” NASA 1
shared that the Office of Communications’ strategy for controlling messaging can be seen
in its hierarchy of information dissemination:
There are press releases, which are sort of the crème de la crème. This is a really
important thing to share and we're going to plaster it everywhere we can. Then
we've got things that we call web features, which kind of go up very quietly on
the website. You may or may not find them. And then certain things get tweeted
out through social media.
According to NASA 1, the communication strategy favors information and projects that
are in alignment with the agency’s “politically blessed” agreements with Congress and
the White House. Information on “politically blessed” projects are touted in formal press
releases while other projects that could possibly destabilize these agreements are less
visibly presented through web features on the agency’s website.
The NASA policy entrepreneurs’ knowledge of and experience with the agency’s
organizational politics and culture equipped them to navigate how the Office of
Communications controls messaging in order to avoid speculation about ideas that are not
“politically blessed.” NASA 1 shared that the team of policy entrepreneurs made it a
point to “not push too hard with OCOM [Office of Communications]” during the
planning, implementation, and reporting phases of the Citizen’s Forum pTA project.
NASA 1 detailed that:
As much as we wanted to tout this and share it and announce it broadly because it
was so new and different, it was sort of a soft, quiet announcement. You had to
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find it. That was as far as I think both when we announced that we were doing it
and then I think when we closed it. I think they were both very quiet so not to get
the comms people spun up.
Getting the Office of Communications too “spun up” at the beginning could have
possibly meant getting the pTA project flagged as something that would disrupt the
“politically blessed” agreements the agency has with Congress and the White House. The
NASA policy entrepreneurs chose to both announce the Citizen’s Forum pTA exercises
and share its results through a web feature to avoid as much scrutiny as possible.
Implications
We can draw at least three implications from this case study. First, because of
their knowledge of the agency’s organizational culture and politics and their expertise in
the details of U.S. federal bureaucracy, the work done by policy entrepreneurs within
NASA was essential to adopting, designing, and implementing pTA for the Asteroid
Initiative’s mission and program design. This knowledge and expertise was critical to
navigating the barriers and challenges to innovative forms of public participation in
NASA program design and decision-making processes in ways ECAST could not have
on its own. Policy entrepreneurs in ECAST did work in the policy stream to shape pTA
as a solution to problems of public engagement and participation in government science
and technology decision-making. It took policy entrepreneurs within NASA, however, to
create the opportunity to adopt it by transforming aspects of the Asteroid Initiative in the
problem stream so that the AGC could be a vehicle for pTA. We in STS have an
expansive literature on how expertise contributes to creating undemocratic decisionmaking processes and outcomes (e.g., Jasanoff, 1992, 2003; Turner, 2001), along with
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literature on how expertise can be used as a political tool in partisan policy debates (e.g.,
Hoppe, 2005, 2009; Pielke Jr, 2007). We lack, however, a rich understanding of how
bureaucratic expertise may, in some cases, actually enable more public participation in
decision-making.
The second implication follows from the first. This case demonstrates that it took
policy entrepreneurs within NASA to navigate the political controls that often create
barriers to innovative forms of public participation. Developing a more detailed
knowledge and understanding of the bureaucratic contexts in which participation takes
place is central to developing participatory theory and practice that is better equipped to
take on the challenges of embedding innovative forms of public participation into formal
government science and technology decision-making processes. STS participatory theory
and practice can benefit from further examining the political pressures on and
administrative challenges to innovative public participation that are built into the
institutional cultures and administrative structures of the American federal bureaucracy,
and how they shape the processes of designing and implementing.
Lastly, we in STS may benefit from using well-established policy studies and
public administration frameworks to examine the political, policy, and administrative
factors surrounding innovative forms of public participation embedded within formal
government science and technology decision-making processes. A modified form of
MSA for the U.S. federal agency programmatic level supplemented with the political
control framework is useful for organizing, describing, and identifying the central
political, policy, and administrative elements that shape how innovative forms of public
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participation are embedded within government agency programs, and key actors who
facilitate those processes.
Conclusion
This case study of pTA in NASA’s Asteroid Initiative’s program design and
decision-making processes offers us three areas to develop in our participatory theory and
practice. First, it highlights the important role played by policy entrepreneurs within
NASA in creating opportunities for innovative forms of public participation. Their
internal knowledge of organizational culture, politics, and their bureaucratic expertise
was vital to managing the barriers to and capitalizing on the opportunities for pTA.
Policy entrepreneurs advocating innovations in public participation are important to STS
participatory practice. Second, creating greater opportunities for public participation in
government science and technology decision-making processes requires a greater
knowledge and understanding of the political pressures and administrative challenges
facing innovative approaches to public participation in program design and
implementation. Third, frameworks from policy studies and public administration
scholarship like MSA and political control are useful to STS participatory theory and
practice in terms of organizing, describing, identifying, analyzing, and explaining not
only the political, policy, administrative contexts but also the actions of behaviors of
actors within those contexts.
There are some limitations, however, to this case study. In terms of theory and
analytic framework, MSA is typically used to examine larger scale policy change. While
applying it with some modifications to this case at the programmatic level has clearly
identified important processes and relationships, more research using it in this way will
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develop its descriptive and analytic strengths as well as its weaknesses (e.g., Fowler,
2019). In terms of methods, there are two limitations to highlight. First, there is a six-year
gap between when the Asteroid Initiative’s AGC was started in 2013 and when the
interviews were conducted with NASA personnel and ECAST members in 2019. While
interviewees recalled important impressions and perspectives on the pTA project, specific
details may have been lost to time; when interviewees were unsure about details, we
worked to specify or corroborate them, or else we did not reference them in this study.
Conducting interviews closer to the completion of the Citizen’s Forum pTA exercises
may have afforded greater recollection of details from interviewees.
Second, while I was able to conduct interviews with NASA personnel who were
policy entrepreneurs for the Citizen’s Forum pTA project, there was limited access to
NASA mid-level managers and leadership. Quite simply, it became clear that it would be
politically uncomfortable for our contacts in the agency to try to arrange those interviews,
and it also became clear that others we might have talked to would have had little
interaction with the design and implementation of the pTA itself. Even so, while
interviews with them may have been sparse on the details of the Citizen’s Forum pTA
project, mid-level managers and NASA leadership may have had greater insight into the
political pressures the agency faces regarding innovative forms of public participation in
agency mission and program decision-making processes. It is also possible that the policy
entrepreneurs we spoke too might have embellished or aggrandized their roles in
shepherding pTA, though their versions of events and the roles they played were
corroborated by the ECAST interviews we conducted.
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Lastly, this case study is an examination of the political, policy, and
administrative contexts surrounding the adoption design, and implementation of pTA into
the science and technology program design and implementation decision-making
processes of just one U.S. federal agency. It cannot comprehensively speak to all the
potential elements that inform the political pressures and administrative challenges
different agencies may face because of their history or because of the science and
technology issue being addressed. Additional research into cases of innovative forms of
public participation, like pTA, that were embedded into U.S. federal agency program
design and implementation decision-making processes would afford comparative
analyses that could begin to suggest categories and trends across political and
administrative environments. Having this kind of empirical knowledge and developing
analytic frameworks from it could benefit our participatory theory and practice when it
comes to creating opportunities for designing and implementing more innovative forms
of public participation in government science and technology decision-making processes.

107
References
Anderson, S. E., DeLeo, R. A., & Taylor, K. (2019). Policy entrepreneurs, legislators,
and agenda setting: Information and influence. Policy Studies Journal, 48(3),
587–611.
Arnstein, S. R. (1969). A ladder of citizen participation. Journal of the American Institute
of Planners, 35(4), 216–224.
Béland, D., & Howlett, M. (2016). The role and impact of the multiple-streams approach
in comparative policy analysis. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis:
Research and Practice, 18(3), 221–227.
Bertelli, A. M., & Lynn, L. (2006). Madison’s managers: Public administration and the
constitution. JHU Press.
Bertrand, P., Pirtle, Z., & Tomblin, D. (2017). Participatory technology assessment for
Mars mission planning: Public values and rationales. Space Policy, 42, 41–53.
Birkland, T. A. (2019). An introduction to the policy process: Theories, concepts, and
models of public policy making. Routledge.
Bora, A. (2010). Technoscientific normativity and the “iron cage” of law. Science,
Technology, & Human Values, 35(1), 3–28.
Bryer, T. A. (2013). Public participation in regulatory decision-making: Cases from
regulations.gov. Public Performance & Management Review, 37(2), 263–279.
Burgess, J., & Chilvers, J. (2006). Upping the ante: A conceptual framework for
designing and evaluating participatory technology assessments. Science and
Public Policy, 33(10), 713–728.
Cairney, P. (2018). Three habits of successful policy entrepreneurs. Policy & Politics,
46(2), 199–215.
Cairney, P., & Jones, M. D. (2016). Kingdon’s multiple streams approach: What is the
empirical impact of this universal theory? Policy Studies Journal, 44(1), 37–58.
Callon, M., Lascoumes, P., & Barthe, Y. (2009). Acting in an uncertain world. MIT
Press.

108
Campbell, J. L., Quincy, C., Osserman, J., & Pedersen, O. K. (2013). Coding in-depth
semistructured interviews: Problems of unitization and intercoder reliability and
agreement. Sociological Methods & Research, 42(3), 294–320.
Carroll, J. D. (1971). Participatory technology. Science, 171(3972), 647–653.
Charmaz, K. (1990). ‘Discovering’ chronic illness: Using grounded theory. Social
Science & Medicine, 30(11), 1161–1172.
Charmaz, K. (2017). The power of constructivist grounded theory for critical inquiry.
Qualitative Inquiry, 23(1), 34–45.
Chilvers, J., & Kearnes, M. (2020). Remaking participation in science and democracy.
Science, Technology, & Human Values, 45(3), 347–380.
Cigler, B. A. (1990). Public administration and the paradox of professionalization. Public
Administration Review, 50(6), 637–653.
Collins, H., & Evans, R. (2002). The third wave of science studies: Studies of expertise
and experience. Social Studies of Science, 32(2), 235–296.
Delborne, J., Schneider, J., Bal, R., Cozzens, S., & Worthington, R. (2013). Policy
pathways, policy networks, and citizen deliberation: Disseminating the results of
World Wide Views on Global Warming in the USA. Science and Public Policy,
40(3), 378–392.
Delgado, A., Lein Kjølberg, K., & Wickson, F. (2011). Public engagement coming of
age: From theory to practice in STS encounters with nanotechnology. Public
Understanding of Science, 20(6), 826–845.
Durant, J. (1999). Participatory technology assessment and the democratic model of the
public understanding of science. Science and Public Policy, 26(5), 313–319.
Durant, R. F. (1995). The democratic deficit in America. Political Science Quarterly,
110(1), 25–47.
Emery, S. B., Mulder, H. A. J., & Frewer, L. J. (2015). Maximizing the policy impacts of
public engagement: A European study. Science, Technology, & Human Values,
40(3), 421–444.

109
Feenberg, A. (2012). Questioning technology. Routledge.
Fereday, J., & Muir-Cochrane, E. (2006). Demonstrating rigor using thematic analysis: A
hybrid approach of inductive and deductive coding and theme development.
International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 5(1), 80–92.
Fiorino, D. J. (1990). Citizen participation and environmental risk: A survey of
institutional mechanisms. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 15(2), 226-243.
Fowler, L. (2019). Problems, politics, and policy streams in policy implementation.
Governance, 32(3), 403-420.
Frederickson, H. G., Smith, K. B., Larimer, C. W., & Licari, M. J. (2015). The public
administration theory primer (3rd ed.). Westview Press.
George, A. L., Bennett, A., Lynn-Jones, S. M., & Miller, S. E. (2005). Case studies and
theory development in the social sciences. MIT Press.
Goodsell, C. T. (2014). The new case for bureaucracy. CQ press.
Griessler, E. (2012). One size fits all? On the institutionalization of participatory
technology assessment and its interconnection with national ways of policy
making: the cases of Switzerland and Austria. Poiesis & Praxis: International
Journal of Ethics of Science and Technology Assessment, 9(1–2), 61–80.
Grundmann, R. (2017). The problem of expertise in knowledge societies. Minerva, 55(1),
25–48.
Gustetic, J. L., Friedensen, V., Kessler, J. L., Jackson, S., & Parr, J. (2018). NASA’s
asteroid grand challenge: Strategy, results, and lessons learned. Space Policy,
4445, 1–13.
Guston, D. H. (1999). Evaluating the first U.S. consensus conference: The impact of the
citizens’ panel on telecommunications and the future of democracy. Science,
Technology, & Human Values, 24(4), 451–482.
Guston, D. H. (2011). Participating despite questions: Toward a more confident
participatory technology assessment. Science and Engineering Ethics, 17(4), 691697.

110
Guston, D. H. (2014). Building the capacity for public engagement with science in the
United States. Public Understanding of Science, 23(1), 53–59.
Guston, D. H., & Sarewitz, D. (2002). Real-time technology assessment. Technology in
Society, 24(1–2), 93–109.
Hennen, L. (1999). Participatory technology assessment: A response to technical
modernity? Science and Public Policy, 26(5), 303–312.
Hennen, L. (2012). Why do we still need participatory technology assessment? Poiesis &
Praxis, 9, 27–41.
Holdren, J. P., Orszag, P. R., & Prouty, P. F. (2009). President’s memorandum on
transparency and open government—Interagency collaboration (Memorandum M
09–12; pp. 1–3). Executive Office of the President.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2009/m
09-12.pdf
Hoppe, R. (2005). Rethinking the science-policy nexus: From knowledge utilization and
science technology studies to types of boundary arrangements. Poiesis & Praxis,
3(3), 199–215.
Hoppe, R. (2009). Scientific advice and public policy: Expert advisers’ and
policymakers’ discourses on boundary work. Poiesis & Praxis, 6(3–4), 235–263.
Jasanoff, S. (1992). Science, politics, and the renegotiation of expertise at EPA. Osiris, 7,
194–217.
Jasanoff, S. (2003). (No?) Accounting for expertise. Science and Public Policy, 30(3),
157–162.
Jasanoff, S. (2012). Genealogies of STS. Social Studies of Science, 42(3), 435–441.
Kaminski, A. P. (2012). Can the demos make a difference? Prospects for participatory
democracy in shaping the future course of US space exploration. Space Policy,
28(4), 225–233.

111
Kaplan, L., Farooque, M., Sarewitz, D., & Tomblin, D. (2021) [Forthcoming]. Designing
participatory technology assessments: A reflexive method for advancing the
public role in science policy decision-making. Journal of Technological
Forecasting and Social Change, 171(120974).
Kingdon, J. W. (1984). Agendas, alternatives, and public policies. Little & Brown.
Kingdon, J. W. (2011). Agendas, alternatives, and public policies (Updated 2nd Edition).
Pearson.
Kleinman, D. L., Powell, M., Grice, J., Adrian, J., & Lobes, C. (2007). A toolkit for
democratizing science and technology policy: The practical mechanics of
organizing a consensus conference. Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society,
27(2), 154–169.
Krabbenborg, L., & Mulder, H. A. J. (2015). Upstream public engagement in
nanotechnology: Constraints and opportunities. Science Communication, 37(4),
452–484.
Krick, E. (2015). Negotiated expertise in policy-making: How governments use hybrid
advisory committees. Science and Public Policy, 42(4), 487–500.
Lambright, W. H. (2010). Exploring Space: NASA at 50 and beyond. Public
Administration Review, 70(1), 151–157.
Liberatore, A., & Funtowicz, S. (2003). ‘Democratising’ expertise, ‘expertising’
democracy: What does this mean, and why bother? Science and Public Policy,
30(3), 146–150.
Lipsky, M. (2010). Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public
service. Russell Sage Foundation.
Loeber, A., Versteeg, W., & Griessler, E. (2011). Stop looking up the ladder: Analyzing
the impact of participatory technology assessment from a process perspective.
Science and Public Policy, 38(8), 599–608.

112
Long, R. J., & Beierle, T. C. (1999). The Federal Advisory Committee Act and public
participation in environmental policy. (pp. 1–46).
https://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.10817.
Mabry, C. (2013, July 8). Extracting public and stakeholder opinions: Unusual suspects
need not apply. Expert & Citizen Assessment of Science & Technology.
https://ecastnetwork.org/2013/07/08/redefining-stakeholder-to-include-unusualsuspects/
Maher, C., Hadfield, M., Hutchings, M., & de Eyto, A. (2018). Ensuring rigor in
qualitative data analysis: A design research approach to coding combining NVivo
with traditional material methods. International Journal of Qualitative Methods,
17(1), 1–13.
McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R. G., & Weingast, B. R. (1987). Administrative procedures
asinstruments of political control. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization,
3(2), 243–277.
Meier, K. J., & O’Toole Jr, L. J. (2006). Bureaucracy in a democratic state: A
governance perspective. JHU Press.
Mintrom, M., & Norman, P. (2009). Policy entrepreneurship and policy change. Policy
Studies Journal, 37(4), 649–667.
Nelkin, D. (1977). Technological decisions and democracy: European experiments in
public participation. Sage.
Nelkin, D. (1979). Scientific knowledge, public policy, and democracy: A review essay.
Knowledge, 1(1), 106–122.
Nowotny, H. (2003). Democratising expertise and socially robust knowledge. Science
and Public Policy, 30(3), 151–156.
Orszag, P. R. (2009). Open government directive (Memorandum M-10–06; pp. 1–11).
Office of Management and
Budget.https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/
2010/10-06.pdf

113
Pielke Jr, R. A. (2007). The honest broker: Making sense of science in policy and politics.
Cambridge University Press.
Powell, M., & Colin, M. (2008). Meaningful citizen engagement in science and
technology: What would it really take? Science Communication, 30(1), 126–136.
Powell, M., & Kleinman, D. (2008). Building citizen capacities for participation in
nanotechnology decision-making: The democratic virtues of the consensus
conference model. Public Understanding of Science, 17(3), 329–348.
Rask, M. (2013). The tragedy of citizen deliberation – two cases of participatory
technology assessment. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 25(1), 3955.
Rawat, P., & Morris, J. C. (2016). Kingdon’s “streams” model at thirty: Still relevant in
the 21st century? Politics & Policy, 44(4), 608–638.
Reber, B. (2006). The ethics of participatory technology assessment. Technology
Assessment in Theory and Practice, 15(2), 73–81.
Rohr, J. A. (1986). To run a constitution: The legitimacy of the administrative state.
University Press of Kansas.
Rowe, G., & Frewer, L. J. (2000). Public participation methods: A framework for
evaluation. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 25(1), 3–29.
Rowe, G., & Frewer, L. J. (2005). A typology of public engagement mechanisms.
Science, Technology, & Human Values, 30(2), 251–290.
Saretzki, T. (2012). Legitimation problems of participatory processes in technology
assessment and technology policy. Poiesis & Praxis, 9, 7–26.
Sarewitz, D. (2000). Science and environmental policy: An excess of objectivity. In R.
Frodeman (Ed.), Earth matters: The earth sciences, philosophy, and the claims of
community (pp. 79–98). Prentice Hall.
Sarewitz, D. (2004). How science makes environmental controversies worse.
Environmental Science & Policy, 7(5), 385–403.

114
Sclove, R. (2010a). Reinventing technology assessment. Issues in Science & Technology,
27(1), 34–38.
Sclove, R. (2010b). Reinventing technology assessment for the 21st century. Washington,
DC: Science and Technology Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.3402.5364
Selin, C., Rawlings, K. C., de Ridder-Vignone, K., Sadowski, J., Altamirano Allende, C.,
Gano, G., Davies, S. R., & Guston, D. H. (2017). Experiments in engagement:
Designing public engagement with science and technology for capacity building.
Public Understanding of Science, 26(6), 634–649.
Shapiro, S. (2013). The Paperwork Reduction Act: Benefits, costs and directions for
reform. Government Information Quarterly, 30(2), 204–210.
Shapiro, S. (2020). Reinvigorating the Paperwork Reduction Act. Regulation, 43, 36–42.
Smith, N., Mitton, C., Dowling, L., Hiltz, M.-A., Campbell, M., & Gujar, S. A. (2015).
Introducing new priority setting and resource allocation processes in a Canadian
healthcare organization: A case study analysis informed by multiple streams
theory. International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 5(1), 23–31.
Stirling, A. (2008). “Opening up” and “closing down”: Power, participation, and
pluralism in the social appraisal of technology. Science, Technology, & Human
Values, 33(2), 262–294.
Tomblin, D., Worthington, R., Gano, G., Farooque, M., Sittenfeld, D., & Lloyd, J. (2015).
Informing NASA’s Asteroid Initiative: A Citizen’s Forum (pp. 1–32).
https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ecast-informing-nasaasteroid-initiative_tagged.pdf
Turner, S. (2001). What is the problem with experts? Social Studies of Science, 31(1),
123–149.
Turner, S. (2013). The politics of expertise. Routledge.

115
U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (2013a, June). Asteroid Initiative
request for information (Solicitation No. NNH13ZCQ001L).
http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=44217
U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (2013b, August). Asteroid RFI
generates substantial interest from the public.
https://www.nasa.gov/content/asteroid-rfi-generates-substantial-interest-from-the
-public/
U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. (2014, January). Asteroid Initiative
ideas synthesis workshop final report (pp. 1–25).
https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/files/Asteroid-Initiative-WS-FinalReport-508.pdf
Waldo, D. (1948). The administrative state: A study of the political theory of American
public administration. The Ronald Press Company.
Weible, C. M., & Sabatier, P. A. (Eds.). (2018). Theories of the policy process (4th ed.).
Routledge.
Wilson, J. Q. (2019). Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it.
Basic Books.
Wehling, P. (2012). From invited to uninvited participation (and back?): Rethinking civil
society engagement in technology assessment and development. Poiesis &
Praxis: International Journal of Ethics of Science and Technology Assessment,
9(2), 43-60.
Wood, B. D., & Waterman, R. W. (1991). The dynamics of political control of the
bureaucracy. American Political Science Review, 85(3), 801–828.
Woodhouse, E. J., & Nieusma, D. (1997). When expert advice works, and when it does
not. IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, 16(1), 23–29.
Wynne, B. (1992). Misunderstood misunderstanding: Social identities and public uptake
of science. Public Understanding of Science, 1(3), 281–304.

116
Zahariadis, N. (2007). The multiple stream framework: Structures, limitations prospects.
In P. A. Sabatier (Ed.), Theories of the policy process (2nd ed, pp. 65–92).
Westview Press.
Ziens, J. (2010). Guidance on the use of challenges and prizes to promote open
government (Memorandum M-10–11; pp. 1-12). Office of Management and
Budget.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2010/m
10-11.pdf

117

CHAPTER FOUR (ESSAY THREE): CONTEXT MATTERS: THE POLITICAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE CONDITIONS OF IMPLEMENTING PARTICIPATORY
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AT THREE U.S. FEDERAL AGENCIES
Introduction
The Science and Technology Studies (STS) community has a rich literature on
designing and evaluating innovative forms of public participation in questions of science
and technology in society (e.g., Delborne et al., 2013; Fiorino, 1990; Guston, 1999;
Kleinman et al., 2007; Powell & Colin, 2008; Powell & Kleinman, 2008; Rowe &
Frewer, 2000, 2005; Selin et al., 2017; Stirling, 2008). This literature mostly focuses on
citizen deliberations organized independent of but parallel to government policy
questions (e.g., Guston, 1999). These deliberations often face obstacles to informing
formal government decision-making processes (e.g., Delborne et al., 2013). European
researchers have developed a considerable literature examining the political cultures and
administrative structures that support and constrain embedding innovative forms of
public participation within formal government science and technology decision-making
processes (e.g., Emery et al., 2015; Horst & Irwin, 2010; Jensen, 2005; Joss, 1998; Joss
& Durant, 1995; Klüver, 2000; Krabbenborg & Mulder, 2015; Krick, 2015; Rask, 2013).
In the American context, however, we have only recently begun to develop our
knowledge and understanding of the political and administrative contexts surrounding
innovative forms of public participation within formal government science and
technology decision-making processes (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2017; Gustetic et al., 2018;
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Kaminski, 2012; Tomblin et al., 2017). There are still gaps in our knowledge regarding
how the bureaucratic contexts and the administrative structures of the U.S. federal
government shape the processes of designing and implementing innovative forms of
public participation when embedded within government program design and decisionmaking. Filling these gaps in our STS participatory theory and practice is central to the
goal of intervening on the undemocratic processes and outcomes that often result from
technocratic approaches to science and technology decision-making in society (Callon et
al., 2009; Feenberg, 2012). Intervening on these technocratic approaches with more
public participation in science and technology decision-making may promote the
redistribution of democratic political power by changing the structures of government
administrative power (Arnstein, 1969; Carroll, 1971; Nelkin, 1977, 1979). Doing this,
however, first requires filling the gap in our knowledge of how the bureaucratic structures
of the U.S. federal government inform the design and implementation of innovative
forms of public participation embedded in government science and technology decisionmaking processes.
This chapter attempts to contribute to developing our knowledge and
understanding of how political and administrative contexts of the U.S. federal
bureaucracy shape the design and implementation of innovative forms of public
participation embedded within formal science and technology decision-making processes.
I do this through a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Ragin, 2014) of three cases where
participatory technology assessment (pTA) – a deliberative form of public participation –
were embedded within federal agency science and technology programs. Working with
the Expert and Citizen Assessment of Science and Technology (ECAST) network, three
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U.S. federal agencies adopted pTA exercises: the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration’s (NASA) Asteroid Initiative; the Department of Energy’s (DOE)
consent-based siting program; and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration’s (NOAA) Environmental Literacy Program.
Familiar STS research might take cases like these and examine the design of pTA
in government, if it led to citizen empowerment of those who participated, or if it had an
impact on agency program outcomes. This chapter, however, takes a different tack.
Recent work in STS has called for STS participatory theory and practice to “ecologize”
itself within the wider “political situations” informing the contexts surrounding
opportunities and barriers to greater public participation in questions of science and
technology (Barry, 2012; Chilvers & Kearnes, 2020). Drawing from qualitative interview
data, policy studies, and public administration scholarship, I analyze the political and
administrative contexts surrounding the design and implementation of pTA exercises at
these three agencies in three specific programs.
This comparative analysis has two goals. The first goal is to identify the sets of
political and administrative conditions that supported or constrained implementing pTA
in each of and across these three cases. Not all three pTA projects were implemented,
however. In the two cases where it was, the reasons behind its implementation were
different. Developing a list of the political pressures and administrative challenges federal
agencies and their personnel face when it comes to designing and implementing
innovative forms of public participation may grant some insight into the conditions for
facilitating greater public participation. A second goal is to highlight the outsized role
“policy entrepreneurs” (Cairney, 2018; Kingdon, 2011) within government agencies play
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in softening the impact these political pressures and administrative challenges have on the
processes of designing and implementing pTA in U.S. federal agency programs. A
greater knowledge and understanding of these political and administrative conditions,
along with the work policy entrepreneurs do to change these conditions, can help STS
scholars and practitioners better anticipate, or even mitigate, barriers to innovative forms
of public participation in U.S. federal agencies.
One theoretical contribution of this study is that it merges work from policy
studies, the study of public administration, and STS. Using tools from a well-known
policy studies analytic framework developed by John Kingdon in the 1980’s (1984,
2011), the Multiple Streams Approach (MSA), I examine what the role of policy
entrepreneurs were in these three cases, and how they were able to bureaucratically
support pTA implementation by mitigating some conditions. To understand the
bureaucratic contexts of U.S. federal agency program decision-making, I draw from
public administration scholarship’s theory of “political control” (e.g., Rohr, 1986;
Frederickson et al., 2015, Chapter 2; Meier & O’Toole Jr, 2006). Meant to keep
bureaucrats accountable to the democratic political process, federal agencies face controls
on their discretion on how to design and implement programs. These political controls
often create bureaucratic hurdles to experimenting with innovative forms of public
participation within federal agency decision-making processes. While STS literature on
participation design is detailed and extensive (e.g., Delborne et al., 2013; Fiorino, 1990;
Guston, 1999; Kleinman et al., 2007; Powell & Colin, 2008; Powell & Kleinman, 2008;
Rowe & Frewer, 2000, 2005; Selin et al., 2017; Stirling, 2008), it has rarely engaged with
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how political pressures and administrative rule requirements impact design and
implementation within government agencies.
Through these frameworks, I will show how the relationships between political
and administrative conditions at each agency for each program informed the design and
implementation processes. Moreover, I will highlight the role federal government
personnel play as “policy entrepreneurs” (Kingdon, 1984, 2011) in creating opportunities
for innovative forms of public participation in science and technology decision-making
processes. In that regard, this chapter aims to make not just a theoretical contribution but
a pragmatic one as well. In so doing, STS participatory theory and practice may begin to
develop approaches that appreciate how the bureaucratic expertise of federal government
agency personnel, in some cases, actually enables greater public participation in science
and technology decision-making.
Background
There are four organizations that form the backbone of this comparative analysis:
the three U.S. federal agencies that adopted pTA, and the ECAST network that worked
with these agencies to design and implement pTA. I begin with a brief introduction to
ECAST and its work to embed pTA in government science and technology decisionmaking. This is followed by a summary of each case of pTA: 1) NASA’s Asteroid
Initiative and the Citizen’s Forum pTA exercises that informed program design and
decision-making; 2) DOE’s nuclear waste consent-based siting program and how pTA
results would have informed the consent-based siting process had the program not been
suspended and; 3) NOAA’s Environmental Literacy Program and the pTA exercises on
local climate resilience and decision-making that were funded through it.
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ECAST and Participatory Technology Assessment
Established in 2010, the Expert and Citizen Assessment of Science and
Technology (ECAST) is a network of academic research, policy analysis, citizen science,
and informal science education institutions distributed across the United States that works
towards greater public involvement in issues at the intersection of science, technology,
and society (Sclove, 2010a, 2010b; Kaplan, Farooque, Sarewitz, & Tomblin, 2021).
Building on the mission of the now-defunct Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment to inform lawmakers of the complexity of science and technology in society,
ECAST designs and organizes peer-to-peer deliberative forums on the impacts of science
and technology issues on the public. The public deliberation element in assessing science
and technology policy questions is what constitutes it as participatory technology
assessment (Burgess & Chilvers, 2006; J. Durant, 1999; Guston & Sarewitz, 2002;
Hennen, 1999, 2012). One of ECAST’s normative goals is to create opportunities to
embed pTA within formal government science and technology decision-making
processes.
While each pTA exercise is tailored to the technical and sociopolitical contexts of
the topic in question, ECAST’s method follows a general outline. First, background
materials on the topic are drafted in collaboration with subject matter experts. These
materials, both text and video, balance the technical aspects of the topic with accessibility
to lay members of the public who are the participants in the deliberations. Meanwhile, a
representative sample of about 100 or so local members of the public are recruited to
participate in one or two daylong deliberation events at local venues. During the forums,
participants are divided into smaller groups to read and view the background materials,
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and then led in prepared deliberation questions on the topic by trained facilitators. These
deliberations often use a role-playing game board to promote discussion among
participants about the different impacts of science and technology issues on different
communities and stakeholders. Table discussions are frequently audio and video
recorded, and sometimes have table observers to take notes on participant’s attitudes and
responses. After each segment of deliberation, participants are asked to write down their
answers to the discussion questions. All these sources of data – audio and video
recordings, table observations, and written participant answers – are analyzed by ECAST
for patterns and themes, with the findings then shared with the (government or nongovernment) organization who commissioned and funded the pTA exercises.
NASA’s Asteroid Initiative and the Citizen’s Forum
In April 2013, NASA announced its Asteroid Initiative. The Asteroid Initiative’s
two main components were meant to meet two goals. First, the Asteroid Grand Challenge
component was a response to a Congressional mandate to detect all hazardous asteroids
in near-Earth space and to develop a planetary defense strategy. Second, the Asteroid
Redirect Mission (ARM) component was a response to a White House directive to
progress on the longstanding goal of a human space flight mission to Mars. To do this,
NASA aimed to develop the space flight and engineering capabilities to capture and
redirect an asteroid as a technological proving ground for missions back to the Moon and
then onto Mars.
In June of 2013, NASA opened a request for information for the Asteroid
Initiative to the public and industry with six areas to “refine the Asteroid Redirect
Mission concept, formulate plans for flight systems development, and gather ideas for
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broadening participation in the mission and planetary defense” (U.S. National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2013). The sixth area, “Partnerships and
Participatory Engagement,” specifically called for “innovative methods such as crowd
sourcing, prizes and challenges, citizen science, and public-private partnerships to
increase the resources for tackling the planetary defense problem and to broaden
participation” (U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2013). ECAST
submitted pTA as a method for broadening public participation in Asteroid Initiative
program design and decision-making under this sixth area. By May of 2014, NASA
selected ECAST’s pTA proposal for funding and entered into a cooperative agreement to
design and implement the pTA exercises for the Asteroid Initiative. Between May and
September of 2014, representatives from NASA and ECAST met several times to design
the content and plan the implementation of pTA as the Citizen’s Forum.
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Figure 4.1

Organizational Chart of pTA Exercises within NASA

In November of 2014, daylong Citizen’s Forums took place in two cities, Phoenix
and Boston. The four topics for deliberation were asteroid detection, asteroid mitigation,
deciding between two engineering options for the ARM, and three scenarios for human
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space flights for Mars exploration. An interim report consisting of the results from the
ARM session was delivered to NASA managers in December 2014, prior to making a
decision on which of two options the agency should pursue for the ARM. In March 2015,
ECAST made a top-level briefing at NASA headquarters of the pTA results. A summary
and full report of the results consisting of additional assessments and evaluation were
released to the public in August 2015.
DOE, Nuclear Waste Management, and Consent-Based Siting
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982 mandated the U.S. federal
government to dispose of roughly 100,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel and highlevel radioactive waste produced since the 1950’s by power generation and government
defense programs. The NWPA amendment of 1987 designated Yucca Mountain in
Nevada as the disposal site for the nation’s nuclear waste. The State of Nevada, local
governments, tribes, and communities, however, strongly opposed the designation
(Endres, 2012; Flynn & Slovic, 1995). In 2010, after decades of legal and technical
objections, the Obama Administration terminated the licensing process for Yucca
Mountain, stating that it was not a workable option.
Also, in 2010, the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future was
formed to develop recommendations for a workable strategy to nuclear waste disposal.
The Blue Ribbon Commission’s final report to the Department of Energy (DOE) in 2012
included eight recommendations, one of which was to use a consent-based approach to
siting nuclear waste disposal facilities as a means to building deeper engagement and
partnerships with interested communities. Based on these recommendations, DOE issued
a three-phase “Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and
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High-Level Radioactive Waste.” The first phase consisted of engaging with the public
and interested parties to learn what elements are important to them in designing a “fair
and effective consent-based siting process” (U.S. Department of Energy, 2016). This took
two forms. First, the public and stakeholders were invited to public comment through the
Federal Register between December 2015 and July 2016. Second, DOE held eight public
meetings in 2016 designed to encourage participation and to provide multiple
opportunities for public input and two-way dialogue. Parallel to and drawing from these
public comments and meetings, phase two focused on designing a consent-based siting
process that would serve as a framework for working with interested communities. The
third phase would have been to take the results of these consent-based deliberations and
use them to begin planning and siting disposal facilities.
In February 2016 under phase two, ECAST entered a subcontract with DOE
through Allegheny Science and Technology to design and assess pTA exercises on the
consent-based siting process. After a scoping meeting with DOE in March 2016, ECAST
organized a two-day expert stakeholder workshop in June 2016 in Boston to collect
advice about deliberation questions, themes, and background information content for
public participants to augment materials and guidance provided by DOE. In the months
after the expert stakeholder workshop, DOE and ECAST agreed upon and completed the
background material that would be provided to public participants, the design and content
of the pTA deliberations on consent-based siting, and had finished selecting forum sites
in five cities across the country. The forums were slated to convene concurrently in early
2017. Following the 2016 presidential election, however, in anticipation of changes in
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policy directions by the new administration, DOE suspended the consent-based siting
program and cancelled the pTA project before it was implemented.
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Figure 4.2

Organizational Chart of Planned pTA Exercises within DOE

NOAA, Environmental Literacy, and Local Climate Resilience
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Office of
Education works towards “building a future workforce and scientifically literate public
ready to adapt to a changing environment.” Since 2005, the Environmental Literacy
Program (ELP) in the Office of Education has supported this mission by funding more
than $75 million in grants to formal and informal science education institutions and
networks. ELP follows a peer-review process of approving and funding proposals. In
September 2015, NOAA awarded ECAST a three-year ELP grant for its proposal to
create a replicable model of building and strengthening local networks of museum staff,
community members, and local officials on creating community resilience plans for four
types of environmental hazards (i.e., sea level rise, extreme precipitation, drought, and
heat waves). While network-building has been an important objective of ELP, ECAST’s
pTA approach to creating partnerships and a framework for engagement to foster
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communities’ abilities to share best practices, build social capital, and generate consensus
on resilience measures was novel for NOAA.
Activities for this project were implemented in three phases over three years. In
phase one, background materials on four hazards were developed during two workshops
with partners and experts to develop deliberation materials for the four hazards. In the
second phase, pilot pTA forums were held at two ECAST-member institutions to
evaluate pTA materials, design, and to train program managers from six additional
science centers throughout the country. In phase three, these six science centers
conducted their pTA forums between March and May of 2018. The day-long forums
simulate the five steps described in NOAA’s Climate Resilience Toolkit, substituting
experts with lay citizens, however. The results of these deliberations were presented to
local resilience planners to inform local climate resilience strategies.
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Organizational Chart of pTA Funded through NOAA ELP
Theoretical Framework

Jason Chilvers and Matthew Kearnes (2020) have recently called on us in the STS
community to remake our participatory theory and practice in a way that is more sensitive
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to the coproduced, relational, and diverse character of science and democracy. One of
their suggestions is to “ecologize” STS participatory theory and practice by moving away
from a focus on discrete, event-based participation studies and towards understanding the
wider systems in which participation takes place. This includes examining the wider
bureaucratic contexts informing opportunities for deliberative participation in formal
government systems. As mentioned in the opening of this chapter, this involves
developing our knowledge of what are the current bureaucratic structures of U.S. federal
government agency decision-making, and how they shape barriers to and opportunities
for imbedding innovative forms of public participation in government science and
technology decision-making processes.
Examining the political and administrative conditions surrounding the adoption,
design, and implementation of pTA at U.S. federal government agencies, however, calls
for working at the intersection of STS, policy studies, and public administration. I used
frameworks from policy studies and public administration to inform my approach to
investigating and comparing the cases. The “political control” framework from public
administration can help explain the political pressures and administrative challenges
agencies and personnel face when designing and implementing innovative forms of
public participation in program design and decision-making. The “policy entrepreneur”
concept from policy studies’ Multiple Streams Approach highlights the role government
personnel play in facilitating pTA by mitigating some of the impacts of political controls
through their bureaucratic expertise.
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Political Controls
The field of American public administration has long examined how the
relationship between the political processes of lawmaking and the administrative
processes of implementation shapes the behaviors of elected government representatives
and unelected bureaucrats (Bertelli & Lynn, 2006; Lipsky, 2010; Meier & O’Toole Jr,
2006; Waldo, 1948). Public administration’s theory of “political control” can help us
better understand how the political culture of American federal government shapes the
priorities and behaviors of federal agencies when it comes to public participation in
science and technology programs. It begins with observing that at the heart of American
political philosophy and government is a tension between if the executive branch should
have strong administrative discretion or if democratically elected representatives should
have direct oversight of and heavy controls on the executive branch’s discretion to
administer government (Rohr, 1986). A consequence of the latter position is the
imposition of political controls on the administrative discretion of the executive
bureaucracy (McCubbins et al., 1987; Wood & Waterman, 1991).
The political process, however, often produces laws that are scarce on details and
funding that government agencies and personnel are nonetheless required to implement.
This motivates an increased use of professional administrative discretion to implement
programs in resource- and option-constrained environments (Goodsell, 2014; Lipsky,
2010). As agencies and bureaucrats find ways to implement policies and programs in
ways deemed outside of what the political process intended, however, elected
representative and the public lose trust in the bureaucracy’s choices (Cigler, 1990).
Elected representatives check the administrative discretion of agencies by imposing
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political controls in the forms of political pressures and administrative rules. Congress
and the Executive Office of the White House use the leverage of budgets and political
support as pressures on agencies, while administrative rules dictate the procedural
requirements of how to design and implement government programs rules (McCubbins et
al., 1987; Wood & Waterman, 1991).
The result of this escalating tension is that both elected officials and government
agencies begin to focus more on institutional politics and preservation than on passing
effective laws and implementing programs that are sensitive to public values and that
address public concerns (Durant, 1995; Frederickson et al., 2015; Meier & O’Toole Jr,
2006; Wilson, 2019). The most explicit form of political control on embedding
innovative forms of public participation in federal science and technology programs are
administrative rules on how agencies can engage with the public. Congressional laws like
the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) establish the minimum and mandatory
requirements (i.e., public comment periods in the Federal Register) for public
participation in matters of federal agency rule and program decision-making. Public input
from these minimum requirements, however, are shown to be ineffective in substantially
informing decision-making processes (Bryer, 2013). The Federal Advisory Committee
Act (FACA) “governs how the federal government seeks outside advice,” specifically,
“who participates in government decision-making, when they participate, how they
participate, and what influence participation has on policy” (Long & Beierle, 1999).
There are, however, “ambiguities in the law and its regulations which limit the
willingness of public agencies to engage the public outside of FACA” rules (Long &
Beierle, 1999). The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) stipulates the procedural
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requirements for of how agencies can collect any type of information from the public.
While meant to reduce the total amount of paperwork burden the federal government
imposes on private businesses and citizens, some federal agencies have argued that
meeting basic PRA requirements make routine administration burdensome (Shapiro,
2013, 2020).
Taken together, the requirements of these administrative rules often create
administrative challenges for agencies to engage with the public on program decisionmaking in innovative ways beyond the minimum requirements mandated by the APA and
within the limits set forth by FACA and PRA. Given the administrative burdens and
potential legal consequences, there are few incentives for agencies to experiment with
innovative forms of public participation in program decision-making. STS scholar Alfons
Bora (2010) calls this matrix of legal limits on top of the already rigid framework of
technocracy concerning science and technology decision-making the “iron cage of law.”
Bora (2010), like public administration scholars, highlights the irony in this “iron cage”
of administrative rules. Even though these rules are meant to ensure that agency
discretion does not extend beyond the control of the political will of democratically
elected representatives, they in practice act as limits on how the public can participate in
government program decision-making. Political controls meant to maintain democratic
legitimacy and accountability of the American federal bureaucracy can in fact act as
barriers to more deliberative, and arguably more democratic, public participation.
Public administration’s theory of “political control” highlights how administrative
rules can pose administrative challenges to embedding innovative forms of public
participation in program decision-making. They often disincentivize experimenting with
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public participation methods beyond APA minimums because of the administrative
burdens, and potential legal consequences, of FACA and PRA requirements. Moreover,
political pressures from Congress or the Executive Office create potential budgetary
consequences or loss of political support for agencies if the processes or results of
innovative public participation stray from what Congress or the Executive Office
intended.
Policy Entrepreneurs
The field of policy studies offers many frameworks for examining and
understanding the social and political processes that explain how policies change over
time (Birkland, 2019; Weible & Sabatier, 2018). One of these frameworks is the
“Multiple Streams Approach” (MSA). Developed in the 1980’s by John Kingdon (1984,
2011), MSA describes the policy process as interactions between three separate yet
interdependent “streams” – the problem, policy, and politics streams. Each stream
represents a set of elements, actors, and processes that interact to create opportunities for
change in policy and decision-making processes.
A central component of MSA is the role of “policy entrepreneurs.” Identifying
policy entrepreneurs within a system and tracing their actions within the streams is
fundamental to the analytic and explanatory work of the framework. Kingdon identifies
three basic qualities of a policy entrepreneur: being in a position or having the authority
to be heard; using political savvy and/or expertise in an issue or policy area to skillfully
negotiate a position and soften resistance to change; and persistence (2011). Found both
within and outside of government, their political savvy, administrative expertise, and
knowledge of institutional politics and culture facilitates certain problems and policy
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solutions through the politics stream (Anderson et al., 2019; Cairney, 2018; Mintrom &
Norman, 2009). Examining the presence and actions of policy entrepreneurs within
government at the programmatic level is key to understanding how to address the
political pressures on and administrative challenges to embedding innovative forms of
public participation, like pTA, into U.S. federal government science and technology
program decision-making.
The MSA framework and the theory of political control, when used together, can
“ecologize” STS participatory theory and practice within the bureaucratic contexts that
inform the ease or difficulty with which innovative forms of public participation, like
pTA, are embedded within agencies (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2020). The “political control”
concept can help us identify political pressures and administrative challenges surrounding
pTA, and the “policy entrepreneur” concept from MSA can help us explain how these
pressures and challenges can be addressed by administratively and politically savvy
advocates within U.S. federal government agencies.
Methodology and Methods
Methodology
I use a “very small-N” Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) approach (BergSchlosser et al., 2009; Marx et al., 2014; Ragin, 1987, 2014) to compare the conditions
informing the three cases of pTA implementation. Developed by Charles Ragin (1987,
2014), QCA has two basic premises. First, change in a system is not caused by just one
factor but is often the result of different combinations of conditions. Second, different
combinations of conditions can produce the same outcome (Simister & Scholz, 2017).
QCA grapples with this complexity by integrating features of the case-oriented approach
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with the variable-oriented approach to identifying and analyzing the different sets of
conditions that explain how similar phenomenon happened in some cases but not in
others (Simister & Scholz, 2017). This is a six-step process.
Table 4.1

Summary of QCA Methodology Application

1. Outcome – The change or outcome
in a system to be analyzed.

2. Identify Cases – Identify similar
cases in which this outcome did
and did not occur.

3. Conditions – The factors that
contributed to the outcome.

Whether pTA was implemented

NASA’s Asteroid Initiative
DOE’s consent-based siting program
NOAA’s Environmental Literacy Program
The political and administrative
conditions that shaped how pTA was
designed and implemented

4. Score – Scoring conditions for
presence (‘1’), absence (‘0’), or
degree of presence (High, Medium,
and Low) in each case.
5. Analysis – Analysis of how each
condition contributed to explaining
whether the outcome occurred and
how it occurred in each case.

Very small-N qualitative analysis

6. Interpretation – Claims of which
conditions, or relationships
between them, most contributed to
whether the outcome occurred and
how it occurred.

The that most facilitated or constrained
designing and implementing pTA

1. Identify a change, or an outcome, to be analyzed. For this research, the outcome
in question is whether pTA exercises were implemented in U.S. federal agencies.
2. Identify similar cases where this outcome did and did not occur. For this research,
there are three cases of whether pTA exercises were implemented in U.S. federal
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agency programs – NASA’s Asteroid Initiative, DOE’s consent-based siting
program, and NOAA’s Environmental Literacy Program.
3. Examine the cases for factors, or conditions, whose absence, presence, or degree
of presence most contributed to whether the outcome occurred. For this research,
it concerns identifying the political and administrative conditions that most
contributed to how pTA exercises at NASA, DOE, and NOAA were
implemented. I did this through a qualitative analysis of document and interview
data for patterns and themes.
4. Once a nearly exhaustive list of conditions has been created, a score is assigned to
each condition for each case. Some conditions are scored using “crisp-set”
analysis to indicate presence (‘1’) or absence (‘0’) in a case, while others are
“fuzzy-set” scored to indicate the comparative degree of presence (i.e. low,
medium, high) (Marx et al., 2014; Simister & Scholz, 2017). For this research,
most conditions were scored using “crisp-set” (e.g., policy entrepreneurs) with
some scored using “fuzzy-set” (e.g., level of controversy).
5. Once all conditions in each case have been scored, analysis of the dataset shows
how different combinations of conditions in each case may explain whether a
particular outcome occurred. Depending on the number of cases in the dataset,
this analysis is either qualitative (very small- and small-N for < 10 cases),
quantitative (statistical analysis of large-N for > 50 cases) or mixed (intermediate
N for between 11-49 cases). Given the very small number of cases in this
research, I conducted a qualitative analysis of the different combinations of
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political and administrative conditions in each case to examine how pTA was
implemented at NASA, DOE and NOAA.
6. Lastly, interpreting the findings to make claims about which conditions, or which
relationships between conditions, most contribute to how the outcome occurred.
For this research, it will be an interpretation of which political and administrative
conditions most support or constrain implementing pTA in U.S. federal agency
science and technology programs.
Methods
This comparative analysis draws on two sources of data to identify the political
and administrative conditions surrounding implementing pTA in U.S. federal government
agencies: documents and semi-structured interviews. Public documents, mostly from the
three federal agencies regarding each project (e.g., press releases, requests for
information and proposals, transcripts of public meetings, etc.), are used to establish the
background details to each case. Semi-structured interviews, however, comprise the bulk
of the data. Subject identification and recruitment for this research was facilitated by my
dissertation work being a subset of a National Science Foundation-funded (NSF) project
examining pTA and cultures of expertise in these three U.S. federal government science
and technology agency projects. 6 The co-principal investigator on the NSF project is a
member of ECAST. Their network of contacts facilitated access to and introductions with
a specific and finite list of ECAST members, federal personnel, and government

This chapter draws on data collected and analyses conducted under the auspices of NSF grant no.
1827574 titled “Participatory Technology Assessment and Cultures of Expertise in the U.S. Federal
Government.” Institutional Review Board (IRB) documents have been submitted to, approved, and
renewed by Boise State University for the NSF grant, along with separate IRB documentation for this
dissertation research.

6
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contractors involved. All participants were either involved in developing, planning, and
implementing pTA exercises at these agencies, and/or had knowledge and experience of
the political and administrative contexts of each agency and of the specific program in
which pTA was a part. A snowball sampling technique, however, was still used at the end
of each interview to ensure that the specific and finite list of participants was not selflimiting.
In total, thirty-two (32) semi-structured interviews were conducted with twentyfive (25) participants between June 2019 and October 2020. Interviews ranged from 40 to
70 minutes in length for a total of 1670 minutes (or over 27 hours) of interview data. For
the NASA and NOAA cases, we successfully contacted and conducted interviews with
agency personnel who were directly involved with the pTA project. For the DOE case,
however, attempts to contact and interview DOE personnel who were directly involved
with the pTA project within the consent-based siting program were unsuccessful.
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Table 4.2

Summary of Interviews Conducted for Each Case

Total Number of
Interviewees

Total Number of
Interviews

Total Number of
Minutes/Hours

25

32

1670 min / ~28 hrs

NASA

DOE

NOAA

Number of
Interviews

12

11

9

ECAST

7

4

6

Contractor

0

3

0

Agency Personnel

5

1*

2

Former Personnel

0

2

0

*Conducted with NASA personnel familiar w/ DOE’s administrative situation.
Interviewers (Jen Schneider and I) asked questions and explored topics
concerning:
•

The purpose and details of each program (i.e., the Asteroid Initiative, consentbased siting, and environmental literacy and resilience), and each program’s role
within its respective agency’s mission.

•

Each agency’s strategy and history of public engagement/participation in
decision-making processes.

•

Each agency’s interest in pTA for its respective program.

•

The sources of political and/or administrative resistance to and/or support for pTA
in each agency.
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•

The kind of working relationship between each agency and ECAST in designing
and implementing the pTA exercises.

•

Perceptions of each agency’s organizational politics and culture, and how they
may have informed how pTA was adopted, designed, and implemented.

Interviews were conducted remotely via Zoom and Google teleconferencing platforms
and were audio recorded. Audio recordings were transcribed using an online, automated
transcription service, TEMI, and were then checked and updated for accuracy and
completeness against the audio recordings prior to data analysis. Throughout the chapter,
I refer to interviewees by their organizational affiliation (i.e., ECAST, NASA, Former
DOE, DOE Contractor, NOAA) and a random number assigned to them (e.g., NASA 3). I
conducted member checks with interviewees I have quoted to assure accurate
representation of their intention and meaning in context.
I conducted data analysis on two levels. First, documents and interview transcripts
were imported into NVivo 12 Pro, a qualitative data analysis software, where they were
coded for themes among answers to interview questions (Campbell et al., 2013; Fereday
& Muir-Cochrane, 2006; Maher et al., 2018). Second, interview data were further
reduced and organized into analytic memos where themes and concepts across interviews
were brought together to build analytic narratives and to identify QCA conditions.
Following a modified grounded theory approach, themes and concepts emerging from the
data were used to refine interview questions to better target explanatory details, and to
begin to build a theoretical model that generalizes those details (Charmaz, 1990, 2017).
At the same time, theories from STS, policy studies, and public administration were used
to inform the questions we initially asked, data analysis in terms of how I coded or named
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certain processes and QCA conditions – this is why the approach is “modified” and not
considered a purely grounded theory approach. For example, as the analysis developed, it
become clear that a useful tool for describing and understanding the actions of federal
personnel was Kingdon’s (2011) policy entrepreneur concept from the MSA framework.
Findings
Conditions
I found eight conditions that contributed most to explaining how and whether
pTA exercises were ultimately implemented for NASA’s Asteroid Initiative, DOE’s
consent-based siting program, and NOAA’s Environmental Literacy Program. Four
conditions refer to the administrative factors within agencies that informed the processes
of designing pTA: Decision Support; Cooperative Agreement; Administrative Rules; and
“Top Cover.” Three conditions refer to the political factors outside the agencies –
Controversy, Agency Culture, and Political Priority. Lastly, whether there were policy
entrepreneurs who facilitated addressing the political pressures and administrative
challenges surrounding pTA. Each case had a different combination of political and
administrative conditions that contributed to how pTA was ultimately implemented. First,
I describe each condition and examples of how they informed the design and
implementation processes in each case. Following that, I discuss which political and
administrative factors most facilitated or constrained implementing pTA in these three
U.S. federal agency science and technology programs.
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Table 4.3

Summary of Conditions
Condition

Description

Decision Support (0 or 1)

pTA results informed decision-making

Cooperative Agreement (0 or 1)

The contract between agency and ECAST
was a cooperative agreement

Administrative Rules (0 or 1)

Administrative rule requirements impacted
pTA design

“Top Cover” (0 or 1)

Agency managers supported pTA

Controversy
(High, Medium, Low)

The degree of controversy surrounding the
program pTA was embedded in

Agency Culture
(High, Medium, Low)

The degree to which the agency’s
organizational culture was open to pTA

Political Priority (0 or 1)

The Presidential Administration prioritized
greater public participation in making
progress on the policy area

Policy Entrepreneurs (0 or 1)

Agency personnel actively facilitated
designing and implementing pTA

Scoring and Analysis
Decision Support
The “Decision Support” condition is present if the results of the pTA exercises
were intended to be used to inform the decision-making process of an agency program.
Interview data shows that if pTA results were going to be used as decision support, pTA
design and implementation faced greater administrative scrutiny or organizational
apprehension. For both NASA and DOE, pTA results were used, or were going to be
used, to inform agency decisions on program content and design. For the NASA case,
results of pTA deliberations were used to inform a choice between two engineering
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options for the Asteroid Redirect Mission in the Asteroid Initiative. For the DOE case,
results of the pTA exercises were going to inform the design and content of the agency’s
consent-based siting process.
For the NOAA case, however, both ECAST and NOAA personnel highlighted
that the agency was not the “client” of the pTA deliberation results. The deliberation
results were meant to inform local resilience planners. NOAA’s interest in pTA was that
it was an innovative form of public education on climate resilience and as a way to build
climate resiliency planning partnerships between the public and local decision-makers.
NOAA 1, aware of the administrative and organizational scrutiny pTA had undergone at
NASA, shared that they “definitely heard some criticism [within NOAA], although I
don't think nearly as much as maybe occurred like at NASA.” NOAA 1 attributed this to
the fact that the results of pTA “weren't feeding back to NOAA decisions.”
Cooperative Agreement
The “Cooperative Agreement” condition is present if the formal working
relationship between the agency and ECAST was a cooperative agreement. In a
conventional contract, the government agency provides “financial assistance…that
provides support or stimulation to accomplish a public purpose” and only the contractor
independently designs and implements the project. A cooperative agreement has the
“additional criterion that the agency expects to have substantial involvement with the
recipient in carrying out the activities contemplated in the agreement” (OMB M-10-11).
Interview data shows that a cooperative agreement structure facilitated designing and
implementing pTA because agency personnel were able to help design and implement
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pTA in ways sensitive to the agency’s organizational culture, political pressures, and
administrative challenges.
In the case of NASA, agency personnel chose to enter into a cooperative
agreement with ECAST. According to NASA 1:
We deliberately chose to do this by way of a cooperative agreement. . . . We
wanted to do this as a cooperative agreement because. . . .it wouldn't have carried
weight as much if it had been exclusively left to ECAST to do. . . . It needed to be
collaborative to be bought into and trusted by NASA leadership.
Moreover, through a cooperative agreement, NASA personnel could better foster support
for pTA and help navigate the political and cultural challenges during the design and
implementation processes because they were “more in touch with what's politically
permissible within the agency” (NASA 1).
For the NOAA case, ELP grants are cooperative agreements meant to use agency
assets, resources, and expertise. As described by NOAA 2, “contracts are definitely a
whole ‘nother ball game. We actually have cooperative agreements which provide us a
whole lot more flexibility to work with our grantees than a typical grant does. So, of the
three different things there [i.e., contract, grant, cooperative agreement], the cooperative
agreement is the best.” In contrast, work on pTA at DOE was done through a
conventional contract. Compared to their experience with NASA, ECAST 5 shared that
while interactions with NASA personnel were formal, interactions with DOE personnel
were “formal intensified” which made the relationship between ECAST and DOE
personnel more like a “business transaction” than a collaboration.
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Administrative Rules
The “Administrative Rules” condition is present if the process of negotiating the
requirements of administrative rule pertaining to public participation in agency decisionmaking greatly changed the design of pTA to the point of jeopardizing implementation.
Interview data shows that the process of negotiating the administrative requirements of
pTA lead to administrative challenges in designing the exercises. In the NOAA case,
pTA was not a decision support element. NOAA personnel shared that only grant
proposal submission, peer review, and selection process rules applied. In contrast, pTA
was a decision support element in the NASA case. NASA 3 shared that pTA in the
Asteroid Initiative “always had the potential threat or challenge of FACA.” Moreover, the
staff in NASA’s Office of General Counsel (OGC), the keepers of these rules, are
“designed to protect the agency” and they can be “very dead-set in their ways” of
protecting the agency from legal trouble (NASA 3). The relationship between NASA 3
and the agency’s OGC, however, meant OGC staff were “willing to explore and
understand what [NASA personnel working on pTA were] trying to accomplish and have
conversations . . . to figure out how to accomplish that. . .” (NASA 3). This contributed to
there being minimal administrative challenges to pTA.
In the DOE case, however, negotiating the requirements of the Paperwork
Reduction Act (PRA) caused significant delays and changes to the design of pTA to the
point of jeopardizing the legal and practical viability of the project. ECAST 1 described
the process of negotiating the PRA requirements as a “fiasco.” Negotiations between
ECAST and DOE’s Office of General Counsel (OGC) delayed the project at several
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points in the design process. DOE’s OGC had legal opinions about how acceptable initial
pTA designs were within PRA rules.
ECAST 5 shared that this “fiasco” stemmed from OGC’s opinion that ECAST
was “not allowed to hand people a piece of paper with a question on it and have them fill
it out” because that would qualify as a survey. Even once ECAST and the DOE OGC
came to an agreement of how to record on paper the public’s responses during the pTA
deliberations, that still required approval by OMB, a process that would take anywhere
between six to twelve months. After several months of delays, to ensure that the forums
would be ready to implement on schedule, ECAST decided to change its pTA design and
forgo any use of paper by the public to record their responses.
“Top Cover”
The “Top Cover” condition is present if agency personnel managing the pTA
project had the support of their supervisors to design and implement pTA. Interview data
shows that having the support of agency leadership gave agency personnel institutional
capital when addressing internal apprehensions to using pTA in program design and
decision-making. For the NOAA case, as a grant funded through a longstanding
education program, top cover was not necessary to advance it through agency
administrative and political concerns. Nonetheless, it had the support of NOAA 2, a
senior leader in the agency, who saw pTA as an innovative approach to creating
education opportunities “to inform people and motivate the kind of actions that they
needed to take” to work towards climate resilience. NOAA 2 shared that they “tried to
figure out how to make the things that we did that supported the agenda of our leadership
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very clear to them, and really not talk about the things that they might not like so much. I
feel like my job is to protect good work.”
In the NASA case, NASA 3 shared that the Grand Challenge structure through
which pTA was adopted afforded NASA personnel some general top cover because it had
been “bought in at the highest levels” of the agency to experiment and test innovative
approaches to achieving Asteroid Initiative goals. NASA 3 noted, however, that to design
and implement such a different method of public engagement for NASA, you “need your
boss, or your boss's boss, to be okay and willing to support you on it.” NASA 1 shared
that they had the support of a “very senior leader” within the agency – NASA 4. NASA 4
was forthright about their support for a project that was, from their perspective, “a
refreshing exercise” in asking the American public “what do they want their space
program to look like and what should it be doing?” According to NASA 5, NASA 4
shared their support at several meetings among NASA leadership concerning pTA and
the Asteroid Initiative.
The DOE case, however, was difficult to score for “top cover” for two reasons.
First, we were not able to conduct interviews with any current DOE personnel who were
directly involved with the pTA project within the consent-based siting program and, thus,
were not able to ascertain from DOE personnel if they had the support of agency
managers. We requested interviews with these personnel, and they declined to participate.
Second, ECAST, former DOE personnel, and DOE contractors shared that support for the
consent-based siting program and the pTA project came from a temporary source: the
political leadership of the agency (i.e., DOE political appointees). ECAST 1 shared that
the DOE personnel managing the pTA project voiced the frustration that even though
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agency political leadership told them how much of a priority the program and project
were, “when the actual issues would come, there was not an immediate resolution. . .
different people were giving different answers and yet nothing to tell us which direction
to go.”
ECAST 5 recalled the tension with having support from a member of the agency’s
political leadership:
[They] could talk a good game. [They were] basically in a political position, so
you could never really tell if [they were] genuine. [They] seemed genuine, but
[they] weren’t someone who was looking at the details of the project. . . . We
often were worried that even if the Trump thing [i.e., the 2016 Presidential
election results] didn't happen, that maybe this would never happen because of
that kind of tension that was evident in the project.
Additionally, DOE Contractor 2, who also has years of experience in federal government
nuclear waste legislation and regulation, shared that there was something amiss with how
the political leadership of the agency approached the consent-based siting program and
the pTA project. DOE Contractor 2 saw the selection of political leadership for the
agency and the consent-based siting program under the Obama Administrations as “stars
aligning” for the policy area. After a short time, however, the political leadership “backed
off.” Had they seriously supported the program and the pTA project, “things could have
moved much differently” with fewer delays and obstacles (DOE Contractor 2). So, while
there was support from the political leadership of the agency for the program and the
pTA project, it was not enough to mitigate the administrative challenges.
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Controversy
The “Controversy” condition refers to the degree of social and political
controversy surrounding the agency program. Interview data shows that the more
controversial and politicized a program is, the greater the likelihood that designing and
implementing pTA will have to grapple with obstacles and resistance that comes from
political pressures. In the NASA case, the controversy surrounding the Asteroid Initiative
had to do with general criticisms of NASA and the purpose of the Asteroid Redirect
Mission (ARM). News coverage from the Washington Post called ARM “NASA’s
mission improbable” given the budgetary, political, and technological issues the agency
had been facing for years since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Shuttle
program (Achenbach, 2013). NASA Watch, a blog run by a former NASA employee who
often makes comments critical of the agency’s approaches and decisions, criticized
NASA and ECAST for the forum’s purpose and methodology surrounding the ARM
decision support in a post titled “NASA pays for decision making advice on a decision it
already made” (Cowing, 2015). These criticisms of the agency and ARM, however, did
not concern the NASA personnel working on the pTA project and had little impact on the
design and ultimate implementation of the forums.
For the NOAA case, while the topic of climate change itself is politically
controversial, the education program that funded the pTA efforts has remained largely
shielded from controversy. NOAA 2 shared that the agency’s Office of Education “used
to focus on climate change” but it was just “too politically charged” to continue framing
their work in that way. Refocusing on environmental literacy and resilience building
projects, however, created distance from the political dimension of the climate change
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topic. For example, ECAST 1, 6, 8, 9, and 10 shared that the goal of the pTA exercises
from ECAST’s perspective was to help inform local resilience planners on climate
change topics. They all went on to share, however, that from NOAA’s ELP perspective
the goal was to meet education goals but through an innovative process.
In contrast, DOE’s programs for nuclear waste management and disposal have
historically been enveloped in high degrees of controversy. Decades of policy delays and
changes concerning nuclear waste management and disposal have created a distrust
between the public and DOE (e.g., Endres, 2012; Freudenburg, 2004; Kinsella, 2001,
2015; Walker & Wellock, 2010; Weart, 1988). Every interviewee for the DOE case
(ECAST 1, 4, 5, 8; Former DOE 1, 2; and DOE Contractor 1, 2, and 3) described the
agency’s historical approach to nuclear waste disposal siting as technocratic, especially
the Yucca Mountain licensing process. ECAST 5 described it as “sending a bunch of
scientists out to a site and saying ‘this is the best place to do it’, and then trying to force it
on people. . .” Former DOE 1 shared that “one of the things that became quite apparent
through the work of the [Blue Ribbon Commission] was just the degree to which trust in
the department and in the federal government as a whole was eroded” because of this
technocratic approach. They went on to share that one of the goals of shifting to a
consent-based siting approach under the Obama Administrations was to “restor[e] some
of the agency's credibility in its engagement with local governments, tribal governments,
concerned citizens and organizations” as a way of mitigating the controversy caused by
technocratic approaches. This “DOE baggage” (Former DOE 2), however, followed the
consent-based siting program as will be highlighted below in “Agency Culture.”
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Agency Culture
The “Agency Culture” condition is the degree to which the agency’s culture is
open to experimenting with pTA in its program design and decision-making processes.
Data shows that an agency’s culture towards public participation is shaped in large part
by how its origins, the relationship its programs have had with the public, and how its
policy directions have been changed by Presidential administrations have shaped its
sensitivity to political pressures. The NOAA case is scored “N/A” because pTA exercises
were designed and implemented through an ELP grant and were not an element of agency
decision support in program design or decision-making. As such, it cannot be scored
given the condition’s definition.
It does serve, however, as an interesting example of how an agency’s location
within the U.S. federal government shapes political pressures and agency culture towards
public participation. NOAA personnel shared their thoughts on why the agency tends to
have a different experience with political pressures than other agencies. NOAA 2
described the agency as “buried within the Department of Commerce and we're not
usually visible to the White House or Congress on the first pass [of the budget] because
they're so focused on the economy and trade and exports.” Additionally, NOAA 2
observed that “because we do have such an important scientific and life and safety role,
they don't usually give us a heavily political person. They usually give us somebody that's
more competent.” NOAA 1 highlighted that the director of the Office of Education is a
career civil servant, not a political appointee. NOAA 2 went on to add that this insulates
them from the impacts political pressures have on other agencies; “EPA [Environmental
Protection Agency] just get thrashed. We watch NASA do somersaults for the politicals
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[i.e., political appointees]. Department of Energy just gets whiplash on policies. And
NOAA just stays under the radar and chugs along.” While NOAA does face substantial
political pressures on some of its programs, like fisheries management, its placement
within the Department of Commerce and its perception as a research and safety agency
insulates its programs from the kinds of political headwinds other U.S. federal science
agencies face.
NASA’s political origins, along with how public its successes and failures have
been, has made the agency acutely aware of how susceptible its budget and programs are
to shifts in national mood, the changing political environments in Congress, and
Presidential priorities (Lambright, 2010). The agency’s origins in the late 1950’s was as
much a cultural, social, and political response to Soviet advances in space as it was a
technological one. As such, NASA has developed an agency culture invested in fostering
public approval and, through it, political capital.
To this point, NASA 1 and 5 were able to point to town hall meetings and focus
groups organized in the 1980’s and 1990’s to hear civilian perspectives on the future of
space exploration. After speaking to colleagues that had attended those meetings and
groups, NASA 1 commented, however, “it's kind of hard to tell the extent to which
anybody was going to take those comments seriously or if these were more to validate
what was already going on.” They went on to share that “as far as things like [public]
involvement in public policy and decision-making, that is still something that is hugely
limited” in the agency. While the agency’s history of public participation in program
design and decision-making may be limited, NASA, as an organization, sees public
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approval as necessary for its political capital. Hence, pTA advocates in NASA framed it
as form of public engagement that could reach a wider audience than its usual supporters.
For DOE, Former DOE 2 shared that the agency carries with it “baggage”
concerning the fears and distrust that come with the nation’s history of federal nuclear
weapons, power, and waste (e.g., Endres, 2012; Freudenburg, 2004; Kinsella, 2001,
2015; Walker & Wellock, 2010; Weart, 1988). In addition to the enduring distrust
between the agency and the public, interview data also pointed to a cultural resistance to
consent-based siting within the agency. Years of examining the agency’s culture
surrounding nuclear waste management informed DOE Contractor 3’s observation that an
attitude among career personnel in the agency is that they “don't think the public has
really anything useful to say. They’re the engineers and they know best and they know
what to do. I think that kind of permeates the place.”
Moreover, when the Obama Administration suspended the Yucca Mountain
licensing process and changed to a consent-based siting approach to nuclear waste
disposal, it effectively suspended over 20 years of work completed since the passage of
Nuclear Waste Policy Act amendment of 1987. DOE Contractor 3 observed that for
personnel who had spent their entire careers working on it, the Yucca project had become
their “identity.” Former DOE 2 corroborated this when sharing that when they heard that
the Obama Administration had cancelled the Yucca Mountain project in 2010, “If I had
been there [at DOE] at the time, it would have been difficult for me after putting so much
work into it.”
When you consider the technocratic attitude, DOE has historically taken towards
public participation and add the element of damaged identities, the Obama
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administration's push for consent-based siting was taking place within an already
unenthusiastic agency culture. DOE Contractor 1, with decades of experience working
with DOE on nuclear waste siting, was of the opinion that there were people at DOE who
“never really want [consent-based siting] to happen” because:
Yucca Mountain is a religion. If you don't believe that Yucca Mountain is the
greatest thing in the world and are ready to devote your life and lay it down on the
line, then you are viewed as a heretic. So, there are those who viewed any work in
the consent-based siting thing as sacrilegious.
Moreover, DOE Contractor 1 described the agency’s culture towards public participation
like this:
It's irresponsible to ask somebody who isn't good at something to be good at
something. We're asking DOE, who is genetically, culturally, and politically
incapable of engaging with the public, to engage with the problem. . . . They don't
want to do it, and they don't see any value in doing it.
Even though there was a big push for consent-based siting from the Obama
Administration and the political leadership of the agency, the culture among the agency’s
careerists was not open to the idea of greater public participation in nuclear waste
program design and decision-making.
These examples highlight how sensitivities to political pressures have been
institutionalized differently between NASA and DOE, while NOAA has been partially
protected from them. For DOE, “whiplash” from major changes in policy has created a
culture unenthusiastic of bringing in more public participation to bear on an already
tenuous policy direction. This is in addition to the technocratic attitudes they already have
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towards participation. An agency’s history of facing political pressures contributes to
shaping its culture concerning public participation.
Political Priority
The “Political Priority” condition is present if pTA was a part of an agency
program in a policy area where the current Presidential Administration has prioritized
progress and supports greater public participation to make that progress. Interview data
shows that when this condition is present, agencies and personnel may have greater
discretion to experiment with innovative forms of public participation in program design
and implementation. Interview data also shows, however, that changes in political
priorities due to changes in Presidential Administrations can prevent implementing a pTA
project regardless of progress made addressing other pressures and challenges. Like with
the “Agency Culture” condition, the NOAA case is scored “N/A.” Climate change policy
has ebbed and flowed as a general priority between Presidential Administrations. These
pTA exercises, however, were designed and implemented through the Environmental
Literacy Program, a longstanding element of NOAA’s Office of Education and not a part
of a specific program meant as a vehicle for a Presidential or Congressional priority.
In the NASA case, the Asteroid Initiative was the manifestation of two political
priorities from Congress and the White House that took place during the second Obama
Administration and its Open Government Initiative (OGI). The goal of the Obama
Administration’s OGI was to encourage transparency, public participation, and
collaboration in U.S. federal government agencies through a series of OMB memos and
incentives. NASA policy entrepreneurs capitalized on the administrative support for
innovative public participation in agency mission design decision-making from the OGI
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by using it to soften concerns surrounding the administrative rules and political pressures
regarding pTA. NASA 2 shared how they would often refer to OMB memo M-10-11,
“Guidance on the Use of Challenges and Prizes to Promote Open Government,” part of
the Obama administration’s OGI, to quell legal concerns regarding administrative rules
and to advocate the benefits of pTA (Ziens, 2010). According to NASA 2, M-10-11
addressed the “common questions around legal hurdles” to innovations concerning public
participation by Grand Challenges to promote public participation. Moreover, M-10-11
was “basically the permission to the agencies to say, ‘not only are we supportive of this,
but here's the reasons why these things are useful’” (NASA 2). In this case, the OGI
provided a backdrop that made designing and implementing pTA more politically
feasible within NASA at the time.
For the DOE case, this condition is scored as both present and absent because a
change in Presidential administrations explains the political support for and subsequent
suspension of the consent-based siting program. The Obama Administrations supported
the Blue Ribbon Commission’s recommendation of more public engagement and
participation through consent-based siting to make progress on nuclear waste siting and
disposal. While the pTA project was adopted in the last year of Obama’s second term,
Former DOE 1 shared that “there was no doubt in anybody's mind that this was going to
lead seamlessly into the Clinton Administration and that the consent-based siting effort
would continue.” When Donald Trump was elected President, however, “everything
stopped and you couldn't even use the word ‘consent’ anywhere (DOE Contractor 1).”
Corroborating this, DOE Contractor 2 shared that “the notion of consent was actually
stripped from the lexicon.” DOE Contractor 3 highlighted that once the Presidential
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transition began, “the whole program went away. None of those reports are even online
anymore.” In terms of the Trump administration’s approach to nuclear waste siting and
disposal, DOE Contractor 2 characterized it as:
“We don't want to go through all these labor-intensive processes to get to ‘Yes.’
They're going to cause trouble anyway. We're just going to do it. . . . Instead of
the court of public opinion, we'll just see you in court.”
The consent-based siting program, and the pTA exercises within it, went from having
strong political support during the Obama Administrations to being suspended by the
Trump Administration.
Policy Entrepreneurs
The “Policy Entrepreneurs” condition is present if there were agency personnel
who facilitated adopting, designing, and implementing pTA. Interview data shows that
when policy entrepreneurs are present, they use their administrative expertise to address
administrative challenges and their knowledge of an agency’s organizational culture to
address political pressures that come with using pTA as a vehicle for greater public
participation in program design and decision-making.
Four NASA personnel met Kingdon’s and other MSA scholar’s criteria for a
policy entrepreneur: NASA 1, 2, 3, and 5 (Cairney, 2018; Kingdon, 2011; Mintrom &
Norman, 2009). Their internal knowledge of the agency’s organizational culture and
politics made them sensitive to which political pressures and administrative challenges
pTA would face. Their administrative expertise of bureaucracy equipped them to help
navigate the political pressures and administrative challenges within the agency in ways
that ECAST would not have been able to do alone. For example, it was their decision to
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enter into a cooperative agreement that allowed them to work closely with ECAST to
garner agency support and to be able to address concerns from agency leadership as they
came up in the design and implementation process. During meetings to garner support
and update NASA leadership on pTA design progress and implementation plans, NASA
2 shared that it was not difficult to address concerns because “we thought about all the
things that people might be nervous about and we had answers to it about why they didn’t
need to be nervous about it.” NASA 3’s good relationship with the OGC staff helped
negotiate the administrative rules requirements in a way that did not drastically change
the pTA design. In the case of NASA, policy entrepreneurs within the agency were
central to navigating the obstacles that often came with the previously described
conditions.
In the NOAA case, one agency personnel met the MSA criteria for a policy
entrepreneur: NOAA 1. Even though this case of pTA was a grant funded through an
education program, NOAA 1 saw pTA as “very well-aligned with what we see as best
practice in community resilience education” and was something that could “get people to
take action and make behavior change” in line with NOAA's mission of science, service,
and stewardship. While the NOAA case did not face the same kinds of political pressures
and administrative challenges as the other two cases, NOAA 1 was an advocate of pTA
and supported its design and implementation as something beneficial to the agency.
The DOE case did not have any policy entrepreneurs within the agency who
facilitated the pressures and challenges encountered by designing and planning the
implementation of pTA. DOE Contractor 3 observed that the DOE manager for the pTA
project was “young” in the sense that they had not been at DOE very long and was an
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engineer working on a social science project. This made it difficult for them “to grasp the
complexity of doing something like this” in the shadow of Yucca Mountain and the
agency’s larger culture towards public engagement (DOE Contractor 3). ECAST
members confirmed that their DOE point of contact, though pleasant to work with and
capable in many other ways, struggled with the mixed political and cultural signals being
sent to them when designing and planning the implementation of something so different
and controversial within the agency.
Table 4.4

Summary of Condition Scores in Each Case

Cooperative Agreement

Administrative Rules

"Top Cover"

Controversy

Agency Culture

Political Priority

Policy Entrepreneurs

pTA Implemented

NASA
DOE
NOAA

Political

Decision Support

Administrative

1
1
0

1
0
1

0
1
0

1
?
1

Low
High
Low

H/M
Low
N/A

1
1/0
N/A

1
0
1

Yes
No
Yes

The goal of the QCA approach is to explain how within sets of similar cases an
outcome occurred in some while in others it did not. This explanatory work is done by
identifying conditions and analyzing the relationships between them in and across cases.
For three cases of pTA in U.S. federal government programs in three agencies, the
different political and administrative contexts in each explain why the relationships
between conditions shaped the processes of designing and implementing pTA differently.
Some conditions, however, weigh heavier in some of these relationships than others.
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Below are four interpretations of the relationships between conditions, and how some
conditions carry greater weight in shaping these relationships.
Implications
Interpretation
From the analysis of how each of the eight conditions informed each case, I make
four claims about what most explains how pTA was successfully implemented in these
three U.S. federal agencies. First, in the case of NOAA, two conditions creating the
context of this case makes it an outlier. Unlike the NASA and DOE cases, pTA at NOAA
was not meant as a decision support element in program design and decision-making.
When pTA is used as a decision support, it increases the likelihood of facing political
pressures and administrative challenges. Additionally, it was designed and implemented
through a well-established education funding program in a uniquely organized agency.
This insulated pTA exercises at NOAA from many of the political pressures and
administrative challenges that were faced at NOAA and DOE. The combination of these
conditions made it a minimal political risk for the agency.
Second, an agency’s culture can serve as an indicator of how it will approach the
political pressures and administrative challenges that come with embedding public
participation into program design and decision-making. Of course, some of the relevant
aspects of an agency’s culture can only be known through the process of designing and
implementing pTA. A general sense of how it will approach greater public participation
in program design and decision-making, however, can be inferred from its history. Take
the differences between NASA and DOE. While NASA may have a limited history of
engaging with the public to make program design decisions, it has historically been quite
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aware of its dependence on public approval for its political capital (Kaminski, 2012;
Lambright, 2010). When adopting, designing, and implementing pTA in the Asteroid
Initiative, there was a general openness to the idea given how it was a means of reaching
a public audience outside of its usual supporters. Compared to DOE, which carries with it
a history of military secrecy, technocratic avoidance of public engagement, and high
levels of distrust with the public, it was perhaps unsurprising that it would approach pTA
and the larger consent-based siting approach with apprehension, or at least a lack of
enthusiasm, even if there was political support for it at first. The interview data collected
from the NASA and DOE cases are evidence for how historically shaped institutional
cultures respond to innovative approaches to public participation. In short, the more open
an agency has historically been to public engagement and participation, the higher the
likelihood of investing resources into overcoming the political pressures and
administrative challenges that may come with designing and implementing pTA.
The third point follows from this observation about agency culture, namely, the
outsized role policy entrepreneurs within an agency play in navigating how an agency’s
culture will approach the political pressures and administrative challenges that may come
with pTA. Take the case of pTA in NASA. While ECAST members are expert scholars
and practitioners in the field of public participation in science and technology decisionmaking, the four NASA policy entrepreneurs were experts in the bureaucratic aspects of
what was needed to address the political and administrative concerns that the agency’s
culture would focus on. They chose to enter into a cooperative agreement with ECAST so
they could better address concerns from agency leadership about pTA as a decision
support element in ways only they would have known. It was through their administrative
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expertise and organizational relationship that the administrative challenges to pTA were
overcome. The presence of policy entrepreneurs changes the impacts other conditions
will have on pTA design and implementation. If it is the bureaucratic contexts of political
pressures and administrative challenges that often make embedding pTA in government
decision-making difficult, it may take the bureaucratic expertise of agency personnel
acting as policy entrepreneurs to mitigate them.
Lastly, and to complicate the policy entrepreneur observation, the DOE case
demonstrates that even without policy entrepreneurs to shepherd pTA through an agency
with a culture resistant to public engagement and the many political pressures and
administrative challenges facing consent-based siting, the pTA project was progressing
towards implementation. It was a change in the Presidential Administration’s priorities
towards nuclear waste disposal that suspended the entire federal consent-based siting
program and canceled the pTA project. Policy entrepreneurs may not have been able to
change that outcome. The shift in political priorities between Presidential
Administrations is the condition that most explains why pTA was implemented in NASA
but not at DOE. On the other hand, if pTA is an element of decision support for an
agency program, and barring shifts in Presidential political priorities during the design
and implementation planning processes, the work of policy entrepreneurs within an
agency was the condition that most explains how pTA navigates the political pressures
and administrative challenges during the design and implementation processes.
This last point raises an important question concerning the sustainability of
innovative efforts in public participation like pTA in agency program design and
decision-making. Of the two cases where the “decision support” condition was present,
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NASA and NOAA, neither agency has undertaken another pTA effort since these in 2014
and 2016, respectively. Shifts in policy priorities and approaches of the Trump
Administration, especially in the DOE case, have limited opportunities for greater public
participation in decision-making, in general. What can be done to institutionalize pTAlike exercises in agency program decision-making to shield them from shifts in political
priorities? NASA 4 and 5 independently shared the idea of institutionalizing within the
agency pTA for missions or programs that will cost $1 billion or more as a way of
gauging public approval. While this fits NASA’s agency culture where public approval
equals political capital, these kinds of pTA triggers would still likely be subject to shifts
in political priorities, especially controversial and costly program with high public
visibility. STS practitioners embedding pTA into government decision-making processes
will have to grapple with the ebb and flow of the larger political environments, just as
they will have to grapple with the combination of conditions that create the context of
any government science and technology program.
Conclusion
This chapter set out to achieve two goals. First, to identify the set of political and
administrative conditions that supported or constrained implementing pTA in three cases
– NASA’s Asteroid Initiative, DOE’s consent-based siting program, and through
NOAA’s Environmental Literacy Program. This will contribute to our STS theory and
practice a better understanding of the political pressures and administrative challenges
(i.e., political controls) federal agencies and their personnel face when embedding
innovative forms of public participation into program design and decision-making. Using
the QCA approach, I found eight political and administrative conditions that explain how
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pTA was successfully implemented or not in each of the three cases. These eight
conditions speak to the suite of administrative, political, or organizational aspects that
informs the pTA design and implementation processes. Of the eight conditions, two most
contribute to explaining how whether or not pTA was implemented – the presence of
policy entrepreneurs, and the changes in political priorities that come with new
Presidential Administrations.
The second goal is to highlight the outsized role policy entrepreneurs within
agencies play in navigating the political pressures and administrative challenges that
come with designing and implementing pTA in U.S. federal agency program design and
decision-making. While pTA was designed and could have possibly been implemented
without the support of policy entrepreneurs in the DOE case, the process of designing
pTA faced several more delays and challenges when compared to the NASA case.
Agency policy entrepreneurs facilitated pTA by using their knowledge of the agency’s
culture and their administrative expertise to address the political pressures and
administrative challenges that came with designing and implementing pTA in ways
ECAST could not have done.
There are, of course, limitations to this analysis. First, there was an unevenness to
interviewee access between the three cases. Most noticeably, we were unable to interview
any current DOE personnel who were a part of the pTA project. The fact that they
declined to participate may be indicative of the political and organization culture of the
agency and may also speak to the general reluctance among agency employees about
speaking to researchers while the Trump administration was in power. About this,
however, we can only speculate. Second, this is a comparative analysis of only three
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cases of government-embedded pTA under different combinations of political and
administrative conditions. The eight conditions found, however, are general enough to
apply to other cases where innovative forms of public participation were embedded in
U.S. federal science agency decision-making, but also specific enough to identify the
individual political pressures and administrative challenges that can inform the design
and implementation processes. Moreover, this kind of knowledge and understanding of
these political and administrative conditions, along with the work policy entrepreneurs do
to navigate these conditions in support of pTA, can aid STS practitioners better
anticipate, or even mitigate, barriers to innovative forms of public participation in U.S.
federal government science and technology decision-making.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
Summary of Dissertation
The three essays at the heart of this dissertation engaged with two related gaps in
STS participatory theory and practice. The first is a gap in our participatory theory
concerning how we understand the bureaucratic contexts that create barriers to more open
and deliberative public participation in government science and technology decisionmaking. I argued in the first essay that due in large part to the “residual realist” (Chilvers
& Kearnes, 2020) trend in STS participatory theory and practice, we read bureaucrats’
resistance to public participation in government science and technology decision-making
primarily or only as antagonism towards lay perspectives because they do not or cannot
understand or contribute to the technical complexities of an issue. This kind of resistance
has led us to be dismissive of opportunities for embedded pTA, or question if such
opportunities would remain as “open” as we would like (Fiorino, 1990). This has,
consequently, led to a gap in our empirical knowledge of how bureaucratic contexts
shape the attitudes and behaviors of government agencies and personnel towards
implementing innovative forms of participation in program design and decision-making. I
suggested that public administration scholarship’s theory of political control can benefit
us in STS to “ecologize” our participatory theory and practice within the wider political
and administrative contexts that inform public participation in government decisionmaking processes. A sensitivity to the inherent political pressures and administrative
challenges that agencies and personnel face may help us not just better understand the
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barriers to innovations in participation but to also better recognize how they can be
addressed.
The empirical analyses in Essay Two and Three expanded on the details of how
political and administrative conditions shape the design and implementation of an
innovative form of public participation, pTA, and underscored the central role policy
entrepreneurs within government played in navigating these political pressures and
administrative challenges. Using Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Approach (Cairney, 2018;
Kingdon, 1984, 2011) in Essay Two, I identified and examined how the political and
administrative elements shaped the challenges to and opportunities for policy
entrepreneurs in NASA to use their bureaucratic expertise to facilitate the processes of
designing and implementing pTA for the agency’s Asteroid Initiative in 2014. This case
study highlighted how many of the political controls agencies face when innovating on
public participation requires the knowledge and skills of policy entrepreneurs within
government to create programmatic opportunities for adoption, design, and
implementation.
In the third essay, I used the Qualitative Comparative Approach (Berg-Schlosser
et al., 2009; Marx et al., 2014; Ragin, 1987, 2014) to identify eight political and
administrative conditions that informed the bureaucratic contexts for designing and
implementing pTA exercises for NASA’s Asteroid Initiative in 2014, DOE’s nuclear
waste consent-based siting program in 2016, and NOAA’s Environmental Literacy
Program in 2018. By analyzing the relationships between conditions for each case, I
made explanatory claims concerning which conditions most contributed to whether pTA
was ultimately implemented. Drawing mostly from the NASA and DOE cases, I found
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that two conditions most contributed to explaining how much of an impact political and
administrative factors would have on the design process and implementation – policy
entrepreneurs and changes in Presidential political priorities. The eight conditions found
are general enough to apply to other cases where innovative forms of public participation
are embedded in U.S. federal science agency decision-making, but also specific enough
to identify the individual political pressures and administrative challenges that can inform
the design and implementation processes. Moreover, this kind of knowledge and
understanding of these political and administrative conditions, along with the work policy
entrepreneurs do to navigate these conditions in support of pTA, can aid STS
practitioners better anticipate, or even mitigate, barriers to innovative forms of public
participation in U.S. federal government science and technology decision-making.
Summary of Limitations
There are some limitations to this research. In terms of theory and analytic
framework in Essay Two’s case study, MSA is typically used to examine larger-scale
policy change; how legislators are influenced to prioritize new approaches, how bills are
drafted, and ultimately passed, along with how flagship policy changes are made. While
applying it with some modifications to this case at the programmatic level has clearly
identified important processes and relationships, more research using it in this way will
develop its descriptive and analytic strengths as well as its weaknesses, and can build
upon the work other public policy and administration scholars are doing in this area (e.g.,
Fowler, 2019). The larger political processes described by Kingdon and MSA scholars
will need to be replaced with equally operational concepts concerning the bureaucratic
features of making changes to programmatic decision-making processes. Elements of
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public administration scholarship’s theory of political control, for example, can aid in
doing this.
In terms of methods, there are several limitations to highlight. First, there were
significant time gaps between when the pTA projects were being designed and when the
interviews were conducted. For example, there was a six-year gap between when the
Asteroid Initiative’s AGC was launched in 2013 and when the interviews were conducted
with NASA personnel and ECAST members in 2019. While interviewees recalled
important impressions and perspectives on the pTA projects, specific details may have
been lost to time; when interviewees were unsure about details, we either worked to
specify or corroborate them, or else we did not reference them in this study. Conducting
interviews closer to the completion of pTA exercises may have afforded greater
recollection of details from interviewees. Second, there was an unevenness to interviewee
access between the three cases. Most noticeably, we were unable to interview any current
DOE personnel who were a part of the pTA project. The fact that they declined to
participate may be indicative of the political and organization culture of the agency and
may also speak to a general reluctance among agency employees about speaking to
researchers while the Trump administration was in power. About this, however, we can
only speculate.
Relatedly, while I was able to conduct interviews with current and former agency
personnel along with contractors who have experienced the political and administrative
environments surrounding public participation in these programs, there was limited
access to mid-level managers and agency leadership throughout the agencies. Quite
simply, it became clear that it would be politically uncomfortable for our contacts in the
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agency to try to arrange those interviews, and it also became clear that others we might
have talked to would have had little interaction with the design and implementation of the
pTA itself. Even so, while interviews with them may have been sparse on the details of
pTA projects, mid-level managers and agency leadership may have had greater insight
into the political pressures each particular agency faced regarding innovative forms of
public participation in agency mission and program decision-making processes.
Wider Implications and Future Directions
These limitations motivate some suggestions for future research. Continuing the
work of “ecologizing” STS participatory theory and practice means gathering more data
on the details of the political and administrative conditions that shape the processes of
adopting, designing, and implementing innovative forms of public participation in
government science and technology program decision-making. Organizing these kinds of
embedded exercises are taxing enough, but investigating in parallel what political
pressures and administrative challenges agency personnel and managers anticipate as part
of innovating on public participation, and examining it in relation to the kind of work this
dissertation has undertaken, may aid STS practitioners anticipate challenges and
opportunities in real-time.
“Ecologizing” STS participatory theory and practice is a part of answering
Chilvers and Kearnes’ (2020) call for us to “enhance public trust, avert crises of expertise
and democracy, and build more socially responsive and responsible science and
innovation” (p. 347). This interventionist-oriented segment of the STS community shares
similar goals with the deliberative democracy segment of public administration, namely,
achieving the democratic goal of greater public participation at all levels of government
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decision-making (Ercan & Hendriks, 2013; Fung, 2015; Gutmann & Thompson, 2009;
Nabatchi, 2010). While the STS focus is on matters of science and technology, the shared
goal of participation above that which is currently mandated by law is framed as a way to
address, or at least temper, the issues of “democratic deficits” in citizen empowerment
and trust in government institutions (Durant, 1995). The COVID-19 pandemic in the
United States is a clear example of what can happen when government’s democratic
capital is not robust enough to sustain enough of the public’s trust in government (science
and technology) decision-making. While greater public participation in government
decision-making is not a panacea to these democratic deficits, it is foundational to
building public trust in government, in general, and in matters of science and technology,
in particular (Wynne, 1992).
The results of this dissertation research are but a small part of this larger
democratic project. While the intended audience of my dissertation is primarily the STS
community for the reasons articulated in Essay One, public administration scholarship
may also benefit from the bureaucratic details uncovered during the processes of
embedding these pTA exercises in federal programs. The political and administrative
conditions I have identified, along with the profiles I have drawn of policy entrepreneurs
at the programmatic level, can help us in both STS and public administration better
grapple with the processes that frustrate attempts to embed innovative forms of public
participation in government decision-making. A cross-pollination between STS
deliberation design and public administration’s political control theory for understanding
the behaviors of agencies and their personnel can produce a mutually beneficial
participatory theory and practice. This dissertation is an example of what this cross-
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pollination can look like and what it can yield. I suggest that further investigations into
similar cases of innovation in public participation in different programs within different
federal agencies in different social and political environments will add texture to our
knowledge of how political pressures and administrative challenges shape the adoption,
design, and implementation processes. In this way, we in STS and public administration
with an interventionist-oriented predilection towards deliberative democracy can be ever
more equipped to enhance public trust and avert crises of democracy in American
democratic government.
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APPENDIX A
Codebook for Case Study of pTA in NASA’s Asteroid Initiative

Specific applications of STS concepts that federal employees were interested in
Descriptions of how the NASA Asteroid Initiative was structured
References to how the four topics for the Citizen Forum were selected

Applied STS Interests

Asteroid Initiative Structure

Citizen Forum Topics

References to the kinds of questions and concerns agency personnel have about the value or
risks of public engagement/participation
References to how agency controls its public and political messaging
References to how Federal personnel had to be convinced of the value of participatory
public engagement; how they were convinced
References to criticisms against NASA's Asteroid Grand Challenge
ECAST member background and role; description of ECAST origins
References to Federal personnel with ties to ECAST prior to pTA project
References to ECAST's public engagement/deliberation method

Concerns about Public Participation

Control of the Message

Convincing Agency of Participatory
Public Engagement

Criticisms of AGC

ECAST Affiliation & Origin

ECAST Contacts in Agency

ECAST Public Engagement Method

Collaboration between Agency Policy References to how champions of public participation within agency were connected and
Entrepreneurs
collaborating

Description

Analysis Codebook for pTA in NASA’s Asteroid Initiative Case Study

Name

Table A.1
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Description
Description of the work ECAST had done previous to agency-specific project to build
reputation as a credible organization
References to the co-production of knowledge and materials between ECAST and agency
Experience in federal government agencies other than during the ECAST project
References to how ECAST and agency frame the goals of pTA
References to agency's history of public engagement
References to how the agency has historically used public engagement for policy- and
decision-making
References to how implementing a pTA event impacted the agency in terms of views on
public participation in policy- or decision-making; references to why more pTA has or has
not happened
Description of how ECAST and agency first connected
References to the initial ideas ECAST and agency had about what to do pTA on
References to how federal employees had internal knowledge of the politics and
organizational culture of their agency; how this knowledge facilitated their ability to
promote participatory public engagement/ ECAST pTA

Name

ECAST Reputation Building

ECAST-Agency Co-Production

Federal Experience

Goals for pTA

History of Public Engagement

History of Public Engagement for
Policy and Decision-Making

Impacts of pTA on Agency

Initial Agency-ECAST Connection

Initial Planning of pTA

Internal Knowledge of Agency
Culture and Politics
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Description
Reference to what kind of formal working relationship ECAST and agency had Cooperative Agreement, Contract, Grant; how the kind of formal working relationship
structure impacted the design and implementation of pTA project
References to the lack of dialogue-based public engagement by federal agencies; how lack
of this kind of engagement impacts the public and agencies
Reference to how agency managers adhere to messaging that strategically maintains
political agreements made with Congress and the Executive Administration
Moments where federal personnel admit a moment of insight into their agency's political
and organizational culture that was prompted by being interviewed
References from agency employees about how the support of certain supervisors/managers
is critical to realizing participatory public engagement event; referred to as "top cover"
Reference to the influence the Obama Administration Open Government Initiative had on
promoting pTA in federal agency
References to the role NASA's Office of Communications plays in controlling public
engagement
References to how federal agencies and employees have concerns regarding the Office of
Management and Budget; particularly the administrative rules surrounding public
engagement

Name

Kind of Formal Working
Relationship

Lack of Dialogue-based Public
Engagement in Agencies

Maintaining Political Balance

Meta-Revelation

Need for Critical Support from
Agency Managers; Top Cover

Obama Open Government Initiative

Office of Communications

OMB & Administrative Rules
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Description
Federal employee's position in agency during ECAST project; positions at agency before
and after ECAST project
References to how agency culture holds technical and scientific knowledge as prime to their
mission success; public input and participation is secondary
Reference to how the Prizes and Challenges program at NASA helped promote ECAST
project
References to how trust in ECAST's public engagement method needed to be built
References to how the public is framed as understanding scientific and technical
information
Federal personnel making recommendations on how to incorporate innovation into public
engagement and/or pTA into agency decision architecture
References to the official evaluation criteria NASA used for assessing RFI submissions
References to how agency employees framed what members of the public should expect
from participating in an engagement event
How federal employees describe and speak of the public
Federal employee with academic training in STS or technology policy

Name

Position in Agency

Primacy of Technical Knowledge

Prizes and Challenges

Proving ECAST Method

Public Understanding of Science

Recommendations for
Institutionalizing pTA

RFI Evaluation Criteria

Setting the Public's pTA Expectations

Social Imaginary of the Public

STS Training
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APPENDIX B
Examples of Analytic Memos for Case Study of pTA in NASA’s Asteroid Initiative
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Cooperative Agreement
This analytic memo describes the formal working relationship between NASA
and ECAST. Specifically, how the cooperative agreement structure influenced the design,
planning, implementation, and reporting of the Citizen’s Forum pTA exercises. NASA
and ECAST did not enter into a conventional grant contract but instead into a cooperative
agreement for the Citizen Forum project. A conventional grant contract is “financial
assistance by the Federal Government that provides support or stimulation to accomplish
a public purpose” wherein an agency funds a project and only the contractor plans and
implements (OMB M-10-11). A “Cooperative Agreement” has the “additional criterion
that the agency expects to have substantial involvement with the recipient in carrying out
the activities contemplated in the agreement” (OMB M-10-11). Interviewee 6 described
cooperative agreement as “one where both, both sides were contributing to conducting
the activity.”
The interview data demonstrates that the cooperative agreement structure of the
working relationship between NASA and ECAST is central to explaining how it was
possible to design and implement ECAST’s pTA method. The data highlights at least
three reasons:
1. It facilitated building trust in ECAST’s method of public participation.
2. It facilitated designing, presenting, addressing concerns about, and reporting on
the project in a manner sensitive to the agency’s cultural and political dynamics.
These two were possible because the cooperative agreement structure allowed NASA
employees to use their internal knowledge of the agency’s cultural and political dynamics
to navigate obstacles in ways ECAST would not have been able.
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3. It facilitated cultural and political feasibility associated with the financial
feasibility of the project.
Instrumental to Building Trust in ECAST’s pTA
Having champions of public participation in technical decision-making (see
Analytic Memo 1) inside of NASA helped lend a kind of credibility to the project and
facilitated trust- building with agency leadership that would not have been possible by
ECAST alone. According to Interviewee 4:
We deliberately chose to do this by way of a cooperative agreement. It was not a
grant. That was really, that's a really important point because…it wouldn't have
carried weight as much, you know, I don't think if, if it had been exclusively left
to ECAST to do. I think that's a really important point, which is that the, it needed
to be collaborative to be bought into and trusted, I think by, by NASA, you know,
leadership.
A cooperative agreement structure was instrumental to building trust in ECAST’s method
of public participation because it brought credibility to the project from internal
promoters. While ECAST had a strategy to build trust in and demonstrate the value of
their method of public engagement method (see Analytic Memo 6), ECAST lacked an
internal knowledge of the agency’s culture, the kind of knowledge needed to address the
usual concerns NASA leadership and technical staff have about public participation (see
Analytic Memo 9 & 10).
Sensitivity to the Agency’s Cultural and Political Dynamics
Formalizing the working relationship between ECAST and NASA as a
cooperative agreement allowed NASA employees to utilize their internal knowledge of

191
the agency (see Analytic Memo 1, section 3). This was especially useful in strategically
designing, presenting, addressing concerns about, and reporting on the results of the
project in a manner sensitive to the agency’s cultural and political contexts. According to
Interviewee 4, the cooperative agreement structure:
gave us a, the ability to, I mean, quite honestly control it, you know, to, you
know, to the degree that we feel like, and, and not, and I don't mean that in a like
in a negative sense either, because I feel that we're also, I mean arguably we're
more in touch with what our, you know, what's kind of politically permissible
within the agency.
Interviewee 4 speaks to how the active involvement of internal NASA champions in the
project allowed them to “control” certain aspects of the process in order to help it align
with what is “politically permissible within the agency”, thus increasing the likelihood of
implementation. To put it a different way, Interviewee 4 stated that “we wanted to do this
as a cooperative agreement because it was so relevant from a practitioner point of view.”
From the perspective of employees at NASA, as practitioners of government projects that
sought new and innovative ways of engaging with the public, a cooperative agreement
structure would enable them to steer the project in line with Obama-era open government
policies (see Analytic Memo 11).
The above quote, however, also highlights a tension of the cooperative agreement
structure. Arguably, ECAST’s submission would not have been selected, nor would have
the Citizens Forum project been implemented, if not for the internal champions positions
in the agency and their knowledge of the agency’s political and organizational culture
(see Analytic Memo 1; also see Analytic Memo 11 for further detail on the policy contexts
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that made ECAST’s submission politically feasible). At the same time, the power
dynamic between NASA (a federal agency and the principal) and ECAST (a nongovernmental organization and the agent) complicates the degree of collaboration that
was possible in at least two related ways. First, the extent to which the NASA team
pushed the project in directions that increased the feasibility of agency acceptance at the
cost of restraining ECAST’s participatory engagement method. Second, the extent to
which the project was politically motivated (i.e. just for increasing public support for
NASA or appeasing important political figures) versus a genuine attempt at public
participation in NASA project design and decision-making.
ECAST interviewees spoke directly to their thoughts on these tensions. In terms
of the first tension, Interviewee 3 shared their perspective on how the NASA team did not
push any specific position or idea in order to increase the feasibility of the project in the
agency. For example, part of the Citizen Forum was a section asking the public to vote
between two engineering options for the Asteroid Redirect Mission (see Analytic Memo 3
&13 for further detail on the Asteroid Redirect Mission and the Citizen Forum content,
respectively). While people at NASA had their preferences about which option was better
in terms of engineering, Interviewee 3 stated that when it came to the NASA team
working on the Citizen Forum, “nobody seemed to be, um, ‘I believe this is the right
answer and we have to make sure that's the one that public comes to’. They seem to be
okay with either direction, which also is an unusual situation.” The NASA employees
helping with designing the forum did not pressure to frame the two engineering options
differently in order to favor one over the other, even if they had knowledge of who at
NASA, especially leadership, preferred which option.
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In terms of the second tensions, Interviewee 13 shared that, “through the whole
entire process, I myself never felt that [NASA was] trying to throw an agenda down our
throat that we would then, like, be parrots on their behalf to the public.” A way in which
the ECAST team substantiated this, as recounted by Interviewee 13, was to ask NASA if
they had any preferences as to which cities should host the forums:
I can recall during the, uh, call that Interviewee 11 was on where he asked NASA
that, you know, if we were to have two or three of these locations depending on
the budget set up for the public forum, did they have a particular, um, location?
Did they have locations in mind that they wanted us to host these events at? And
they thought for a little bit and they said, “no, not really”. Um, and after or during
the call at some point, I remember Interviewee 11 saying, “well, that's the right
answer because if you told us it had to be here, has to be there, we wouldn't be
able to do this project because then I know it's politically motivated”; they were
just trying to get, like, the congressman or senator brought in…They were
actually trying to sincerely get some feedback here from the public.
According to the members of the ECAST team, who collectively have decades of
experience in the science and technology policy field, academically and in practice, they
interpreted the NASA team’s intentions and input into project design as sincere; not
politically motivated or intent on turning the project into a public relations project.
A member of the NASA team with graduate training in STS spoke directly to this.
Speaking for themselves, Interviewee 12 shared that they:
did have some people after the fact say like, "oh, this seems like NASA, just
putting the screws and trying to get some like generic thumbs up from the public".
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In everything that I did, I, I, I honestly don't care if NASA gets more public
support or not. Um, like I genuinely, from my undergraduate work, like I think it's
the right thing to do for us to embed public values in our decisions. So for
whatever intent I had, it was, it was not this sort of stereotype of, trying to sort of
grease the skids for public support.
On behalf of the NASA team on the Citizen’s Forum project, Interviewee 12 went on to
share:
Um, I felt like we kind of stood back. We, we viewed the ECAST as the experts
in making content accessible. Um, I, we didn't try to make them sort of say like,
"Yay, the asteroid redirect mission is great". There was no way in which we were
trying to do anything like that.
The NASA team’s training in STS concepts of participatory technical decision-making in
government, along with the ECAST team’s expert sensitivity to federal agency’s
tendencies to use public engagement as a vehicle for increasing public support for NASA
or appeasing important political figures tempered concerns of the project being
detrimentally influenced by the power dynamic between the two organizations.
Cultural and Political Feasibility
The cooperative agreement structure helped increase the political feasibility of the
pTA project by making it a small financial risk. According to Interviewee 1 [ECAST],
the Asteroid Grand Challenge members of the NASA team provided $150,000 for the
Citizen Forum project while ECAST, through Arizona State University, provided
$50,000. This $200,000 budget, however, was just the cost of implementing the Citizens
Forum at two sites, Phoenix and Boston. No one from the ECAST team was compensated

195
for their work; a payment-in-kind. Interviewee 1 went on to estimate that if the project
had been done under a “normal scheme”, or contract structure, the price tag would have
been at least $500,000.
The lower cost to planning and implementation made the project what
Interviewee 6 described as a “low dollar value gamble” in the eyes of NASA program
managers and agency leadership. Interviewee 8 corroborated by sharing that “if the, the
science or engineering program offices had a choice, they probably wouldn't fund it out
of their own pockets”, preferring that limited funds go to “instruments or a grad student
or on somebody doing the technical work.” The cooperative agreement structure allowed
the Citizen Forum project to be a low financial risk, making it both financially feasible
and more politically feasible for the agency.
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NASA’s Political Pressure Points
This analytic memo describes the political pressures NASA navigates in order to
maintain alignment with its political stakeholders. The interview data sheds light on the
political pressures that motivate the agency’s concerns about public participation into
their mission priorities, designs, and decision-making processes. Insight into how NASA
navigates these political pressures is central to understanding the organizational contexts
that inform the agency’s relationship with public participation. This memo will touch on
three points:
1. ECAST’s member’s opinions on NASA’s political savvy.
2. Insight from NASA employees of the agency’s political pressure points.
3. Observations from ECAST members of how they experienced the NASA team
navigating these pressure points.
ECAST’s Observations on NASA’s Politics
ECAST researchers, experts in the field of science and technology policy, shared
their observations about NASA’s political savvy. When discussing NASA’s successes in
funding the international space station compared to the Department of Energy’s lack of
funding to complete the superconducting supercollider, Interviewee 11 noted:
if you think about why one of those happened and why one of those did not, I
think you have to come to the conclusion, quite frankly, that NASA does politics
better than physicists do…. NASA has some perhaps slightly more sophisticated
understanding of how to operate in a high stakes political environment.
Interviewee 11 explained that “the long-term high dollar value of individual projects
means that NASA has to work on the stability of its political environment, um, very, very
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well. And that requires both the, you know, direct contact with political decision makers
and the bank shot to the public as well.” For NASA to be able to continue funding its
projects, it needs to be acutely aware of its relationships with the political decision
makers controlling its budget and directives.
Insight from NASA Personnel of Political Pressure Points
In terms of political decision-makers controlling its budget and directives,
interviews with NASA employees reveal that the agency has a culture of acute political
sensitivity to its Congressional mandates and its White House directives. Interviewee 4
shared that “when NASA says stakeholders they are talking about a pretty narrow group
of stakeholders. NASA is talking about the presidential administration and the Congress,
political stakeholders.” While NASA has democratic stakeholders in the American public
and commercial stakeholders in its aerospace technology contractors, the agency has two
political stakeholders: the political body that controls its budget and legislates its
mandates (i.e., Congress) and, as a mission-driven agency, the office that directs its
mission objectives (i.e., the Executive).
Interviewee 4 added that after nearly twenty years of being involved with NASA
policy, the agency has a heightened awareness about its relationship with Congress and
the White House. According to Interviewee 4, NASA is “paranoid about disrupting
whatever balance it thinks, you know, the, the leadership thinks it has and agreements
that it has with, um, um, the White House and the Congress.” An example of the
“paranoia” is when agency leadership is deciding what kinds of projects to undertake and
how those projects are presented to the public and its political stakeholders. Interviewee 4
described an instance when a project appeared to be something different from what the
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political stakeholders had sanctioned. They articulated the agency leadership’s position
as, “we couldn't possibly put that out there because we already knew what we were going
to do because it was already politically blessed.” Agency leadership is resistant to ideas
and projects because they are sensitive to maintain clear alignment with projects and
policies that have been “politically blessed” by Congress and the White House.
The ECAST submission for a pTA exercise was a kind of project that could
disrupt the alignment with the “politically blessed” ideas from Congress and the White
House. While Analytic Memo 9 details the variety of concerns that members of the
NASA project team articulated about public participation in the agency’s policy- and
decision-making processes, some of these concerns were about how public participation
could deviate from what has already been “politically blessed” by its political
stakeholders. Interviewee 6 articulated that “some people might see risks associated with
asking the public what they think and then does that mean you have to do what they say?
You know, from like a public perception standpoint.” Interviewee 4 reiterated this
concern as, “what if the public, you know, comes in and says, you know, we think we
should do something 180 degrees different than what we've already got an agreement to
do?”
According to Interviewee 4, however, these kinds of concerns about how public
participation may disrupt the “politically blessed” agreements, “really comes from our
comms and legislative folks more so than our senior leadership, I mean like the technical
senior leadership.” Interviewee 6 corroborated that this concern is “more of, like, a
communications office fear usually like, you know, a hesitance maybe to talk about
planning before a decision has been made.” NASA’s Office of Communications and the
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Office of Legislative Affairs police the agency’s projects and information dissemination
in order to protect the “politically blessed” arrangements between NASA and its political
stakeholders (see Analytic Memo 4 for more detail on how NASA’s Office of
Communications controls the agency’s messaging in order to maintain political alignment
with Congress and the White House). This latter addition, a hesitance to talk about
something before a decision has been made, is a dimension of controlling the agency’s
message in order to avoid speculation that NASA is entertaining ideas and pursuing
projects that have not been “politically blessed” beforehand.
Observations from ECAST on NASA Personnel Navigating Political Pressures
While this hesitance was attributed to the Office of Communications, the ECAST
members of the project shared their observations of how the NASA team on the project
were also concerned about controlling the flow of information both inside NASA and
externally to the public and the agency’s political stakeholders. Interviewee 5 observed
that during the planning stage of the project, the NASA team was:
very concerned about the wrong kinds of information getting out. Very image
conscious. So you know, everything had to be checked with, all right, is this, is
this ah, is this question going to cause some kind of backlash outside of NASA?
There, there, there was a lot of kind of, it almost seemed like paranoia that like if,
if this information got into the wrong hands or people saw this kind of thing in the
wrong way, that there could be some kind of public backlash against NASA.
Interviewee 5, an ECAST member, independently corroborates the “paranoia”
description Interviewee 4, a NASA employee, articulated. The concern is that public
backlash because of uncontrolled information could motivate Congress or the White
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House to question NASA’s policies, potentially putting into jeopardy the “politically
blessed” agreements.
Additionally, Interviewee 5 also corroborated the concern regarding public
participation in decision-making processes articulated by Interviewee 4 and 6.
Interviewee 5 stated:
there was also a lot of concern about, you know, they didn't want people to think
that we were using this to make any kinds of decisions, right. So it had to be
really clear that the information that was being used was not being used to some
kind of final decision, right. It's not, it's not a, it's not, but that they didn't use it,
but they didn't want people to go, oh, "this is replacing some kind of decisionmaking process."
This speaks to a concern that public participation in the agency’s decision-making
process could be seen by officials in the agency and the larger federal government as
replacing the conventional process that is mostly aligned with the projects that are
“politically blessed” by Congress and the White House.
This sensitivity to political perceptions extended into the reporting phase of the
Citizen Forum project. Interviewee 5 also noticed that the NASA team:
were very careful about that being publicized before they actually had a chance to
see the results and see what the results said, right? I remember like when we were,
when we were analyzing the results you know, we had to be very careful about
who we were sharing this with. And we couldn't announce things until they said it
was okay. And this, this was pretty late, right?... they were just carefully
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managing the messaging on this and carefully managing when people learned
about what we were doing.
The NASA team, sensitive to how the Office of Communications and the Office
of Legislative works to maintain political alignment with Congress and the White House,
were aware of the need to control when and how to publicize the results of the Citizen
Forum. The ECAST-NASA final report took the additional precaution to disclaim that
“any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material
are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration or the institutions with which the authors are
affiliated” [28]. And that
opinions and analysis in this report reflect ECAST and the authors’ opinions, and
do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration or the United States Government. ECAST also takes responsibility
for the content of the background material here, which was created for
deliberation and research purposes and not for establishing policy or technical
briefings [28].
Not only do these disclaimers provide evidence for not wanting to disrupt “politically
blessed” projects by distancing the agency from the analysis, opinions, findings, and
conclusions or recommendations made in the report, but also provides evidence for the
institutional hesitance to talk about something before a decision has been made for the
same reasons.
Interviewee 5’s observation of the NASA team’s desire to control the information
speaks to Interviewee 4’s comment about controlling the project; it stems from wanting
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to manage how information is presented so as not to disrupt political peace within and
outside the agency. NASA, its leadership and as an agency, due to “the long-term high
dollar value of individual projects” and its executive directives, has created a political
culture keen on guarding its budgetary and project discretion interests. As such, it is
sensitive to anything that may foster speculation on projects that do not align with what
has been “politically blessed” by Congress and the White House. Adopting and
implementing the Citizen Forum project involved navigating these political pressure
points.

